UNIVERSITY OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

Caribbean Small Island State Security

And

United States Hegemony in the Caribbean Region

By

Roger Baird

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Arts,

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

The Degree of Masters of Arts in Island Studies

CHARLOTTETOWN, PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

May 2011

UNIVERSITY OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

FACULTY OF ARTS

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Arts acceptance of, a thesis entitled “Caribbean Small Island States and United States Hegemony in the Caribbean Region”, submitted by Roger Baird in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN ISLAND STUDIES.

_____ _____

Dr. Barry Bartmann, Supervisor Date

Department of Political Studies

University of Prince Edward Island

_____ _____

Dr. Henry Srebrnik, Internal Examiner Date

Department of Political Studies

University of Prince Edward Island

_____ _____

Dr. Paul Sutton, External Examiner Date

Department of Caribbean Studies

London Metropolitan University

Acknowledgements

Completing a thesis is a challenge. Thanking all those who contributed to my journey is an even greater one. I am grateful to everyone, too numerous to mention individually, who had a role in my thesis. There are a few people, however, that I must thank personally.

I would probably still be pondering over the direction of my thesis if I would not have found my way back to Dr. Barry Bartmann's office. Not only has he been my supervisor and mentor, but ever the consummate gentleman. Dr. Bartmann's intellect and inspiration have been a source of sound guidance, learning and support to me for many years.

Dr. Henry Srebrnik and Dr. Paul Sutton, my internal and external thesis committee members, to whom I am deeply indebted for their direction, assistance, time and good nature.

Scott Burke, who's unwavering, friendship, encouragement, time, incredible command of the English language and comments on endless drafts have been pivotal in my thesis journey.

The Faculty of Arts, especially Dean Richard Kurial, and everyone involved with the Master of Arts in Island Studies for your professionalism, collegiality, and support.

University of Prince Edward Island Robertson Library staff, for their assistance and resourcefulness over the years in assisting me find even the rarest of books.

Colleagues and friends who believed in me, thank you for being there for me.

Thank you to my entire family for your love, and support.

Above all, I thank my wife, Crystal, who has stood by me and encouraged me constantly.

Abstract

The emergence of Caribbean small island states (SIS) through the 'demonstration effect' has resulted in even some of the smallest Caribbean islands achieving sovereignty. Past conventional security threats, such as the 1983 coup and intervention in Grenada, have resulted in the US Commonwealth Caribbean relations being interpreted in the context of US hegemony. Such an interpretation has been pejoratively interpreted as being negative, and therefore having a negative impact on Commonwealth Caribbean SIS. However, increasing recognition of unconventional security threats in the Caribbean (such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration, money laundering and gun smuggling) have led to the direct and indirect involvement of the United States (US) in the region's security agenda through increased regional cooperation. Despite negative connotations of US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean, the US role in Commonwealth Caribbean SIS security can be considered that of a mentor state. This thesis will argue pejorative negative interpretations of US hegemony, in the context of the 1983 US invasion of Grenada, to assert that non-conventional threats are the predominant security threat to Commonwealth Caribbean SIS.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Maps

Chapter 1: Introduction

The Emergence of Small Island Developing States

Microstates have found an active role in the international system,[1] a role that was once marginalized and perceived as minimal in the international community due to the open question of small state viability and security.[2] Many felt very small size "precluded the capacities necessary for the exercise of sovereignty.[3] Nonetheless, the decolonization of the post WWII era resulted in the proliferation of smaller states, leading to 45 microstates in the international system, of which 32 are small island developing states (SIDS), in the international community.[4] Table 1 below lists the current SIDS in the

---

[1] The Commonwealth Secretariat's benchmark or cut-off of 1.5 million will be used to define a microstate.
For discussion on the definition of a small state see: Commonwealth Advisory Group, *A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997), 8-9. (hereinafter *A Future for Small States*).
For discussion on the international system see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 9-16. (hereinafter *The Anarchical Society*).
For discussion on islands see: Godfrey Baldacchino, "Editorial Introduction", *Tijdschrift Voor Economishce En Sociale Geografie - Journal of Economic and Social Geography - Island Studies* 95, no. 3 (2004): 269-271.

[2] George Abbott provides insight into the definition of viability where he notes that viability is "defined in terms of the minimum criteria necessary for supporting a modern industrial state." However, Abbott elaborates that "very few of the developing countries, regardless of their size, can claim to be viable in this sense." He also suggests that such criteria are inaccurate due to the application of "standards and criteria set by political, social and economic developments taking place in the developed countries", and that such criteria "are not only unattainable but also quite unnecessary for small states."
George Abbott, "Small States - The Paradox of Their Existence," *Development Policy in Small Countries*, ed. Percy Selwyn (London: Croom Helm in association with the Institute of Development Studies, 1975), 107-108. (hereinafter "Small States - The Paradox of Their Existence").

[3] Barry Bartmann, "The Microstate Experience: Very Small States in the International System" In *Hvitabok (the White Book)*, September (Torshavn: Foroya Landstyrri, 1999), 2. (hereinafter "The Microstate Experience").

[4] A small island state for the purposes of this study is a microstate, but also an island. The definition of an island is elusive and is widely discussed in the discipline of Nissology. Stephen Royale, in a *World of Islands* addresses the definition of an island as 'a piece of land surrounded by water' is inaccurate as "some accepted islands are not surrounded by water, and not all pieces of land surrounded by water are called, or are regarded as islands." Royale concedes that a response "cannot be given satisfactorily, unless one adopts the pleasing simplicity of Bill Holm's ruling 'an island is whatever we call an island'."
Godfrey Baldacchino, *A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader* (Charlottetown, P.E.I.: Institute of Island Studies, 2007), 52.

international community with their date of sovereignty, date of United Nations (UN) membership, their former colonial power and their population in the year when they attained sovereignty. SIDS have repeatedly been referred to throughout the literature as having an acute sense of island identity due to their defined territory, which speaks to their sense of separateness, regardless of size.[5] The proliferation of small states begs the question, why and how did the international system foster the current number of small states, particularly SIDS in the international system?

Bill Holm, *Eccentric Islands Travels Real and Imaginary* (Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions, 2000), 3.

[5] David Weale, "Islandness," *Island Journal* 8 (1991): 82.

Table 1:

State[6]	Sovereignty[7]	UN Membership[8]	Former Colony of[9]	Population[10]
Iceland	1944	1946	Denmark	127,000
Cyprus*	1960	1960	United Kingdom (UK)	563,000
Samoa	1962	1976	New Zealand (NZ)	116,000
Trinidad and Tobago	1962	1962	UK	900,000
Malta	1964	1964	UK	324,000
Maldives	1965	1965	UK	98,000
Barbados	1966	1966	UK	247,000
Nauru	1968	1999	Aus, NZ and UK	6,000
Mauritius	1968	1968	UK	787,000
Tonga	1970	1999	UK	90,000

[6] "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook, " https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed February 18, 2010,). (hereinafter "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook").

[7] *Ibid*.

[8] United Nations, "Member States," http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml. (hereinafter "Member States").

[9] "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook", s*upra* note 6.

[10] Population numbers are at the time of independence.
United Nations, "Demographic Yearbook – Statistics Division," http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2.htm. (hereinafter "Demographic Yearbook – Statistics Division").
*Note – the Republic of Cyprus is a former British Crown Colony, declared independent 16 August 1960. Data exclude persons in the military and special internment camps, numbering 12,422 at 1946 census.
United Nations, "Cyprus," *Demographic Yearbook - Statistics Division*, no. 12 (1960), 138-139.
However, The Treaty of London, which was abandoned in 1963 with the Great Cypriot Coup, witnessed Turkish Cypriots adopt a policy of *de facto* partition and presentation of a *fait accompli* to the London Conference to demand the separation of constitutional arrangement.
"Developments in Cyprus - January to February - Fighting at Limassol - British Government's Protest Against Importation of Arms - Strengthening of British Forces," *Keesing's Record of World Events* 14 (1963-1964): 20117.
External intervention from Greece and Turkey witnessed one third of the Island under Turkish control. This resulted in two different states with the emergence of the *de facto* state of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)in 1983. The TRNC was separate from Ankara as a self-governing jurisdiction and was only recognized by Turkey. Partition of the Island led to initiatives such as the Annan Plan, named after then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Despite its failure, "the entire island entered the EU on 1 May 2004, although the EU acquis - the body of common rights and obligations - applies only to the areas under the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot Government, and is suspended in the areas administered by Turkish Cypriots. However, individual Turkish Cypriots able to document their eligibility for Republic of Cyprus citizenship legally enjoy the same rights accorded to other citizens of European Union states."
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Cyprus - Introduction, " https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html (accessed January 11, 2011).

Fiji	1970	1970	UK	520,000
Bahrain	1971	1971	UK	220,000
Bahamas	1973	1973	UK	190,000
Grenada	1974	1974	UK	100,000
Comoros	1975	1975	France	300,000
Sao Tome and Principe	1975	1975	Portugal	80,000
Cape Verde	1975	1975	Portugal	30,000
Seychelles	1976	1976	UK	60,000
Solomon Islands	1978	1978	UK	213,000
Tuvalu	1978	2000	UK	7,000
Dominica	1978	1978	UK	81,000
St Lucia	1979	1979	UK	121,000
Kiribati	1979	1999	UK	58,000
St Vincent & the Grenadines	1979	1980	UK	119,000
Vanuatu	1980	1981	France and UK	118,000
Antigua and Barbuda	1981	1981	UK	76,000
St Kitts and Nevis	1983	1983	UK	46,000
Marshall Islands	1986	1991	United States (US)	40,000
Micronesia	1986	1991	US	98,000
Palau	1994	1994	US	16,000
Timor-Leste**	2002	2002	*Portugal/Indonesia	740,000[11]

**Portugal drew plans for East Timorese transition to independence in 1975, with Portuguese sovereignty ending in 1978. Pro-independence versus pro-integration movements led to civil war in East Timor resulting in Indonesian occupation of East Timor in 1975. East Timor was incorporated as Indonesia's 27th province in 1976 even though East Timor never recognized Indonesia's claim.
"East Timor - Formal Granting of Independence," *Keesing's Record of World Events* 48, no. 1 (2002): 44782.

[11] *Ibid.* at 44781.

The attitudes towards microstates and the issue of state size have roots in the perception of small states that date back to the Concert System in the early 19th century, where they were viewed, for the most part, as dependencies. The continued marginalization of microstates in the international community is exemplified by Liechtenstein's application to the League of Nations in 1920.[12] The issue of small size was denied as the reason of non-admission. Nonetheless, this suggested that "the smallness of a state does not prevent its being admitted into the League".[13] Even so, the League of Nations' decision in the case of Liechtenstein resulted in the hesitancy of other European small states as they withdrew their applications to the League of Nations, as seen in the case of Andorra. Luxembourg remained the single exception because of its history and army.[14]

---

[12] Liechtenstein is one of four historic European small states; the other three are Andorra, Monaco and San Marino. Three of the four petitioned the League of Nations for membership: San Marino (1919), Monaco (1920) and Liechtenstein (1920). The League of Nations observed "by reason of [Liechtenstein's] limited area, small population, and her geographical position, she has chosen to depute to others some of the attributes of sovereignty", as Liechtenstein had no army, and therefore "could not discharge all the international obligations which would be imposed on her", resulting in the non-admission of her application due to close connections with another state. Some of the examples cited include were control of customs; administration of posts, telegraphs, telephone services; diplomatic representation of subjects in foreign countries other than Switzerland and Austria; and final decisions in certain judicial cases.
Michael M. Gunter, "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations: A Precedent for the Nation's Ministate Problem?" *The American Journal of International Law* 68 (July 1974): 498. (hereinafter "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations").

[13] *Ibid.* at 499; League of Nations. "Report on the Second-Sub-committee to the Fifth Committee." *Records of the First Assembley – Plenary Meetings* (1920): 563-564. (hereinafter "Report on the Second-Sub-committee to the Fifth Committee").

[14] See Hudson's discussion on the special case of Luxemburg in that Luxembourg was seen as meeting obligations under Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant.
M. O. Hudson, "The Members of the League of Nations," *British Yearbook of International Law* 16 (1935). (hereinafter "The Members of the League of Nations").
Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant states:
Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of

The case of Liechtenstein in the League of Nations set a precedent for small states, as it was not until 1946 (with the admission of Iceland into the United Nations) that another microstate joined Luxembourg as an equal among the international community, and illustrated that the inclusion of microstates in the international system was considered more the exception than the rule.[15] Iceland also demonstrated that islands were to be considered strong candidates for sovereignty and self-determination due to the fact that island dependencies were already governed as separate jurisdictions which strengthened their claim for independence.

The first wave of decolonization witnessed the independence of larger colonies such as India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel within five years from the end of WWII.[16] The forces of decolonization influenced a second wave of decolonization that tested

---

the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.
It shall be the duty of the Council in such cases to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.
The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.
Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.
"Avalon Project - the Covenant of the League of Nations" http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp (accessed January 6, 2011,).

[15] Iceland is unique due to the extent of its geo-political importance and role as a founding member of NATO in 1949, considering that Iceland does not have a standing army.

[16] Rupert Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization*, Vol. 9 (Massachusetts: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1964), 35. (hereinafter Rupert Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization*).

the perceptions of small size. For instance, in 1958, Sierra Leone, with a population of 2.5 million, was considered a "borderline case"[17] implying that any smaller territories were viewed as being unviable to attain sovereignty.[18] Even though the British Colonial Office encouraged the federation of smaller countries,[19] the wave of decolonization of Africa in 1960 (See Table 2),[20] witnessed the self-determination of smaller and smaller territories with the independence of Gabon (population 446,000) and Mauritania (population 970,000) from France in 1960.

The push for self-determination by ever smaller entities influenced a second wave of decolonization which invoked a response from the United Nations, embodied in UN Resolution 1514 and UN Resolution 1541.[21] These resolutions strengthened the call to sovereign statehood, as demonstrated by the self- determination of small island colonies in the Commonwealth Caribbean. However, UN Resolutions 1514 and 1541 applied to colonial countries and

---

[17] *Ibid*.
[18] Hilary Blood, *The Smaller Territories, Problems and Future.* (London: Pub. by the Conservative Political Centre on behalf of the Conservative Commonwealth Council, 1958), 9-12,18,19.
[19] The UK colonial office encouraged the federation of smaller colonial territories, even to the extent of creating federations between mainland territories from different colonial powers. The union of the Gambia (UK) and Senegal (France) were formed but the challenges of integrating of two colonial political, economic, legal and social systems were too much to overcome.
[20] Ghana, with a population of 4,691,000, was the first African territory to demonstrate the ability to achieve sovereignty in 1957.
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook "Ghana", https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
[21] UN Resolution 1514 (XV) 14 December 1960: Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples which effectively led to the self-determination of blue water colonies, many of them islands, versus mainland sub national movements. UN Resolution 1541 (XV) 15 December 1960: Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73E of the Charter which allowed for the monitoring of political development of colonial territories.
United Nations "Resolution 1514 and Resolution 1541", http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/15/ares15.htm. (hereinafter "Resolution 1514 and Resolution 1541").

peoples and did not extend residual rights of self-determination to Nations within states. For example, the island of Mayotte was the only Island in the Comoros group of islands which chose to retain its links to France and forgo independence as a part of the Comoros.[22] Similarly, Anguilla chose to remain a dependency of Britain and forgo associate statehood as part of St. Kitts and Nevis.[23]

In addition, colonial powers aimed to create larger political entities out of their former colonies. This is illustrated by attempts at federation in Africa and in the West Indies. For example, in 1958, the British Colonial Office encouraged the union of UK colonies with the West Indies Federation, which was slated for independence from the UK in 1962. The federation was considered to be the formation of a larger, more viable state and seemed to be a more likely and successful course of action.[24] This sentiment was due to the recognition of similar political, economic and social structures, and the degree of integration already present in the region through shared institutions such as the University of

---

[22]Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Mayotte - Introduction and Disputes - International," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mf.html (accessed January 11, 2011).
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Comoros - Introduction and Disputes - International
," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cn.html (accessed January 11, 2011).

[23] The islands of St. Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla became an associated state of the UK with full internal autonomy in 1967. The island of Anguilla rebelled and was allowed to secede in 1971, retaining its links to Britain. Anguilla was formally recognized in 1980 as a separate British dependency.
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Anguilla - Introduction," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/av.html (accessed January 11, 2011).
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Saint Kitts and Nevis - Introduction
," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sc.html (accessed January 11, 2011).

[24] Anthony Payne, *The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79: Regional Integration among New States* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 14-15. (hereinafter *The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79*).

the West Indies.[25] However, "the demand for sovereignty could be as urgent and strong among the politically conscious in the smaller territories as in the larger; they were in no way abashed by the difficulties that freedom may bring."[26] The fervor of self-determination among island colonies is exemplified by the dissolution of the West Indies Federation in September 1961,[27] which led to the immediate self-determination of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.[28]

The independence of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago raised concerns over the remaining small colonies, but also encouraged the eventual self-determination of Barbados in 1966.[29] The self-determination of the largest entities of the planned West Indies Federation left the British Colonial Office with the predicament of what was to become of the remaining smaller island colonies in the Commonwealth Caribbean.

---

[25] *Ibid.* at 248.

[26] Burton Benedict, *Problems of Smaller Territories* (London: Pub. for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies by Athlone Press, 1967), 24. (hereinafter *Problems of Smaller Territories*).

[27] The challenges of integration of the West Indies proved to stall the integration process. The advancement of self-government on each of the island territories, economic prosperity by mainly Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, and "the acute sense of island nationalist identities led to the push for self-determination of the larger islands in the West Indies".
The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-7, supra note 24 at 22.

[28] The challenges of the West Indies Federation highlighted the vertical relationship the respective islands had with Britain rather than with each other, despite modest levels of integration in the region.
Ibid. at 36.

[29] Guyana, formerly British Guiana, a mainland British Colony, and part of the Commonwealth Caribbean gained independence 26 May 1966.
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Guyana - Government
" https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gy.html (accessed January 11, 2011).
Barbados gained independence 30 November 1966.
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Barbados - Government - Independence," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bb.html (accessed January 11, 2011).

Though the British Colonial Office in Whitehall encouraged the concept of decolonization, it was felt many of the smaller Commonwealth Caribbean island colonies were not ready for the responsibilities of statehood. Therefore, these smaller island colonies entered into the arrangement of associate statehood, where respective self-governments would be responsible for national affairs and were encouraged to engage in regional cooperation, but were spared the responsibilities of external affairs such as defense and international relations, which remained the responsibility of the British Colonial Office in Whitehall.

Where the push for self-determination emanated from British island colonies, the self-determination of dependencies was addressed with indifference and caution among other empires, as demonstrated by colonies of France, the Netherlands and Portugal. The French, who continue to covet the geopolitical importance of their 'outre de mere' to promote their international presence and influence, also benefited from steadfast 'departments' that promoted strong ties with France.

The Dutch devolved powers to their colonies, making them countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In doing so, they exemplify the caution afforded to self-determination, when Aruba in the Dutch Antilles opted to keep its status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1996 rather than pursuing sovereignty.[30]

[30] Gert Oostindie, "Dependence and Autonomy in Sub-National Island Jurisdictions*" The Round table*, Vol. 95 no. 386 (London: September 2006): 618.

Furthermore, in the Portuguese islands, the power of independence influenced emerging nationalist independence movements in Cape Verde and Sao Tome Principe as early as the 1950s.[31] However, the Portuguese insisted that they should keep control over their colonies despite the emergence of nationalist sentiments in Portuguese colonies. This led to Portugal's colonial wars from 1961 to 1974. The Colonial Wars influenced the Movement of the Armed Forces in 1974, where a political coup of junior-ranking officers in the army influenced the Carnation Revolution, also commonly referred to as the 25th of April Revolution. That Revolution resulted in a change of government and an end to the contentious Colonial Wars. The ending of the Colonial Wars witnessed the independence of Portuguese colonies, including Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe and East Timor in 1975.[32]

Appreciating the differences in approach among colonial powers towards their dependencies, it seems the proliferation of small states in the international system is due in part to the approach the British Colonial Office took. This is especially so if one considers the independence of the Maldives in 1965 with a population of 98,000, breaching "the tacit minimal size of 100,000."[33]

---

[31] US Department of State - Bureau of African Affairs, "Background Note: Sao Tome and Principe," http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5434.htm (accessed December 15, 2010).
Basil Davidson, "On Revolutionary Nationalism: The Legacy of Cabral," *Latin American Perspectives* 11, no. 2, (Spring 1984): 15-17, http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2633519.
[32] Lawrence S. Graham, "Is the Portuguese Revolution Dead?" *Luso-Brazilian Review* 16, no. 2 (Winter 1979): 147-159, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3513531.
Stewart Lloyd-Jones, "Portugal's History since 1974," ISCTE – Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa (Lisbon), http://www1.ci.uc.pt/cd25a/media/Textos/portugal-since-1974.pdf (accessed December 15, 2010).
[33] Barry Bartmann, "Very Small States at the Millennium: The Contest between Vulnerability and Opportunity," *Invited Paper at the International Colloquium of the Royal Commonwealth Society,*

This breach caused concern in the UN of the increased potential of having a General Assembly of Village States,[34] as the US and the UK expressed their concerns of having such a small state, like the Maldives, having the same "equal vote" as the US and Soviet Union in the UN.[35] Such concerns influenced an inquiry on small state membership to the UN and raised the question of "how to square formal voting power with the realities of international politics?"[36] Though the US supported Maldives admission to the UN, the US raised concerns of similar, small state membership to the UN. Moreover, (former) UN Secretary-General U Thant recognized the dilemma, as he stated, "it appears desirable that a distinction be made between the right of a ministate's independence and the question of full membership in the UN."[37]

Despite UN concerns of small states' abilities to meet UN requirements any classification of UN membership for small states "would run the risk of establishing discriminatory criteria which would detract from the sovereign

---

the Commonwealth at the Millenium Conference Centre (February 20, 1998), 2. (hereinafter "Very Small States at the Millennium").

[34] Urban Whitaker, "Mini-Membership for Mini-States," *War/Peace Report* 7 (April 1967), 3-5. P. C. Rao, "Microstates and the United Nations," *Indian and Foreign Review* 5 (November 15, 1967): 17,21.
Joseph R. Harbert, "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972," *International Organization* 30, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 109-127, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706250. (hereinafter "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972").

[35] Stephen M. Schwebel, "Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations," *The American Journal of International Law* 67, no. 1 (January 1973): 109, http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2199098. (hereinafter "Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations").

[36] Michael M. Gunter, "What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?" *The American Journal of International Law* 71, no. 1 (January 1977): 110, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2200327. ("What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?").

[37] *Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, 22 UN GAOR, SUPP. (No. 1A) 20, UN Doc. A/6701/Add.1 (1967). (hereinafter *Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization).*
Furthermore, the US and UK submitted proposals of associate statehood for small states to the UN.
"Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations", *supra* note 35 at 110-111.

equality of Member States,"[38] as it would run contrary to "the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" as outlined in the UN charter preamble and "to the sovereign equality of all its members",[39] under article 2 of the UN Charter. The UN's findings "shut the door to any attempts to limit ministate membership",[40] and maintained the sovereign equality of states despite size, and left the sovereignty option open to other small territories/colonies.

The independence and UN recognition of ever smaller states such as the Maldives demonstrated independence was a viable option for even the smallest of colonies and undoubtedly inspired Commonwealth Caribbean nations to pursue the sovereignty option.

Though discussions of federation ceased and resurfaced with proposals of political union among the smaller islands of the Eastern Caribbean, the acute sense of separateness among island identities was insurmountable. The perceptions of small statehood are exemplified by the initial view of Sir Eric Gairy, Premier of Grenada, who "accepted the logic that the smaller island territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean could not make their own way in the global system as sovereign states.[41]However, such views could not withstand the changing attitudes in the UN, the non-aligned movement (NAM),[42] the Group of

[38] UN Doc. S/AC.16/SR.6, at 7 (1970).
[39] "Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations", s*upra* note 35 at 112.
[40] "What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?", *supra* note 36 at 112.
[41] *Africa* (London), June, 1975, 23-24.
The Times (London), 28 June 1975.
[42]"Non Aligned Movement " http://www.nam.gov.za/ (accessed July 26, 2010).

77;[43]and the World Bank's shifting focus from 'reconstruction' to 'development.'[44] These changes ultimately altered the views of Sir Eric Gairy (who became Grenada's first Prime Minister in 1974) because they made sovereignty an option for small island territories

Emerging SIDS interests were also furthered through initiatives in regional cooperation creating regional institutions such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and, in particular, the Caribbean development Bank, "whose existence serves to sustain small economically unviable states."[45] Such initiatives provide microstates access to regional and international support, which ensure "their international legal personality and continued independence…." This exemplifies the principle of "extantism,"[46] which is described as" the sanctity of sovereignty of existing states, however small."[47] Extantism is the mutual recognition of each nation's sovereignty in addition to shared challenges in surviving in the international community, and addresses concerns of even the smallest of microstates being 'cast adrift'.[48] The principle of extantism is

---

[43] "The Group of 77 " http://www.g77.org/ (accessed July 26, 2010).
[44] *A Future for Small States, supra* note 1 at 119.
[45] *The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961*-79, supra note 24 at 274-275.
[46] Schaffer defines 'extantism' as the support for already existing nation states.
Bernard Schaffer, "The Politics of Dependence", *Development Policy in Small Countries*, ed. Percy Selwyn (London: Croom Helm in association with the Institute of Development Studies, 1975), 25, 34.
[47] Barry Bartmann, "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security," *Round Table* 91, no. 365 (July 2002): 372. (hereinafter "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security").
[48] This concern is expressed in the words of Shridath Ramphal, former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations: "Sometimes it seems as if small states were like boats pushed out into a turbulent sea, free in one sense to traverse it; but, without oars or provisions, without compass or sails, free also to perish. Or perhaps, to be rescued and taken aboard a larger vessel."
Commonwealth Secretariat. Consultative Group on the Special Needs of Small States, *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society: Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985), 119. (hereinafter *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society).*

exemplified by Eric Gairy's slogan "Independence will support Grenada; the people of Grenada do not have to support Independence."[49]

The independence of smaller and smaller states in the Commonwealth Caribbean instilled confidence in small island leaders that sovereignty was a viable option. This was especially so in the eastern Caribbean, where the self-determination of Grenada, the first of the 'tiny' islands to attain independence, inspired the smaller territories in the West Indies to pursue the sovereignty option. This inspiration of ever smaller states pursuing the sovereignty option in the Commonwealth Caribbean has been described by Vaughn Lewis as the "demonstration effect",[50] illustrated in Table 2, and engendered the sentiment that the preconception "relating size and sovereignty has been exposed as a myth."[51]

---

[49] *Trinidad Guardian*, 1 November 1972.

[50] Vaughn A. Lewis, Commentary on Basil Ince, "The Decolonization of Grenada in the United Nations," in Independence for Grenada: Myth or Reality? (Proceedings of a Conference on the Implications of Independence for Grenada," (St. Augustine: Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, 1974), 54. (hereinafter "The Decolonization of Grenada in the United Nations").
"Very Small States at the Millennium", s*upra* note 33 at 2.

[51] A. Lewis, " Small State is in the International Society: with Special Reference to the Associated States', *Caribbean Quarterly*, vol. 18, no. 2, (1972): 36-47 and 'Commentary' in Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, *Independence for Grenada – Myth or Reality?*, Port of Spain, 1974, 53-5.

Table 2:

State[52]	Sovereignty[53]	UN Membership[54]	Former Colony of[55]	Population[56]
Jamaica	1962	1962	UK	1,661,000
Trinidad and Tobago	1962	1962	UK	1,229,953
Barbados	1966	1966	UK	247,000
Grenada	1974	1974	UK	100,000
Dominica	1978	1978	UK	81,000
St Lucia	1979	1979	UK	121,000
St Vincent & the Grenadines	1979	1980	UK	119,000
Antigua and Barbuda	1981	1981	UK	76,000
St Kitts and Nevis	1983	1983	UK	46,000

The independence of ever smaller states continued to be reflected in the composition of international institutions as SIDS membership to the UN became commonplace, as every SIDS is a member. Furthermore, the independence of SIDS promoted the emergence of regional bodies such as the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which is comprised of the 'tiny' Eastern Caribbean islands.[57] Other SIDS regional bodies, such as the Pacific Forum,

[52] "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook", *supra* note 6.
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] "Member States", s*upra* note 8.
[55] "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook", *supra* note 6.
[56] Population numbers are at the time of independence.
"Demographic Yearbook – Statistics Division", *supra* note 10.
[57] Member states include: Anguilla-1995, Antigua and Barbuda-18 June 1981, British Virgin Islands-22 November 1984, Dominica-18 June 1981, Grenada-18 June 1981, Montserrat-Overseas dependency of UK, St. Lucia- 18 June 1981, St. Kitts and Nevis-18 June 1981, St. Vincent-18 June 1981. "Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) " http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/oecs.jsp?menu=community (accessed March 3, 2010). (hereinafter "OECS").

have emerged in the other significant cluster of SIDS, the South Pacific. South Pacific SIDS includes the following states in Table 3.

Table 3:

State[58]	Sovereignty[59]	UN Membership[60]	Former Colony of[61]	Population[62]
Samoa	1962	1976	New Zealand (NZ)	116,000
Nauru	1968	1999	Aus, NZ and UK	6,000
Tonga	1970	1999	UK	90,000
Fiji	1970	1970	UK	520,000
Solomon Islands	1978	1978	UK	213,000
Tuvalu	1978	2000	UK	7,000
Kiribati	1979	1999	UK	58,000
Vanuatu	1980	1981	France and UK	118,000
Marshall Islands	1986	1991	United States (US)	40,000
Micronesia	1986	1991	US	98,000
Palau	1994	1994	US	16,000

In addition to the larger clusters of the Commonwealth Caribbean and the South Pacific, a third area of SIDS with fewer states is found in the Indian Ocean.

Table 4:

State[63]	Sovereignty[64]	UN Membership[65]	Former Colony of[66]	Population[67]
Maldives	1965	1965	UK	98,000
Mauritius	1968	1968	UK	787,000
Comoros	1975	1975	France	300,000

[58] "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook", *supra* note 6.
[59] *Ibid.*
[60] "Member States", s*upra* note 8.
[61] "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook", *supra* note 6.
[62] Population numbers are at the time of independence.
"Demographic Yearbook – Statistics Division", *supra* note10.
[63] "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook", *supra* note 6.
[64] *Ibid*.
[65] "Member States", s*upra* note 8.
[66] "Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook", *supra* note 6.
[67] Population numbers are at the time of independence.
"Demographic Yearbook – Statistics Division", *supra* note10.

Seychelles	1976	1976	UK	60,000

The prevalence of SIDS regional cooperation reflects their recognition for collaboration in the area of development, but also of security, which captured the attention of the international community with the events of Grenada in the early 1980s. The events in Grenada put the question of small state security to the forefront of international security concerns as it demonstrated that the smallest states: "… are weakened by emigration, constrained by remoteness, and ultimately dependent on others for their very survival. They have, in consequence, a lowered capacity to absorb external shocks, no independent existence worthy of that name, and no future."[68]

However, such a bleak picture is not an entirely accurate depiction of small state security, as it has also been recognized that small states:

> "…have resilient political structures, sympathetic patrons among the major powers and good prospects for development in the exploitation of their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)."[69]

The initiatives of SIDS, regional bodies and international institutions promoting collective security have created "a world made safe for small states."[70] This inclusive atmosphere has also advanced the participation of dependencies or, more accurately, sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs), that have realized

---

[68] Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne, "Lilliput Under Threat: The Security Problems of Small Island and Enclave Developing States," *Political Studies* 41, no. 4 (December 1993): 592, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9501183528&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live. (hereinafter "Lilliput Under Threat").
[69] Ibid.
[70] Barry Bartmann, *A World made Safe for Small States* (Charlottetown: Institute of Island Studies, 1991). (hereinafter *A World made Safe for Small States).*

increased autonomy. This new found autonomy has witnessed SNIJs such as Aruba, Bermuda, Cook Islands and Niue enjoying characteristics approaching those of sovereignty.[71] As well, the international community has experienced a new phase of self-determination, witnessing the emergence of de facto states, most notably Bougainville. The emergence of de facto states has proven to create new challenges among members of the international community, particularly in the area of security and the manner in which it is perceived, and subsequent impacts on the international system as a whole.

The need for the study

The proliferation of very small states in the international community reflects the evolution of the international system and corresponding international relations and security concerns. The US invasion of Grenada in 1983 reaffirmed concerns over small state security, and led to an increased focus on conventional security threats to SIS and gained international condemnation. US intervention was portrayed as an attack on another sovereign state and constituted a major security concern to Commonwealth Caribbean states; ultimately, it was conveyed

[71] Aruba, part of the Lesser Antilles and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, is a SNIJ which enjoys a sub-national associate membership in UNSECO. Moreover, that the Cook Islands and Niue enjoy full membership in UNESCO, as Barry Bartmann points out, raises "intriguing questions concerning their legal status" as they demonstrate an "international legal personality" in their para-diplomacy activities despite being SNIJs of New Zealand. Furthermore, Bermuda demonstrates a special case of a British overseas territory, as it has provided input into issue areas which directly affect the island and has maintained para-diplomatic activity in a number of tourist offices throughout the US, in Toronto and in London, in addition to 14 consulates. However, Bermuda does not have a Representative office in London. Barry Bartmann, "In Or Out: Sub-National Island Jurisdictions and the Antechamber of Para-Diplomacy," *Round Table* 95, no. 386 (September 2006): 545,554-555.
See also, Godfrey Baldacchino, *Island Enclaves: Offshoring Strategies, Creative Governance, and Subnational Island Jurisdictions* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010).

in the context of US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean.[72] However, such pejorative negative connotations fail to illustrate the US as a neighboring state protecting the interests of international security, as demonstrated in Kuwait in the early 1990s.

In addition, the predominance of non-conventional security concerns, which extend beyond the confines of any national border, has proven to define the security agenda of small island states. The re-examination of the US role in the Commonwealth Caribbean, SIS security in non-conventional terms, and regional cooperation will reveal the nature of US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean in the context of the US as a mentor state to Commonwealth Caribbean SIS.

---

[72] Anthony Payne highlights that "the concept of hegemony has been much debated in the international political economy literature but it is best theorized in neo-Gramscian terms…." Anthony Payne, "Rethinking United States-Caribbean Relations: Towards a New Mode of Trans-Territorial Governance," *Review of International Studies* 26, no. 1 (January 2000): 73, http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/20097656. (hereinafter "Rethinking United States-Caribbean Relations").
Neo-Gramscians term hegemony as 'dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and leading social classes, but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful. Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 7. Robert Cox also suggests that 'there can be dominance without hegemony; hegemony is only one possible form dominance may take' Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 1, 1981), 153. However, John Agnew suggests, "Ultimately, hegemony is the global diffusion of economic, political and cultural practices originating from the activities of one nation- state." John Agnew, (ed.) Peter J. Taylor and Gerard Kearns, *Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis* "The United States and American Hegemony (New York: Halsted Press, 1993), 209-211. Therefore, the hegemonic power is dominant in all three spheres of economic activity, providing an economic base for the diffusion of its political and cultural institutions and practices. *Ibid*. at 207-238.

Hypothesis

The reaction to the US invasion of Grenada was considered a major international security concern in the early 1980s, and was viewed by the international community as the negative consequences of US hegemony in the region. Comparatively, the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait a decade later illustrated how a larger neighbor intended to annex and wipe the international legal personality of its smaller neighbor. However, this was not realized in the case of the US and Grenada. The US returned governance and order to Grenada with no indication of annexation. Though Grenada signaled the weakness of small island states to the international community, conventional security threats would prove to be secondary to SIS security as the prevalence and severity of non-conventional security threats proved to be a more of security concern. Therefore, this thesis will argue pejorative negative interpretations of US hegemony in the context of the 1983 US invasion of Grenada to assert that non-conventional threats are the predominant security threat to Commonwealth Caribbean States.

Methodology Used to Determine Findings

The above hypothesis will examine primary and secondary sources from the perspective of international relations theory.[73] Chapter 2, the literature

[73] Ole Holsti describes how international relations theories act as coloured sunglasses, allowing the wearer to see only the salient events relevant to the theory. Three main approaches of International Relations Theory (realism, liberalism and constructivism) provide a basis to discuss the hypothesis. These approaches are outlined in Snyder as follows: "Realism focuses on the shifting distribution of power among states, Liberalism highlights the rising number of democracies and the turbulence of democratic transitions, and Idealism illuminates the changing norms of sovereignty, human rights, and international justice, as well as the increased potency of religious ideas in politics." Moreover, Snyder asserts that "theories of international relations claim to explain the way international politics works, but each of the currently prevailing theories falls

review, uses primary sources from the UN and numerous secondary sources to illustrate the evolution of SIS in the international community and discuss emerging SIS themes such as size, self-determination and security. Chapter 3, *The Role of the United States in the Commonwealth Caribbean*, uses primary sources from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), and the US Department of State, in addition to numerous secondary sources to demonstrate the nature of US and Commonwealth Caribbean SIS relations. Chapter 4, *Small Island State Security and Non-Conventional Security Threats*, uses primary sources from the OECS, CARICOM, and the US State Department in addition to secondary sources to illustrate the prevalence of non-conventional security in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Chapter 5, *Commonwealth Caribbean Regional and International Cooperation and Integration*, uses primary resources from the OECS, CARICOM, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the US General Accounting office, in addition to secondary sources, to illustrate the increase of regional and international cooperation in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the degree of US integration into Commonwealth Caribbean security initiatives. Chapter 6, Conclusions, draws on secondary sources to support concepts and findings.

---

well short of that goal." He also asserts that "one of the principal contributions that international relations theory can make is not predicting the future but providing the vocabulary and conceptual framework to ask hard questions…."
Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no. 145 (November - December 2004): 53-55, 62, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4152944.
Also, though international relations theory has attributes of historical perspective, William T.R. Fox suggests that "International Relations has to be viewed as a subject which is something more than contemporary history if it is to evolve as a legitimate academic specialty or to yield results relevant to the major choices which governments and opinion leaders make in world politics. Preface in W.T.R. Fox, ed., *Theoretical Aspects of International* Relations (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), ix.

Descriptions of Proposed Chapters in Thesis

Chapter 1 – The introduction: will describe the evolution of the international system and small states to explain how so many small island developing states proliferated in the international community despite concerns over size, viability, and security.

Chapter 2 – The Literature review: will examine authors' contributions and analysis to the perception of small state size and viability; the increased participation and proliferation of small states in the international system, evolving perceptions of size and recognition of small island states, small island state security and the differentiation between conventional and non-conventional security threats, the interconnectedness of the international security in the post-WWII and Cold War system under the auspices of the UN, and its impacts on interstate relations such the US and the SIDS of Grenada.

Chapter 3 – The US in the Commonwealth Caribbean: will discuss the role of the US in the Commonwealth Caribbean and differentiate it from the US role in Latin America, the events leading up to and including the US invasion of Grenada in 1983; the international reaction to the US invasion and its impact on SIDS security and international security as a whole.

Chapter 4 – Unconventional Security Threats: will discuss the perceptions of conventional security towards SIS; and the recognition, prevalence and effects of unconventional security threats on SIS in the Commonwealth Caribbean region.

Chapter 5 – Regional Cooperation between the US and the Commonwealth Caribbean: will discuss how regional and international cooperation has increased in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The chapter also discusses the importance and degree of US integration into Commonwealth Caribbean security initiatives.

Chapter 6 – Conclusions.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The transformation of the international system and evolution of the sovereign state has posed new challenges to the international community which can be observed through the evolution of the international system and interstate relations with their long contemporary beginnings in the Concert of Europe to current norms with the United Nations.[74] Such an examination reveals that there were fewer than 20 states during the Concert of Europe system in 1815, 50 states during the League of Nations, and that the number increased to 192 fully recognized states during the post-WWII era via the process of decolonization.[75] Consequently, the proliferation of ever smaller states raised concerns of small statehood viability, as their limited size was perceived as a weakness and caused concerns of small state ability to meet security needs and participate fully in the international community.[76] Despite being disregarded as anomalies in the international system only decades earlier, the continued proliferation and existence of small states resulted in a profound examination of small states.

The examination of small states revealed that many were islands, leading to the recognition that small island states experienced different challenges than did other mainland states. The literature review will observe the changing

---

[74] Hedley Bull differentiates between the concepts of international system and international community when he admits one may presuppose the other, but asserts that an international system may exist where an international society or community may not. For further discussion, see:
The Anarchical Society, supra note 1 at 8-14.
[75] Amry Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," *The Journal of Politics* 26, no. 2 (May 1964): 308, http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2127598. (hereinafter "The Small States in International Politics and Organization").
[76] George C. Abbot defines viability as the "minimum criteria necessary for supporting a modern industrial state."
"Small States - The Paradox of Their Existence", *supra* note 2 at 107.

perceptions and attitudes toward small states in the international community; discuss the recognition of small island states; and reveal the unique nature of island state security compared with that of mainland microstates.

History of Small States in the International Community

Amry Vandenbosch identifies four phases in the history of small states in contemporary international relations: (1) the Congress of Europe after the Napoleonic wars, where small states were not considered important; (2) the departure from the great power system in the Congress of Europe with the peace conferences of The Hague of 1899 and 1907; (3) the post-WWI inclusion and tolerance of the small state in the League of Nations; and (4) the rise of small states in the post-WWII era in the UN.[77]

The Congress of Europe

Vandenbosch provides insight into the nature of the Congress or Concert of Europe and the departure from the great power system. The Congress of Vienna's defining of the great powers was intended to maintain the peace in Europe following the Napoleonic Wars; in addition, it also defined small states as a category in the discipline of international relations.[78] Though small states were present at the Congress of Vienna, they played a minimal role at the proceedings as "the smaller Sovereigns, Princes, and States had no

---

[77] "The Small States in International Politics and Organization", *supra* note 75 at 293-312.

[78] Rothstein viewed the Napoleonic Wars as the beginning of differentiating states from one another as great powers, France, Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria were distinguished from other small states/powers.
Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 11. (hereinafter *Alliances and Small Powers*).

representatives in the deciding conference, and no voice in the decisions by which their future destiny was determined."[79] The limited role of these small states is significant, as the Great Powers demonstrated Bertrand Russell's definition of power, the "capacity to produce intended effects",[80] as they:

> "rearranged the map of Europe, restored dynasties, confirmed the partition of Poland, united Belgium with Holland, neutralized Switzerland, created the German confederation, and prescribed rules of international law with respect to the free navigation of rivers, the rank of diplomatic representatives, and the suppression of the slave trade."[81]

Robert L. Rothstein, in *Alliances and Small Powers*, observes the great powers distinguishing themselves from smaller powers by creating an international system where the great powers of Europe made the decisions which the small powers were to obey.[82] Consequently, the Concert was successful in managing the international system by preventing wars among small states, as the Concert frequently intervened in small state internal affairs, made and dissolved unions, determined boundary lines, ended international conflicts and exercised guardianship over weak states.[83] Even though the Concert was successful in preventing general war among small states,, war

---

[79] Palmerston to Marquis of Normandy, October 10, 1848, in B.F.S.P., LI, 672. Cited in Edwin De Witt Dickinson, *The Equality of States in International Law,* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), 295. (hereinafter *The Equality of States in International Law).*
Also, the Congress of Vienna illustrated the Europeanization of the international system as all European states were represented, with the exception of Turkey and its dependencies/principalities.

[80] Bertrand Russell, *Power - A New Social Analysis,* Norton, 1969), 315.

[81] *The Equality of States in International*, *supra* note 79 at 295.
"The Small States in International Politics and Organization", *supra* note 75 at 295.

[82] *Alliances and Small Powers*, *supra* note 78 at 13.

[83] "The Small States in International Politics and Organization", *supra* note 75 at 296.

remained a reality among larger states, as demonstrated by the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars. However, the Concert's reliance on the balance of power among its members to maintain peace proved to be misguided after the onset of WWI.

In addition to the Concert's inability to contain general war among major states, the two Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 represented "a departure from the principle of Great Power control" which ultimately defined the Concert System, and proved to affect the dynamics of the international system.

The Hague Conferences - Departure from the Great Power System

The first Hague Conference was influenced by Russia with its calling for an international conference to consider the problem of increased development of military forces "to proportions hitherto unknown", where 26 states were represented.[84] The absence of Latin American small states from the inaugural Hague Conference demonstrated European large power inclination to dismiss them as members of the international community. Their exclusion to participate in the international system is significant, as the first Hague Conference set a precedent in reaching out beyond Europe to include China, Persia and Siam.[85] However, the emergence of new powers, such as the US, which effectively asserted itself after the Spanish American War in 1898 and further

[84] Dan L. Morrill, "Nicholas II and the Call for the First Hague Conference," *The Journal of Modern History* 46, no. 2 (June 1974): 296, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1877523.

[85] "Russia may have wished to limit the invitations to the nations represented at the Court of St. Peters- burg, fearing the difficulties and obstacles to reaching any agreement which would result from the presence of a too great number of states."
A. G. de Lapradelle and Ellery C. Stowell, "Latin America at the Hague Conference," *The Yale Law Journal* 17, no. 4 (February 1908): 270, http://www.jstor.org/stable/784436.

demonstrated its power with the attainment of a blue water Navy rivaling that of the Royal Navy, signaled intentions to assert US influence and contest European domination of international affairs.[86]

US influence is illustrated with the inclusion of Latin American states to the second Hague Conference in 1907. Latin America's inclusion to the second Hague Conference increased representation at the Conference to 44 states. Moreover, Latin America's apparent omission from the first Hague Conference and inclusion in the second signaled the international equality among state representation, as nearly all independent states in the world were present: 21 European; 19 American; and 4 Asian states.[87] It is important to note that, though small states were present at the Hague Conferences, it was not an end to great power/small state conflict. A *London Times* editorial aids in illustrating the attitudes towards small state participation, as their inclusion induced scrutiny from critics in larger countries who viewed the Conference as a failure, one that:

> "Was predestined to fail because the convocation of such a body at all was based upon a gross violation of the 'law of facts.' In plain English, the Conference was a sham and has brought forth a progeny of shams, because it was founded on a sham. The only principle upon which all these powers could be induced to send delegates to it was the legal and diplomatic convention that all sovereign states are equal. For certain purposes the convention is useful, but, on the face of it, it is a fiction, and a very absurd fiction at that. Everybody knows that all sovereign states are not equal. The differences between them in population, in territory, in wealth, in armed strength, in their habits of thought, in their conceptions of law and right – in all that goes to make up civilization – are among the most obvious and insistent of facts. The suggestion that they should submit to such a doctrine is simply fatuous. Such submission would

[86] Matthew M. Oyos, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War," *The Journal of Military History* 60, no. 4 (October 1996): 633, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944659.
[87] "The Small States in International Politics and Organization", *supra* note 75 at 296.

> involve the subjugation of the higher civilization by the lower, and would inevitably condemn the more advanced peoples to moral and intellectual retrogression."

The insistence that small states were lacking in capacity compared to that of the large states aptly describes the popular opinion in the 19th century and into the 20th. This opinion reflected an international system that was dominated by large powers which viewed small states as being unable to settle their own affairs, and in the reference to " armed strength", lends to the view that a state legitimizes its sovereignty through its ability to make war. This notion is reflected in the work of Von Treitschke, who views sovereignty as "… drawing the sword when [the state] sees fit that a defenseless state may still be termed a Kingdom for conventional or courtly reasons… but in point of fact such a country can no longer rank as a state."[88] The occupation with military might is illustrated through the events of WWI and the attitude towards small states during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.

WWI and the Paris Peace Conference

The orchestration of WWI by large powers consequently impacted small states, which continued to assert their interests. The preoccupation with a state's ability to assert itself through military might is further illustrated through the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, where the distinction between small and large powers continued. Britain viewed the US ranking of Brazil as an intermediate state and not as a small state with condescension that "the Brazilian contribution to the war of two or three torpedo boats" was insufficient of

[88] Von Treitschke, H. (1965) Politics I, in Richard Howard Cox, *The State in International Relations.* (San Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 1965), 53-54.

such recognition.[89] The Paris Peace Conference illustrated that the great powers were not eager to treat small states as equals, in that they were viewed as having limitations and therefore occupied "an insecure position in the family of nations."[90] However, the great powers had concerns of offending small states by "obvious domination by the great powers,"[91] due to the increasing number of small states emerging out of the wreckage of former empires. Where European peoples/nations were viewed as capable of self-government, former German possessions in the Pacific and Africa were dismissed as barbarian nations "to whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of political self-determination in the European sense" and that they "would probably never be able to look after themselves."[92] Where religion and nationalist tendencies were contained in Europe,[93] the Paris Peace Conference created three types of mandate in the division of Germany's colonies: "A" Mandates "for nations such as those in the Middle East which were nearly ready to run their own affairs"; "B" Mandates which would be run by the mandatory power; and "C" Mandates for "territories that were contiguous or close to the mandatory power, which would administer the territory as part of its own. "C" Mandates covered Southwest Africa and the Pacific Islands near Australia and New Zealand.[94]

---

[89] "The Small States in International Politics and Organization", *supra* note 75 at 298.
[90] *The Equality of States in International*, *supra* note 79 at 339.
[91] "The Small States in International Politics and Organization", *supra* note 75 at 296.
[92] Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919* [Peacemakers], 1 US ed. (New York: Random House, 2001), 99, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/upei/Doc?id=10235307. (hereinafter *Paris 1919).*
[93] *Ibid.* at 494.
[94] *Ibid.* at 103.
Furthermore, The "C" mandates in Africa and the Pacific were viewed as confirming predictions that the arrangement was very much like direct annexation. The UN took over the Mandates at the end of WWII which lasted till 1994, when the last mandate, Palau, gained independence from the US (Palau was originally placed under Japan in 1919 and then the US in 1945).

The influence European small states gained in the Hague Conferences and during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference - despite some obvious limitations - continued to spill into the League of Nations, where they received representation on the council and considerable representation in the Assembly.[95]

The League of Nations

The increased profile of small states is described through the works of Annette Baker Fox in *The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969.*[96] Fox notes that the League of Nations offered an unprecedented opportunity for lesser states to play a part in the system: “Thus several small states could become prominent actors through diplomatic negotiation, the right-handmaiden of weaker states.”[97] However, Michael Gunter, in “Liechtenstein and the League of Nations: A Precedent for the United Nations Ministate Problem”, illustrates the limits to small state inclusion in the international community with the applications to the League of Nations from the historic very small European states of San Marino, Monaco and Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein proved to be the only state to carry out an application which was denied, prolonging these ‘Lilliputian’ states’ recognition in no more than a courtly or ceremonial sense.[98]

Ibid. at 106.
[95] "The Small States in International Politics and Organization", *supra* note 75 at 299.
[96] Annette Baker Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969," *International Journal* 24, no. 4 (Autumn 1969): 751-764, http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/40200289. (hereinafter “The Small States in the International System”).
[97] *Ibid.* at 754.
[98] "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations," *supra* note 12 at 496-501.

The Fifth (Admissions) Committee admitted, "there can be no doubt juridically, the Principality of Liechtenstein is a sovereign state." However, that "by reason of her [Liechtenstein] limited area, small population, and her geographical position she has chosen to depute to others some of the attributes of sovereignty".[99] Moreover, the Committee noted that Liechtenstein had "no army" which meant it "could not carry out all her obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant."[100] Liechtenstein's exclusion from the League of Nations influenced the League to "consider whether and in what manner it would be possible to attach to the League of Sovereign States, which, by reason of their small size, cannot be admitted as ordinary members."[101] Such a consideration raises the question of whether Liechtenstein's 'small size' was the "actual problem."[102]

Moreover, Rosalyn Higgins' analysis of the League of Nation's decision illustrates inconsistency in the recognition of sovereign statehood in the international system, when she states: "As for the diminutive states, to insist that they are sovereign, but so small that they have had to depute some of the attributes of sovereignty, is legal reasoning of the most unfruitful kind. It is more in conformity with the facts to come to the conclusion that sovereignty is a relative concept; and while these states may possess attributes for limited

---

Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations and International Court of Justice, *The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). (hereinafter *The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations*).

[99] "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations", *supra* note 12 at 498-499.
League of Nations, *The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings,* Annex C, 652, 667.

[100] "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations", *supra* note 12 at 498.
"Report on the Second-Sub-committee to the Fifth Committee", *supra* note 13 at 667.

[101] *Ibid*. at 652.

[102] "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations", *supra* note 12 at 499.

participation in world events, they do not possess it for comprehensive participation."[103]

Luxembourg became the only very small state to become a member of the League of Nations, despite experiencing similar scrutiny to that of Liechtenstein in its application. Luxembourg's acceptance is considered in large part due to the change in its policy of neutrality, which led to the maintenance of a standing army that "justified its capacity to fulfill the obligations of Article 16 of the Covenant,[104] which was highlighted as a deficiency in the case of Liechtenstein's application, as it had no army.[105] This further illustrates the legitimizing of state sovereignty through the ability to make war, as Jurist Quincy Wright notes:

> "In practice, a state is not regarded as fully sovereign unless it has substantially all of the powers of normal states at the time. Among the powers commonly possessed by states is that to convert a state of peace into a state of war, to defend itself…to occupy…*res nullius*, to perform wrongful acts rendering itself responsible."[106]

This recognition of similar power among states creates a measure in which to determine if a state is sovereign or not. However, the limits of its scope is highlighted with the observations of Rosalyn Higgins, who notes "discussions, for example, of whether a 'dependent state' can exist under international law are largely meaningless unless there is first an examination of whether the community of nations would find it appropriate, in light of its long-range

---

[103] *The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations*, *supra* note 98 at 35.
[104] "The Members of the League of Nations", *supra* note 14 at 141.
[105] "Report on the Second-Sub-committee to the Fifth Committee", *supra* note 13 at 667.
[106] Q. Wright, *Mandates Under the League of Nations* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1930), 292-293.

objectives, to afford the rights which follow from 'statehood' to entities fettered by restrictions which impair their independence."[107]

Nonetheless, the League of Nations' decision to reject Liechtenstein's application kept "the historic European very small states (Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Andorra)…confined to the margins of international diplomacy."[108] However, increased international participation of small states, particularly those in Latin America supported by the US, influenced an initiative to codify "the ideas" of statehood that "were in the air" under traditional international law.[109] Consequently, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States was signed in 1933.[110]

---

[107] Higgins notes that "this does not necessarily imply a constitutive view of the recognition of statehood; it merely reflects the fact that, in the final analysis, it is the representatives of states which decide upon what criteria must be met before any entity is a state."
The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations, *supra* note 98 at 11.

[108] *A World made Safe for Small States*, *supra* note 70 at 1.
Dewent Whittlesey describes Andorra as "political anomaly" making the position of Andorra in the international community much more unclear than other European microstates at the time. Andorra is a legacy of a medieval arrangement between France and Spain. Andorra's constitutional arrangement was resolved in 1983 by the Council of Europe with the recognition that Andorra's two co-princes arrangement is constitutional.
Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Andorra - Introduction," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/an.html (accessed January 12, 2011).
Derwent Whittlesey, "Andorra's Autonomy," *The Journal of Modern History* 6, no. 2 (June 1934): 147-155, http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/1875140.

[109] Thomas D. Grant, "Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 37, no. 2 (1998-1999): 447, http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/cjtl37&div=19&id=&page=. (hereinafter "Defining Statehood").

[110] Signatories to the convention were Honduras, the US, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Cuba.
Am. J. Int'L L. cited in *Ibid.*at 414.

The Montevideo Convention and the Concept of Statehood

The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in 1933 codified "the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population b) a defined territory c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states."[111] Alan James notes, "There is no international constitution which can be consulted regarding the relevant meaning of the term sovereignty."[112] For Bull, "sovereignty" is something to be 'asserted' by states which participate in international relations.[113] However, Alan James' observes "whether a state asserts independence and supremacy in a sufficient degree to be adjudged as actually asserting them in practice."[114] Therefore, as many small states met criteria recognized under the Montevideo Convention, the observations of Bull and James aptly reflect large states' concerns, if these small states did in fact assert

[111] *The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations*, *supra* note 98 at 13.
Though Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States has been scrutinized and it is viewed "further criteria are necessary to make a satisfactory definition of the state", however, it represents the only accepted codified definition of statehood.
"Defining Statehood", *supra* note 109 at 447.
[112] Sovereignty is an elusive concept and remains an "emotive term that it very naturally finds an important place in international rhetoric."
Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 1, 17. (hereinafter *Sovereign Statehood*).
[113] Hedley Bull defines sovereignty as "an independent political community, which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth's surface and a particular segment of the human population"; that internal sovereignty is the supremacy over all authorities within that territory and population; and external sovereignty is the independence of outside authorities.
The Anarchical Society, supra note 1 at 8-9.
[114] *Sovereign Statehood*, *supra* note 112 at 20.

their 'sovereignty' in sufficient degree as an equal in the international community.[115]

Small States in the Inter-War Years

Though small states experienced more favorable conditions with the League of Nations, they were short-lived with the onset of the worldwide depression of the 1930s, and the increased influence of revisionist powers (Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan), which particularly affected small states of Eastern Europe. Annette Baker Fox notes:

> "Whatever promise collective security under the League might have held out was destroyed by actions of small states as well as great. Neither "bridge-building" nor balancing off one predatory great power against another, the favored techniques of European small states, succeeded in protecting those in the path of the determined aggressors. Nor did the "one-way" alliance with an in-effectual though friendly great power, France, which paid little attention to protecting its small allies."[116]

The failure of the League to provide collective security exposed the precariousness of small state security, as highlighted by Fox when she observes, "for ruthless great powers, vulnerable small states seemed easier to defeat than to woo."[117] David Vital notes that Czechoslovakia capitulated in both WWI and WII "without a shot being fired", and uses it as an example of the typical 'small' power.[118] Ultimately, the League of Nations' inability to avoid

---

[115] Also, Bull highlights the beginnings of the state system as a regional, European system becoming a global system in the 19th and 20th centuries, which still structures international relations today.
The Anarchical Society, supra note 1 at 20.
[116] "The Small States in the International System", *supra* note 96 at 755.
[117] *Ibid.*
[118] David Vital, *The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 7. (hereinafter *The Survival of Small States*).

major conflict resulted in its demise with the outbreak of WWII. Despite the perceived vulnerability of small states during WWII, the independence of Iceland in 1944 and acceptance into the UN in 1946 marked the equal participation of only the second very small state in the international community.[119]

From the League of Nations to the UN - The Question of Small State Viability

Despite shortcomings of the League of Nations, the organization signified an evolution of international principles that continued in the United Nations Charter, including governance, independence, and admission into statehood under three sets of stipulations about self-determination, the treatment of self-governing territories and trusteeship.[120] Rupert Emerson notes that the Declaration of Non-Self-Governing Territories "…for the first time gave the organized international community some access to the way in which the colonial powers were behaving and some title to debate their achievements and short comings."[121] Though the intent and interpretation of the Declaration of Non-Self-Governing Territories differed between colonial powers and anti-colonial supporters, the effect witnessed the independence of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel within five

---

Also, it is important to note that Vital uses the terms small state and small power interchangeably.
David Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations* (Clarendon Press, 1967), 7. (hereinafter *The Inequality of States*).

[119] "The Microstate Experience", *Supra* note 3 at 1- 2.

[120] Elmer Plischke, *Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), 3-4. (hereinafter *Microstates in World Affairs*).

[121] Rupert Emerson viewed "the principle of self - determination made an explicit appearance" in the UN charter.
Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization, *supra* note 16 at 35.

years from the end of WWII.[122] Unlike the post-WWI period that witnessed the emergence of states from former empires, the post-WWII period witnessed the emergence of states from among dependencies of the victors.[123] Moreover, the emergence of new states, many of them considered small states, raised concerns over small state viability in the international system. David Vital and Amry Vadenbosch[124] argue that there is no single or accurate formula to rank a state, that "only the top of the pyramid is normally defined clearly", referring to others as "lesser states".[125] This ranking of states highlights the recognition of the asymmetry of relational and structural power between the great powers and small states in the international system.[126] Despite the tendency to rank states in the international system, Hedley Bull, in *The Anarchical Society*, avoids the explicit differentiation or ranking of states according to their size. Instead, he provides insight into the practical dimension of state participation in the international system.[127]

Moreover, David Vital speaks to these lesser states in *The Inequality of States*, asserting that "a small state is more vulnerable to pressure, more likely to give way under stress, more limited in the political options open to it and subject to a tighter connection between domestic and external affairs,"[128] raising concerns of small state viability, as they typically lead a "defensive life" and

---

[122] *Ibid*.
[123] "The Small States in the International System", *supra* note 96 at 757.
[124] "The Small States in International Politics and Organization", *supra* note 75 at 293-294.
[125] *The Inequality of States*, *supra* note 118 at 7-8.
[126] DİLAVER ARIKAN AÇAR, "Small State Playing the Asymmetric Game: Continuity and Change in Albanian Foreign Policy" (Unpublished PhD, Thesis submitted to Dept. of International Relations, Bilkent University), 215. (hereinafter "Small State Playing the Asymmetric Game").
[127] *The Anarchical Society, supra* note 1 at 8.
[128] *The Inequality of States*, *supra* note 118 at 3.

avoid situations where their weakness might be exploited.[129] For Vital, state viability is tested "by its capacity to withstand opposition and stick to purposes thought commensurate with the national interest."[130] Ultimately, Vital questions small state viability,[131] as he describes the survival of small states in international relations as precarious,[132] asserting that their autonomy will remain until it is challenged.[133]

Similar to Vital, Rothstein, (*Alliance and Small Powers)* views small states as assuming a defensive and vulnerable position in international relations.[134] In contrast to Vital, Rothstein addresses the social consideration of size as he asserts that small size is a question of psychological handicaps as much as it is a problem of limited capabilities. Rothstein views weakness as a fundamental aspect of small size and that their correlation manifests a different self-view. He argues that this leads small states to recognize limited choices, assume a defensive posture and assume vulnerability in international relations.[135] The

---

[129] *Ibid.* at 87.
[130] *Ibid.* at 184.
[131] Barry Bartmann provides insight in to the notion of viability as he notes "…much of the debate in the 1950s and early 1960s on the future of these diminutive entities centred on notions of viability, or rather the absence of those conditions which were deemed to lie beyond the traditional criteria for statehood in international law: a resident population, a fixed territory, a government and a capacity to engage in relations with other states. 'Viability' meant those conditions necessary to give full meaning to these familiar prerequisites of international law. Tozun Bahcheli and others, *De Facto States* (London, 2004), 18, http://www.myilibrary.com?id=5897.
[132] *The Inequality of States*, *supra* note 118 at 190.
[133] *The Survival of Small States*, *supra* note 118 at 12.
It is notable that Vital viewed small states in the traditional sense. For instance, Vital used an upper limit of a small state of 10 to 15 million for a developed state and 20 to 30 million for an underdeveloped state, but sets no lower limit, as he concludes that smaller states would clearly experience similar challenges, only intensified where it is 5 to 10 times smaller.
The Inequality of States, *supra* note 118 at 8.
[134] *Alliances and Small Powers*, *supra* note 78.
[135] "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", *supra* note 47 at 363.

perception of the small state handicap or vulnerability contributes to what Rothstein referred to as a 'security dilemma' among small states.[136]

Despite the view of small states as lesser states, Annette Baker Fox asserts in *The Power of Small States*[137] that small states had a role to play in the international system,[138] and this signaled the inclusion of small states in international relations.[139] Fox describes the ability of small states to respond "… to the pressures of great powers during the second World War, and managed with varying degrees of success to prove that small and militarily weak States are by no means automatically reduced to being helpless pawns in international politics…."[140] Moreover, she observes that small states' ability to avoid capitulation in some crises contradicts charges of weakness as "small states in the 1950s seems to have found greater freedom of maneuverability at the very time their military inequality vastly increased."[141]

Furthermore, Fox's illustration of a small state's ability to counteract large state influence demonstrates the capacity for self-help. In addition, Fenwick

---

[136] *Alliances and Small Powers*, *supra* note 78 at 24.

[137] It is important to note that Fox dealt with small states in the traditional sense, using the case studies of five states – Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Spain during WWII – to illustrate that small/weak states in fact have the means to fend off the challenges of the great powers. Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 5. (hereinafter *The Power of Small States*).
In addition to the fact that this thesis focuses on very small states, the reference to Turkey as a small or weak state during WWII is also debatable.

[138] In asserting inclusion of small state in the international system, Fox recognized the requirement for a definition of a small state.
"The Small States in the International System", *supra* note 96 at 751.

[139] "Small State Playing the Asymmetric Game", *supra* note 126 at 12.

[140] Alan de Rusett, "Review: [Untitled]," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 36, no. 3 (July 1960), 358, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2610034.

[141] *The Power of Small States*, *supra* note 137 at 180, 186-187.

views self-help as the fundamental 'mark of sovereignty',[142] as it was frequently used as a criterion to distinguish between sovereign and non-sovereign states.[143] Like Fox, Simon Kuznets questions the perceptions of size and viability.

In addition to international relations literature, Simon Kuznets, in *Six Lectures on Economic Growth,*[144] provides insight into the assumptions of economic size and viability. Kuznets examines the concerns of economic capacity of smaller states considering the limits to economic growth in smaller economies such as access and sufficient quantity of natural resources or attributes,[145] which ultimately questions their viability as "some measure of these collective attributes may offer a gross index of power.[146] However, Kuznets examines the advantages of smallness recognizing that the social cohesiveness of smaller states makes their smaller economies more resilient to external economic shocks and exhibit more equal distribution of income between social classes and geographical regions.[147] Kuznets' findings lend to the misconceptions of size, revealing the "limitation of size is not really an important

---

[142] C. G. Fenwick, *International Law* (New York: Appelton-Century-Crofts, 1948), 106.
[143] "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", *supra* note 47 at 362.
[144] Similarly, to international relations, the consideration of economics was focused on large states.
Simon Smith Kuznets, *Six Lectures on Economic Growth* (Illinois: Free Press, 1959). (hereinafter *Six Lectures on Economic Growth*).
[145] (Underground resources, coastline, etc); a minimum scale to support heavy industrial manufacturing (airplanes, automobiles, heavy electrical generators); reliance on mono-economies (or few sectors compared to larger economies).
Ibid. at 90.
[146] Lebow discusses Morgenthau (1948) and Waltz (1979) in that they offer multi-dimensional definitions of power that include such factors as size, population, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, national character, morale, and the quality of diplomacy and government**.**
Richard Ned Lebow, "Review: Small States and Big Alliances," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 3 (Sep., 1997), 707, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952086.
[147] *Six Lectures on Economic Growth*, *supra* note 144 at 27-30.

handicap to development."[148] Similar to studies of the period, Kuznets views 'small' in the traditional sense, and uses the threshold of 10 million to define a small state economy.

Economist William Demas, in *The Economics of Development in Small Countries,*[149] builds on the work of Kuznets and considers a small state to have a population less than 5 million.[150] However, Demas makes a significant contribution in recognizing challenges attributed to small size, recognizing 'that a country with less than 3 million people' may experience difficulty in providing full-scale governmental administrative services.[151] Consequently, Demas questions the viability of very small states in the international community. Moreover, Kuznets' reference to the very small states of Monaco, Andorra and Luxembourg as splinters in the international community[152] further illustrates Bartmann's observation that these European very small states at the time were considered "exceptions to the rule, that very small size precluded the capacities necessary for the exercise of sovereignty."[153]

Small State Size

Barry Buzan provides perspective into the implications of state size in the international community, stating:

---

[148] Harvey Leibenstein, "Review: Six Lectures on Economic Growth," *The American Economic Review* 51, no. 1 (March 1961): 172, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1818935.
[149] William G. Demas, *The Economics of Development in Small Countries: With Special Reference to the Caribbean* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965).
[150] Demas also focuses on the criterion of land size to define small from an economic perspective as it reflects the potential of more scarce resources.
Ibid. at 22.
[151] *Ibid.* at 50-51, 57.
[152] *Six Lectures on Economic Growth*, *supra* note 144 at 90.
[153] "The Microstate Experience," *Supra* note 3 at 2.

> "Size counts because states are supposed to be relatively permanent constructions fulfilling the wide range of functions necessary for self-government, without sufficient size, the unit is too fragile in company of its larger fellows and lacks the capability to perform all tasks of self rule."[154]

The view that very small size precluded the capacities necessary for the exercise of sovereignty was demonstrated by the British Colonial Office in Whitehall, which viewed states with populations of less than 2.5 million or states smaller than Sierra Leone as being unable to seriously pursue the option of sovereignty up until 1958.[155] However, the independence of the French territories Mauritania and Gabon, with populations below one million and half a million, respectively, and the 1960 independence of the British island of Cyprus, with a population of less than one million, challenged the preconception that small size precluded the capacities necessary for the exercise of sovereignty. The independence of ever smaller dependencies and inclusion into the international community influenced the UN General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541.

UN Resolutions 1514 and 1541 and the Emergence of Very Small States

James Mittleman, in *Collective Decolonisation and the U.N. Committee of 24*[156] describes the 1960 UN General Assembly Resolution I514 (XV) – the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples – as a basis for self-determination, in that it became a definitive expression of

---

[154] Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Colorado: L. Rienner, 1991), 66. (hereinafter *People, States, and Fear*).
[155] Colin Cross, *The Fall of the British Empire, 1918-1968*, 1 American ed. (New York: Coward McCann, 1969), 341.
[156] James H. Mittelman, "Collective Decolonisation and the U.N. Committee of 24," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, no. 1 (March 1976): 41-64, http://www.jstor.org/stable/159647. (hereinafter "Collective Decolonization and the U.N. Committee of 24").

anti-colonialism.[157] Resolution 1514 was accompanied by UN Resolution 1541 (XV) (15 December 1960), which outlined principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73E of the Charter,[158] which called for the monitoring of political development of colonial territories. These resolutions influenced the creation of a Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which served as the major international instrument of decolonization, advocating for the self-determination of non-governing peoples, and ensuring the absence of obstacles impeding implementation of Resolution 1514.[159] These UN instruments challenged obstacles impeding the right to self-determination and ultimately influenced the independence of ever smaller dependencies.

The independence and granting of UN membership to the Maldives in 1965 is described by Barry Bartmann as breaking the tacit lower limits of

---

[157] *Ibid.* at 41.
It is notable that the inalienable right to self-determination as expressed in Resolution 1514 omitted continental nations. Rupert Emerson notes the problem in determining the 'self' in 'self-determination', which was eased by the distinction between colonial peoples and those other unfortunate souls who sought independence within the boundaries of existing states. *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization*, *supra* note 16 at 27-30. Furthermore, the influence of great powers is illustrated by Alex Bellany, who, in "The English School", emphasizes how the apparent origin of international society's foundational rules and their dissemination by European and Western powers during the period of decolonization was both consensual and coercive, cited in Alex J. Bellany " The English School", Martin Griffiths(ed.), *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 84.
[158] "Resolution 1514 and Resolution 1541", s*upra* note 21.
[159] The Special Committee is a sub-organ of the General Assembly, established under Resolution I654 (XVI) it is also referred to as the Special Committee on Decolonization. "Collective Decolonization and the U.N. Committee of 24", *supra* note 156 at 65.

statehood with a population of fewer than one hundred thousand people,[160] demonstrating the independence of ever smaller states. The inclusion of such lesser states (the perception at the time) raised concerns over sovereign equality and establishing an imbalance of power among nations.[161] Holsti notes in "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" that very small states were considered to engage in the international system only on a very limited basis.[162] This perception is exemplified by UN observers, who raised concerns and "argued that the admission of small nascent nations resulted in a growing imbalance between voting power in the UN and 'real' power in the 'real' world."[163]

Therefore, colonial powers encouraged the creation of larger political entities, through federations, as a means to alleviate disadvantages of size. This is exemplified by the creation of the West Indies Federation, as it was "a means of increasing the effective size of the West Indian territories to the point where they became eligible for self-government as one unit."[164] However, Anthony Payne, in *The Politics of the Caribbean Community 1961-79*, discusses the failure of the federation and described the lure of self-determination among Commonwealth Caribbean states with the independence of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados. The independence of these larger Commonwealth Caribbean Islands reflected Andrew Scott's view that "the key consideration…

---

[160] "The Microstate Experience", *Supra* note 3 at 3.
[161] "Very Small States at the Millennium", s*upra* note 33 at 1.
[162] K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (September 1970): 233-309, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013584.
[163] "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972", *supra* note 34 at 110.
[164] *The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-*79, supra note 24 at 13.

for independence …is whether a group of persons desiring to proclaim themselves a 'nation' have the capacity to assert their independence and act on that basis."[165] Also, the independence of these larger Commonwealth Caribbean Islands in comparison with smaller islands in the region exemplifies Burton Benedicts observation that 'small' is a relative term, therefore questioning the practice of establishing arbitrary 'cut-offs' for the acceptable size of a state.[166]

The challenges in ranking states according to size influenced other considerations to categorize states, as seen through the work of David Singer and Melvin Small. Singer and Small included diplomatic recognition to establish the status of states in the international system. However, they primarily excluded "globally insignificant entities" with populations of under half a million, but eventually remedied their limitation by accounting for states which were members of the League of Nations or the UN.[167]

Even though small state viability was repeatedly questioned, as illustrated through the works of George Reid, who "emphasized the near irrelevance of conventional capabilities of power" of very small states, he does recognize very small state potential in "political will and diplomatic ingenuity in meeting the

---

[165] A. M. Scott, *The Functioning of the International System* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 235.
[166] Many of the small entities undergoing decolonization were part of the British Empire resulting in the Commonwealth assuming an active role in the studies and literature of microstates. Such as, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies 1963 Seminar and report, *Problems of Smaller Territories*.
Problems of Smaller Territories, *supra* note 26 at 45.
[167] J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815-1940," *World Politics* 18, no. 2 (January 1966): 239-247, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009697.

fundamental objectives of security and survival."[168] The recognition of very small states lends to Harold Laswell's and Abraham Kaplan's idea that "power is participation in the making of decisions."[169] However, Barry Bartmann in *The Microstate Experience: Very Small States in the International System*,[170] differentiates the beginnings of very small state diplomacy from that of larger states, as very small states were considered "local powers", as they had few ongoing bilateral relationships, limited permanent missions, and engaged mostly with the former colonial power, or a neighboring state.[171] This differentiation between very small states and large states became the focus of the UN in 1968.

UN Report on Small States:

The UN Secretary-General's 1968 annual report reflected the issue with small state viability, as the report acknowledged growing apprehension over sovereign entities that were described as exceptionally small in area, population,

---

[168] George Reid, "A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policies of very Small States with Special Reference to the Commonwealth Caribbean", PhD Thesis, University of Southampton, 66-82 cited in "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", *supra* note 47 at 363.

[169] Harold Dwight Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (Yale University Press, 1950), 75.

[170] "The Microstate Experience", *Supra* note 3.

[171] Despite the modest beginnings of microstate diplomacy, Barry Bartmann observes that it does not suggest these states are indifferent to international concerns, and asserts microstate diplomacy is as 'symbolic' as it is 'practical', that international participation "reaffirms the dignity and the legal equality of all states…."
Ibid. at 14.
In addition to Barry Bartmann, Elmer Plischke, in *Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options*, describes very small state diplomacy in the international community as "relations between nations as taking an odd twist", with Luxembourg, a miniature European Grand Duchy accrediting its own diplomatic emissaries to only 10 other countries and relying on a neighbour to represent it to some 50 other governments; or one country commissioning a single ambassador on multiple assignments to 10 African states, and another government appointing 9 ambassadors to represent it simultaneously to more than 40 countries. Plischke describes the early beginnings and nature of very small state diplomacy as a "phenomenon…yet little understood."
Microstates in World Affairs, *supra* note 120 at 1.

and human and economic resources.[172] Correspondingly, these new states were categorized as small states, very small states, ministates and the more preferred term, microstates.[173] UN concerns over microstates required UN Secretary-General U Thant to call for a study to "lay down the necessary limitations of full membership while also defining other forms of association which would benefit both the "microstates" and the United Nations…" [174] such as dissociating the principle of sovereign equality from that of equal voting.[175]

The UN microstate study was addressed by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) in "Status and Problems of Very Small States and Territories" in 1969,[176] which was updated in 1971 in *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems* by Jacques Rapoport *et al*.[177] The report's exploration of any special or associate membership for microstates concluded any diminutive categorization of microstates was a contentious issue with microstates, as they considered UN full membership as the "final stamp of approval on their independence."[178] Consequently, the UN studies in addition to

---

[172] *Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, *supra* note 37.
[173] *Microstates in World Affairs*, *supra* note 120 at preface.
[174] Edward Dommen and Philippe Hein, *States, Microstates, and Islands* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 4. (hereinafter *States, Microstates, and Islands*).
Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, *supra* note 37.
[175] Jacques Rapoport and others, *Small States & Territories: Status and Problems,* (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 14. (hereinafter *Small States & Territories*).
[176] United Nations Institute for Training and Research. and Jacques Rapoport, *Status and Problems of very Small States and Territories.* (New York: 1969).
[177] *Small States & Territories*, *supra* note 175.
The study is considered "one of the most comprehensive examinations" of small states.
Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, *supra* note 48 at 8-9.
However, Edward Dommen notes that the UN "study has not led to any concrete action or even to a resolution mentioning the specific problems of microstates."
States, Microstates, and Islands, *supra* note 174 at 20.
[178] "What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?", *supra* note 36 at 116.

the work of the UN microstate Committee prevented large state inclinations to limit microstate membership[179] and ceased any considerations of a separate, diminutive status for microstates.

The UNITAR study further consolidated the use of population as the key indicator to categorize states, and fixed the microstate upper limit at a population of one million.[180] In addition to the UNITAR Study, Charles Taylor in 1969 contributed to the establishment of an identifiable group of "microstates." In contrast to the UNITAR study, Taylor uses a population of less than 2,928,000 to define a microstate,[181] as he notes difficulties and arbitrariness involved in fixing an acceptable cut-off point and admits possibilities ranging from one hundred thousand to one million.[182] Taylor's findings are significant in that, according to Taylor's criteria, his study concludes from a sample of 181 countries, that 74 states and territories are identified as very small and 50 of those are islands or groups of islands.[183]

Elmer Plischke provides perspective into the significance of UN membership and its relation to the recognition of states in the international community, as he explains: "Sovereign states, without attempting to define a theoretical essence of statehood include not only those states deemed to be independent in the traditional sense but also a few otherwise questionable entities that satisfy two or more of four criteria: Acknowledgement of independence by the former parent or colonial country; formal recognition by some other states; establishment and maintenance of regularized bilateral diplomatic relation with one or more governments; and Membership (other than observer ship) in the UN or its specialized agencies."
Microstates in World Affairs, *supra* note 120 at 11-12.

[179] "What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?", *supra* note 36 at 122.

[180] *Small States & Territories*, *supra* note 175 at 31.

[181] In addition to a population of less than 2,928,000; Taylor used a land area less than 142,822km and a GNP of less than US$1,583 million to identify a state as a microstate. Charles Taylor, "Statistical Typology of Micro- States and Territories: Towards a Definition of a Microstate," United Nations Institute for Training and Research: *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems* (1971), 194. (hereinafter "Statistical Typology of Micro- States and Territories").

[182] See William L. Harris in Microstates in the United Nations: a broader purpose" Columbia Journal of Transnational law, Vol 9 (Spring 1970): Annex, p.23.

[183] "Statistical Typology of Micro- States and Territories", *supra* note 181 at 192-194.

Taylor's recognition that islands are typically small states complements the work of Stanley de Smith, who views a state with a population of less than 150,000 to be very small. [184] In addition to DeSmith's particularly low population cut-off, he observes "island societies as insular." [185] DeSmith asserts that maritime borders may be particularly indomitable, and uses the example of the English Channel to illustrate that it has served, in some respects, to be a maritime frontier larger than the Atlantic Ocean itself.[186] The correlation between island microstates and island insularity provides insight into the sense of island separateness, island identity, and the lure of self-determination of ever smaller island microstates.

The Demonstration Effect:

The emergence of these smaller and smaller states is discussed by Payne in *The politics of the Caribbean Community 1961-79*.[187] The path to independence for Grenada in 1974 is described and the influence of the 'demonstration effect' is highlighted as it influenced the independence of ever smaller territories.[188] Vaughn Lewis's 'demonstration effect' refers to the attitude of the Commonwealth Caribbean when the 1966 independence of mainland Guyana created optimism for independence across the region: if Guyana can gain independence, why not Barbados, and why not independence for Grenada

---

[184] De Smith, S. A. (Stanley A.), *Microstates and Micronesia: Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories* (New York: New York University Press, 1970), vii.
[185] *Ibid.* at 55-92.
[186] *Ibid.* at 57.
[187] *The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-*79, *supra* note at 24.
[188] "The Decolonization of Grenada in the United Nations", *supra* note 50. As cited in "Very Small States at the Millennium", s*upra* note 33 at 2.

and for St. Kitts?[189] The issue of size seemed to become less of a barrier. As Philippe Hein observed, "it does not appear likely that any country will in the future be excluded from United Nations membership because of its size.[190] Moreover, Patrick Emanuel notes that the verification of small state viability is witnessed in the surviving and functioning of these states in the changing environment of the international community.[191] Payne, in "The Contours of Modern Caribbean Politics",[192] points out that these very small states "were able to survive and operate in the international system in which several institutions had come into existence to sustain small, vulnerable states."[193]

Further Recognition of Islands:

As the Commonwealth Caribbean witnessed the independence of many small islands, Caldwell *et al*, in "The Demography of States,"[194] supported Taylor's correlation between microstates and islands, furthering the recognition of the small island state by affirming that the smaller the state, the greater

[189] "The Microstate Experience", *Supra* note 3 at 4.
[190] *States, Microstates, and Islands*, *supra* note 174 at 20. Hein observes the increase of microstate membership in the UN, with 3 states with an average population of more than 1,300,000 from 1960-1962, then 7 states with an average population of 430,000 from 1964 to 1973, then 13 states with an average population of 150,000 between 1974 and 1983.
[191] Patrick Emmanuel, "Independence and Viability: Elements of Analysis," in Vaughn A. Lewis, ed., *Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean* (Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1976), 3.
[192] Anthony Payne and Paul K. Sutton, *Modern Caribbean Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
[193] Anthony Payne, (Eds.) Anthony Payne and Paul K. Sutton, "The Contours of Modern Caribbean Politics ", in *Modern Caribbean Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 14. (hereinafter "The Contours of Modern Caribbean Politics").
[194] Caldwell's study also reflects the changing attitudes towards small as Caldwell defined microstate territories by using a population of 500,000 or less compared with Taylor's population cut-off of 2,928,000. Caldwell concluded 79% were islands, 15% were coastal enclaves and 6% were inland.
John C. Caldwell, Graham E. Harrison and Pat Quiggin, "The Demography of Microstates," *World Development* 8, no. 12 (December 1980), 956.

likelihood that it is an island. Barry Bartmann provides insight into the observation that most microstates are indeed islands, explaining that "it is generally a more difficult challenge for avaricious continental neighbors to realize their ambitions than might be the case with neighboring enclave states, as irredentist claims are typically more difficult to justify with island microstates."[195]

The Vulnerability of Small Island States

The recognition of development challenges of these new states quickly followed their achievement of statehood. Hein, in "The Study of Microstates," highlights the UN's identification of 'handicaps' shared by small island states found in various UN resolutions since 1972,[196] and outlines numerous contributions of the Commonwealth, which assumed a leading role in the study of microstate development.[197] Moreover, Barry Bartmann, in "Island War and

[195] "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", *supra* note 47 at 366.

[196] Handicaps identified included "smallness, remoteness, constraints in transport and communications, great distances from market centres, highly limited internal markets, lack of marketing expertise, low resources endowment, lack of natural resources, heavy dependence on a few commodities for their foreign exchange earnings, shortage of administrative personnel and heavy financial burdens." UNCTAD Resolution 111(V) paragraph 1)
Hein discusses how small islands differ from other microstates in that they experience specific transport problems, biological endemism, and cultural factors. Furthermore, Hein notes that the UN was unlikely to depart from the category of "island developing countries", as it was the mirror of the geographical category of "land-locked developing countries", and that it was not until a 1983 meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement where experts referred to small island developing countries.
(Non-aligned Movement, 1983), cited in *States, Microstates, and Islands*, *supra* note 174 at 20.

[197] Hein, in "The Study of Microstates", discusses Commonwealth initiatives such as, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies 1972 conference on "Development Policy in Small Countries"; 1977 meeting Commonwealth Caribbean Finance Ministers which gave vulnerability formal expression within the
Commonwealth; and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in 1979, and 1981. Hein points out the significance of the 1979 meeting with the creation of a special program of action in favor of the smallest members of the Commonwealth. In addition, the Commonwealth Secretariat conference on "Problems and Policies in small economies" produced a report authored by Bimal Jalan, which Hein refers to as "one of the most comprehensive analyses of

Security," reveals that the international community was prompt in identifying that small island states "…were exceedingly vulnerable to non-conventional invasions from mercenary forces and those forces could be few in number."[198] The mercenary attacks in the Seychelles, the Comoros, and the Maldives exemplify the extent of small island state vulnerability as "these states can be overrun or their governments overthrown by a few dozen armed men."[199] George Quester elaborates:

> "How few Cuban or South African mercenaries would be required to take over and establish effective control over such a republic? Is it one airplane-load of such operatives, or two? How easy is it for a foreign warship to establish the same domination? Where there is no hinterland for the inhabitants of the island to retreat to, there is no second line of defense, no backup position from which to repulse such foreign aggression."

In *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,* Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike[200] provide a comprehensive account of the 1979 Revolution, the 1983 political coup and the internal difficulties in Grenada where as few as 50

---

economic problems available…", which highlighted about 20 microstates that experienced "distinct disadvantages" in the area of development.
States, Microstates, and Islands, *supra* note 174 at 19-20.
Also, Commonwealth Secretariat work focuses on four main areas of challenge and opportunity for small states: (i) tackling volatility, vulnerability, and natural disasters; (ii) strengthening capacity; (iii) addressing issues of transition to the changing global trade regime; and (iv) managing new opportunities and challenges from globalization.
Commonwealth Secretariat, "Commonwealth Secretariat Briefing - Small States." http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/216535/FileName/ComSec (accessed July 15, 2010).

[198] Barry Bartmann, (Ed.) Godfrey Baldacchino, "Island War and Security," *A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader* (Charlottetown: Institute of Island Studies, 2007), 300. (hereinafter "Island War and Security").

[199] "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", *supra* note 47 at 367. See also, George H. Quester, "Trouble in the Islands: Defending the Microstates," *International Security* 8, no. 2 (Autumn 1983): 161, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538600, for further discussion on modest military capabilities required during coup in Grenada. (hereinafter "Trouble in the Islands").

[200] Anthony Payne, *Grenada Revolution and Invasion* (London: Croom Helm,1984). (hereinafter *Grenada Revolution and Invasion*).

armed supporters encouraged "serious economic and political change" [201] that would influence the region and the international community. Barry Buzan, in *People, States, and Fear;*[202] provides insight into the transcending of internal difficulties to external concerns demonstrated by Grenada with his idea that "domestic threats to a weak state can almost never be isolated from the influence of outside powers, thus entangling domestic security problems with its external relations."[203]

Conventional Security Concerns

Barry Bartmann and others highlight the occurrence of conventional/irredentist threats to the non-sovereign micro territories of East Timor, Western Sahara and the Falkland Islands.

The Falklands:

The irredentist threat of Argentina in the Falklands shifted focus on small island state security to the Commonwealth Caribbean. The Argentinean invasion of the Falklands also increased irredentist tensions between Venezuela and Guyana and Belize and Guatemala. Tensions in Guyana increased to the extent that its government appealed to the UN Security Council that the massing of Venezuelan troops on the Guyanese border represented a real and present

---

[201] *Ibid.* at Introduction.
"Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", *supra* note 47 at 367.
[202] *People, States, and Fear*, *supra* note 154.
[203] Jyoti M. Pathania, "Bangladesh: Non-Traditional Security," http://www.southasiaanalysis.org//papers8/paper751.html (accessed July 8, 2010). (hereinafter "Non-Traditional Security").

irredentist threat to Guyana's territorial sovereignty.[204] Such examples illustrate the presence of irredentist threats and the relationship between Commonwealth Caribbean states and Latin American states.

George Quester, in "Trouble in the Islands: Defending the Microstates,"[205] notes that the Falklands demonstrated how "a miniscule population can become central to a major international incident,"[206] as the Falklands not only pitted Argentina and Britain against one another, but also tested international relations with the US.

Grenada:

Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike, in *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, provide a comprehensive account of the 1983 US invasion of Grenada.[207] Moreover, Payne, in "The Contours of Modern Caribbean Politics," provides insight into how the events in Grenada signaled the first time "Caribbean States themselves were forced to think about their own security",[208] and that the events were rooted in the economic difficulty of these very small

---

[204] Odeen Ishmael, "The Trail of Diplomacy-Part 8 " http://www.guyana.org/features/trail_diplomacy_pt8.html (accessed January 18, 2011). (hereinafter "The Trail of Diplomacy ").
"Non-Aligned Countries - Attendance at the March 1983 Summit Conference in Delhi," *Keesing's Record of World Events* 29 (1983): 32350-32351.
Pollard notes, "Guyana lodged a complaint with the Security Council in 1971 when Venezuela, in an unwarranted and unprovoked act of aggression, occupied Guyana's half of the island of Ankoko in the Essequibo river and which, incidentally, still remains under hostile occupation." Duke E. E. Pollard JCCJ, "International Law: The Protection of Small States) " http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/speeches/pollard/03-Intl (accessed January 20, 2011), 8. (hereinafter "International Law: The Protection of Small States").
[205] "Trouble in the Islands", *supra* note 199 at 160-175.
[206] *Ibid.* at 161.
[207] *Grenada Revolution and Invasion*, *supra* note 200.
[208] "The Contours of Modern Caribbean Politics", *supra* note 193 at 23.

states as they were searching for "a better alternative to traditional policies and practices."[209]

Paul Sutton, in "US Intervention, Regional Security, and Militarization in the Caribbean,"[210] provides insight into how US attention shifted to the Commonwealth Caribbean with the 1983 coup. Sutton observes that the US military presence in the Commonwealth Caribbean prior to the invasion of Grenada was small[211] and describes how the US invasion of Grenada was perceived as "the watershed year in which the influence of the United States, willy-nilly, came observably to replace that of Britain,"[212] which would translate into an increased US presence in the region. For Payne[213] and Sutton,[214] the US invasion of Grenada signaled an attempt by the US to reassert US hegemony in the region despite views proposed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who argue that, despite US political and military superiority, the US no longer possessed adequate resources to assert formal hegemony.[215]

---

[209] *Ibid.* at 13.
[210] Paul Sutton, (Eds.)Anthony Payne and Paul K. Sutton, "US Intervention, Regional Security, and Militarization in the Caribbean", *Modern Caribbean Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 277-293. (hereinafter "US Intervention, Regional Security, and Militarization in the Caribbean").
[211] *Ibid.* at 284.
[212] Tom Adams, Prime Minister of Barbados, Speech before the Royal Commonwealth Society, London, 9 Dec 1983. Cited in Sheila Harden, ed., *Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World: Report* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1985), 14. (hereinafter *Small is Dangerous*).
[213] Anthony Payne, *The International Crisis in the Caribbean*, 1984), 35-66. (hereinafter *The International Crisis in the Caribbean*).
[214] "US Intervention, Regional Security, and Militarization in the Caribbean", *supra* note 210 at 278, 291.
[215] For further discussion see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed. (Illinois: Scott, Foresman, 1989), 38-60. (hereinafter *Power and Interdependence*).
Also, Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 31-46. (hereinafter *After Hegemony*).

In contrast, Buzan provides insight into the interconnectedness of security concerns in the international community and goes past the limitation of realist "emphasis on the state"[216] when he notes that the "state and system cannot be disconnected from each other in relation to security."[217] Furthermore, Buzan's concept of a 'security complex' provides a basis for discussion into motives for the US invasion of Grenada as he recognizes "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another…", that geographical, political, strategic, historical, economic or cultural links bind the interests and actions of states.[218]

Barry Bartmann also provides perspective to the significance of the US invasion of Grenada in terms of microstate security, in that it "…demonstrated vividly the asymmetries of power between very small states and major powers" in the international community and marked "…the first occasion when a sovereign microstate found itself in open conflict with a major power."[219] Though

---

[216] *People, States, and Fear*, *supra* note 154 at 249.
[217] Buzan explains, "The Security problems of states cannot be assessed without reference to the system, and the character and dynamics of the system cannot be understood without reference to states."
Ibid. at 246, 251.
[218] *Ibid.* at 105-106.
[219] "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", *supra* note 47 at 363.
In addition, William Zartmann describes power asymmetry as being divided along the "North-South" axis and deals with international relations between the affluent, industrial, developed "First World," which generally comprises the northern countries, and the poor, raw-material-producing, underdeveloped "Third World" nations of the south. Zartmann explains that, "negotiations take place most productively under conditions of equality and trade-off, when parties are equally capable of contributing to a common good without which they would equally suffer, these productive conditions are lacking in situations of power asymmetry. One side has power, the other side is hurting; one likes things the way they are and the other wants to change them, without the means to make the other hurt more than it would be hurt itself if its demands were not heeded."

microstate viability to participate as an equal member in the international community was no longer contested, Bartmann notes that the events of Grenada induced "…increasing concern about the quality of the independence" of microstates, as it became apparent that "very small states pursue independent policies and partnerships in the global system at their peril."[220] Consequently, the events of Grenada became a "watershed in Caribbean affairs,"[221] which resulted in many works highlighting the concerns surrounding microstate security.

Microstate Vulnerability Literature – Mid-1980s

The events of Grenada influenced four major studies focused on the vulnerability of microstates: *Small is Dangerous*,[222] *Vulnerability: Small States in a Global Society*;[223] *Small States and the Commonwealth*;[224] and *States, Microstates and Islands*.[225] Though the Commonwealth Secretariat addresses

---

I. W. Zartmann, "Negotiating from Asymmetry: The North-South Stalemate," *Negotiation Journal* 1, no. 2 (1985): 121, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1985.tb00301.x. (hereinafter "Negotiating from Asymmetry").

[220] "Very Small States at the Millennium," s*upra* note 33 at 2.

[221] Robert Thomson, "Review: The Caribbean After Grenada," *International Journal* 40, no. 2, (Spring 1985): 379, http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/40202264.
For usage of watershed see William Safire and William Safire, *Safire's Political Dictionary*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 797.

[222] *Small is Dangerous*, *supra* note 212.

[223] *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society*, *supra* note 48.

[224] Peter Lyon, ed., *Small States and the Commonwealth* (London: Buttersworth, 1985). (hereinafter *Small States and the Commonwealth*).

[225] Though this work is not published by UNCTAD there are linkages as Edward Dommen and Philippe Hein were UNCTAD employees and the UNCTAD Secretariat contributed a chapter. *States, Microstates, and Islands*, *supra* note 174 at 216.

the impacts of natural disasters and economic vulnerability,[226] these particular studies focus on political vulnerability.[227]

Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World – Report of a Study Group of The David Davies Memorial Institute for International Studies, edited by Sheila Harden, signaled a return to the focus on very small state viability, now couched in the term vulnerability, as the study title suggests. The study questions the effectiveness of the UN collective security system and compares the events of the Falklands and Grenada. Where the Argentinean invasion was viewed as a violation of "such key UN principles as non-intervention, the non-use of force, and the right of self-determination of peoples" the British action was welcomed. However, the US action after an internal coup was perceived as "violating the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of an independent state" and despite US justification, intervention has continued to be perceived as "highly emotive."[228]

The study reaffirmed the misjudgment and lack of attention paid to microstate security, raising the problem of adequate security forces[229] and internal security concerns as "a coup in an island only thirty miles wide will have a far greater chance of success than one in a larger area where it might be contained."[230] Moreover, the repercussions for the international community

---

[226] *A Future for Small States, supra* note 1 at 19.
[227] Mark Bray," Small Countries in International Development," *Journal of Development Studies* 23, no. 2 (January 1987): 297, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=7137156&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live. (hereinafter "Small Countries in International Development").
[228] *Small is Dangerous*, *supra* note 212 at 103.
[229] *Ibid.* at 75.
[230] *Ibid.* at 2.

were reaffirmed, as the Grenada invasion had proved that microstate security extended beyond national borders.[231] In addition, the study addressed the political, economic and social stability determinants in microstate security;[232] these determinants are also addressed in the works of the Commonwealth Secretariat.

The 1984 Commonwealth Secretariat Consultative Group on the Special Needs of Small States published a report entitled *Vulnerability: Small States in a Global Society*.[233] The Consultative Group continued to use UNITAR's 1 million upper limit to define a microstate, as it was particularly relevant in the Commonwealth context[234] and represented a group of states that provided "clear evidence that severely restricted human resources can be a crucial constraint on a country's overall capacity to function effectively as an independent member of the international community."[235] In general, these very small states were "buffeted politically, economically and socially from both internal and external forces…."[236]

However, the report focuses on very small state vulnerability to external attack and discusses Commonwealth leaders' emphasis on the international community's "…moral obligation to provide effectively for the territorial integrity

---

[231] *Ibid.* at vii.
[232] *Ibid.* at 88-89.
[233] The events in Grenada prompted Commonwealth leaders at a meeting in 1983 to establish a Consultative group on the special needs of small states.
Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, *supra* note 48 at 1-2.
[234] 29 of the 49 Commonwealth states in the mid-1980s had populations under 1,000,000.
"Small Countries in International Development", *supra* note 227 at 295.
Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, *supra* note 48 at 9.
[235] *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society*, *supra* note 48 at 9.
[236] *Ibid.* at v.

of small states" in the Goa Declaration,[237] and calls for the strengthening of UN collective security. Moreover, the report discounts any argument based on the ineffectiveness of the UN's collective security system when it states that "steps should have been taken…to discourage the decolonization of very small territories which would obviously be unable to defend themselves militarily."[238] In addition, the report provides insight into the misconceptions of size by differentiating between 'weak states' and 'weak powers', asserting "the internal cohesion of small states translate into their strength, which also explains very small state emergence and survival in the international community.[239] Robert C. Kiste and R.A. Kerr exemplify this distinction in *The Potential for Soviet Penetration of the South Pacific*, recognizing the "presumed cohesion of small societies, which tends to promote a strong sense of national identity, an asset which makes 'subversion by stealth' less likely."[240]

Also from the Commonwealth, a collection of papers from the *Round Table*, a journal focused on Commonwealth international affairs, was published in 1985. *Small States and the Commonwealth*, edited by Peter Lyon, was presented at the 1985 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in the Bahamas.[241] Similar to other such literature of the time, vulnerability of small states is the focus. However, despite the negative connotations of the title, "Problems of Vulnerability", Faber's contribution to the collection provides

---

[237] *Ibid.* at 4-5.
[238] *Ibid.* at 5.
[239] *A Future for Small States, supra* note 1 at 14.
[240] Kiste, Robert C. and R.A. Herr and Centre for Asian and Pacific Studies, "The Potential for Soviet Penetration of the South Pacific Islands: An Assessment," (1984), 6.
[241] Small states and the Commonwealth, *supra* note 224.

insights into the assets of statehood, recognizing that jurisdiction and a legal international personality which can speak for itself in the international community are valuable resources. [242]

In addition to the Commonwealth, the UNCTAD Secretariat contributed to the literature in *States, Microstates and Islands.*[243] This collection of papers provides a thorough discussion of the definition of a microstate by Dommen and a review of microstate literature by Hein. Similarly, the issues of vulnerability and development of small states are addressed. However, *States, Microstates and Islands* provides a shift in focus to countries outside the Commonwealth system.

It is interesting to note that there was shared authorship of the four works in 1985. Peter Lyon was a member of the *Small is Dangerous* study group in addition to his own work. Neville Linton was a member of the consultative group for *Vulnerability: Small States in a Global Society*, and provided background materials for *Small is Dangerous*. This provides an explanation for the overlap of content, particularly between *Small is Dangerous* and *Vulnerability: Small States in a Global Society*, as they both focus on international affairs and provide similar recommendations.[244]

---

[242] Faber, M, (Ed.) Peter Lyon, "Problems of Vulnerability," *Small States in the Commonwealth* (London: Butterworth, 1985), 20.
[243] Though this work is not published by UNCTAD there are linkages as Edward Dommen and Philippe Hein were UNCTAD employees and the UNCTAD Secretariat contributed a chapter. *States, Microstates, and Islands*, *supra* note 174 at 216.
[244] "Small Countries in International Development", *supra* note 227 at 299.

Microstate Conventional Security threats in the 1990s

The concerns of microstate conventional security would resurface with the events of Kuwait in 1990. The "inefficacy of conventional military options for very small states,"[245] was confirmed with the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.[246] This event signaled only the second instance of an invasion and occupation of a microstate in the post WWII era.[247] Barry Bartmann, in *Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security*, illustrates the gravity of the annexation of Kuwait. Bartmann describes the events of Kuwait as a "more ominous" security threat to microstates and the international community than Grenada, as Iraq attempted to eradicate the "international legal personality of a sovereign state and a member of the UN…had it stood, would have been cause for grave concern for other vulnerable small states" in the international community.[248] John G. Stoessinger, in *Why Nations Go to War*,[249] contrasts the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and the annexation of Czechoslovakia by Hitler.[250] Following annexation in 1939, Czechoslovakia "ceased to exist", receiving no response from the great powers of the day until five months later when Hitler attacked Poland and WWII was officially declared.[251] In contrast, the annexation of Kuwait was condemned by the US and, with the support of

---

[245] "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", *supra* note 47 at 364.
[246] John George Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War* (California: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2005), 252. (hereinafter *Why Nations Go to War*).
[247] "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", *supra* note 47 at 366.
It is important to note the invasion and occupation of European microstates, particularly Luxembourg during WWI and WWII.
[248] *Ibid*. at 363-364.
[249] *Why Nations Go to War, supra* note 246.
[250] Czechoslovakia was considered a small state in the traditional sense at the time.
[251] *Why Nations Go to War, supra* note 246 at 252.

Britain, "the cornerstone of a thirty-nation coalition…under the United Nations flag" called for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.[252]

The events of Kuwait illustrated that a "consensus had been reached that international intervention was justified in cases of aggression by one country against another."[253] In contrast, Stoessinger remarks that consensus on international intervention regarding internal matters of the state "is not all-encompassing."[254] Nonetheless, the reaction of the international community, as expressed through the UN and the subsequent liberation of Kuwait, exemplified the capability of UN collective security, and reaffirmed an international system safe for small states.[255] The UN's response to the Kuwait invasion reasserted the UN to be a relevant organization capable of resolving interstate conflicts.

Non-Conventional Security Threats in the 1990s

Though the international system proved to be responsive to microstate security, Sutton, in *Size and Survival: The Politics of Security in the Caribbean and the Pacific*,[256] asserts that small state security needs are continuous, not contingent, and that the international community cannot guarantee their survival. As a result, Sutton argues that small states need to adopt more comprehensive

---

[252] The UN Resolution for the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait passed 14 to 0 with one abstention by the government of Yemen and was a historic vote as was the first instance on such a matter since the North Korean Aggression of 1950 that the security Council was not paralyzed by a Soviet veto. Stoessinger highlights that the 1950 vote was" an aberration" due to the absence of the Soviet delegate and was unlike the 1990 vote on Kuwait.
Ibid. at 256-257.
[253] *Ibid.* at 325.
[254] Though Stoessinger uses the example genocide in Africa he illustrates the international community's caution in intervening in the internal matters of a state at large.
Ibid.
[255] *A World made Safe for Small States*, *supra* note 70.
[256] Paul K. Sutton, *Size and Survival: The Politics of Security in the Caribbean and the Pacific* (London: Frank Cass, 1993). (hereinafter *Size and Survival*).

security policies.[257] This is reflected in the wake of economic pressure on social stability in the Commonwealth Caribbean, where the former Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, A.N.R. Robinson, warned during the 1989 CARICOM Summit that, unless the situation was addressed, "the Caribbean could be in danger of becoming a backwater, separated from the main current of human advance into the twenty-first century."[258] Ironically, Robinson was captured during a coup only a year later.

Bishnu Ragoonath's ("The Failure of the Abu Bakr Coup: The Plural Society, Cultural Traditions and Political Development in Trinidad,"[259]) describes the events of 1990 in Trinidad, which confirmed that microstates can be overrun by a few dozen armed troops, as the coup was instigated by just over 100 organized youths in the Muslimeen. Unlike Grenada, the events of Trinidad did not consume the international community. The 1990s would witness a focus from conventional security threats to non-conventional security threats facing microstates.

The security agenda of the 1980s was perceived mainly in conventional terms focused on the state and was eventually broadened to include more comprehensive issues such as economic and environmental threats to the state. However, the 1990s would introduce a shift in the "security paradigm,"[260] as

---

[257] *Ibid.* at preface.
[258] A. N. R. Robinson, "The West Indies Beyond 1992", paper prepared for the CARICOM Heads of Government Conference, Grand Anse, Grenada, July, 1989.
[259] Bishnu Ragoonath, (eds.) Paul K. Sutton, " The Failure of the Abu Bakr Coup: The Plural Society, Cultural Traditions and Political Development in Trinidad," *Size and Survival: The Politics of Security in the Caribbean and the Pacific* (London: Frank Cass, 1993).
[260] "Non-Traditional Security", *supra* note 203.

there was a deepening of the notion beyond the breadth of military security to include a consideration of the human and social impacts of security. James Rosenau provides insight into non-conventional security threats by distinguishing them "from conventional issues by the fact that they span national boundaries and thus cannot be addressed, much less resolved, through the actions undertaken only at the national or local level."[261] The increased recognition of non-conventional security threats are illustrated through the literature of Sutton and Payne, who continue a line of discussion similar to that of the 1960s and mid-1980s, arguing that microstates generally have "low viability and high vulnerability" in the international community.[262]

The mid-1980s literature in the Commonwealth Caribbean considered non-conventional security threats (drugs and smuggling, and related activities such as surveillance of waters, and protection of fisherman) as low-level security threats.[263] By the 1990s, Sutton, in "The Politics of Security in the Caribbean and the Pacific,"[264] observes that the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) - an island microstate regional organization - "placed a greater premium on potential threats from internal subversion, secession and mercenary action…", that is, threats of a non-conventional nature.[265] Conversely, mainland

---

[261] James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 106.
[262] "Lilliput Under Threat", *supra* note 68 at 591.
[263] Paul K. Sutton, "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean", *Size and Survival: The Politics of Security in the Caribbean and the Pacific* (London, England: Frank Cass, 1993), 15. (hereinafter "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean").
[264] *Size and Survival*, *supra* note 256.
[265] Sutton outlines non-conventional security threats such as regime instability, economic difficulties, environmental hazard, drug abuse, extra-territorial Jurisdiction and secession. Sutton uses the category of Small Island and Enclave Developing states (SIEDS) to categorize microstates, in:
"The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean", *supra* note 263 at 17.

Commonwealth Caribbean states such as Guyana and Belize were more concerned over conventional threats such as irredentist territorial claims by Venezuela and Guatemala.[266] Though Sutton recognizes similar geopolitical and security concerns among islands and enclave states,[267] despite observations raised by Selwyn that island characteristics have more to do with size than 'islandness' because such characteristics "…could be paralleled in small, remote mainland countries, or indeed in peripheral regions of many larger countries."[268] Sutton's differentiation between island and mainland microstates' geopolitical and security concerns speaks to the distinctiveness of Islands and ultimately surpasses arguments related to size. The further recognition of 'islandness' is demonstrated with UN initiatives in the 1990s.

The Issue of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Vulnerability

The particular vulnerability and distinct needs of small island developing states were further recognized by the UN under Agenda 21, with the call for a conference specific to this group of states, resulting in *The Barbados Plan of Action* (1994). The conference focused on the economic, environmental and social development vulnerabilities or disadvantages of islands and viewed them

---

Also, Sutton provides recommendations towards small state security strategies such as policy capacity, economic growth, regional cooperation, extra-regional association and diplomatic coordination.
Paul K. Sutton, "Towards a security Policy for Small Island and Enclave Developing States", *Size and Survival: The Politics of Security in the Caribbean and the Pacific* (London, England: Frank Cass, 1993), at 194-199.

[266] "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean", *supra* note 263 at 16-17.

[267] Sutton and Payne identify five common characteristics of small island enclave developing states, such as, openness, islandness, or enclaveness, resilience, weakness and independence. "Lilliput Under Threat", *supra* note 68 at 579.

[268] Percy Selwyn, "Smallness and Islandness," *World Development* 8, no. 12 (December 1980): 950.

as having "similar physical and structural challenges to their development."[269] SIDS asserted gross domestic product was an inadequate measure of their development, as it did not reflect the special problems associated with small size,[270] and requested the creation of a vulnerability index detailing SIDS vulnerabilities or challenges to development. Accordingly, Lino Briguglio's vulnerability index in *Small Island Developing States and their Economic Vulnerabilities*,[271] under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), sets out similar disadvantages to SIDS development, such as the characteristics of small size, insularity and remoteness, proneness to natural disasters, environmental factors, dependence of foreign sources of finance and demographic factors due to migration.[272] Such conclusions speak to the vulnerability of small island states and contribute to the notion of very small state unviability. However, Anthony Payne notes:

> "…one can still legitimately feel a sense of disappointment on reading much of what has been written about the economic implications of smallness. The main problem has been that the analysis has never been grounded in a common economic definition of small size. As a result, it slips and slices over the general area of smallness in a loose and unsatisfactory manner…
> In addition to these confusions, there is the further analytical difficulty that

---

[269] Similar development challenges include: small population, limited resources, remoteness, susceptibility to natural disasters, vulnerability to external shocks, and excessive dependence on international trade. In addition, SIDS growth and development can be further hindered by: high transportation and communication costs, disproportionately expensive public administration and infrastructure due to their small size, and little to no opportunity to create economies of scale. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Sustainable Development, "DSD: Areas of Work: SIDS - SIDS Members," http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_sids/sids_members.shtml (accessed April 13, 2010).
[270] Lino Briguglio, "Small Island Developing States and their Economic Vulnerabilities," *World Development* 23, no. 9 (September 1995): 1616, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9510290620&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live.
[271] *Ibid.* at 1615.
[272] *Ibid.* at 1616-1618.

> small states include those with developed and developing economies, the problems of which are not patently the same."[273]

Godfrey Baldacchino notes Thomas Kuhn's classic study of the role of paradigms in science and how it is the accumulation of 'discordancies' or 'anomalies' of evidence that cannot adequately be explained by traditional theory that forces a major paradigm shift in scientific thinking."[274]

Baldacchino points out that "students of small states have now anomalies aplenty that cannot be accounted for by the traditional economic theory of small states." This is illustrated in the work of Armstrong and Read, who assembled and compared the economic performance of small states, and came to conclusions that challenge traditional thinking towards the economic vulnerability or unviability of size: "Size has no significant effect upon a country's economic growth performance, such that hypotheses concerning the adverse implications of small size are unfounded in empirical fact…"

The strong growth achieved by some microstates is better than expected given the adverse effects of their small size. In addition, the performance of many large states is worse than expected given their beneficial size.

---

[273] A. Payne, ed., *Economic Issues* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 50.
Godfrey Baldacchino and David A. Milne, eds. Godfrey Baldacchino and David A. Milne, "Introduction", *Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands: The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 3-4. (hereinafter *Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands*).
[274] *Ibid.* at 4.
Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 210.

"[An] alternative interpretation… emphasizes the critical importance of inter-state differences in the quality of endogenous policy formulation and implementation."[275]

Geoffrey Bertram and Ray Watters offer an example of new thinking towards small island state economics through their Migration, Aid and Bureaucracy (MIRAB) model, which was originally "an attempt to model the stylized facts of modern economic development in a number of small Pacific islands,"[276] and also set out to "cast doubt on the widespread perception that small islands suffered from vulnerability."[277] The MIRAB model recognizes the sustainability and development prospects of small island economies which focus on the flow of aid, movement of migrants, operation of bureaucrats and active remittance networks.[278]

In addition to Bertram and Watters' MIRAB model, Godfrey Baldacchino sets out the idea of PROFIT: People considerations affecting citizenship, residence and employment rights (P); Resource management (R); Overseas engagement and ultra national recognition (O); Finance (F) and Transportation

---

[275] *Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands*, *supra* note 273 at 5.
Armstrong, H.W. and R. Read, "Trade, Competition and Market Structure in Small States: The Role of Contestability," *Malta, Bank of Valletta Review* 18 (1998): 12-13.

[276] Geoff Bertram, "Introduction: The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century," *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 47, no. 1 (April 2006): 1, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=20308326&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live. (hereinafter "The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century").
See also, Geoff Bertram and Ray Watters, "The MIRAB Economy in South Pacific Microstates., 26(3):497-519, September 1985." *Pacific Viewpoint* 26, no. 3 (September 1985): 497-519. (hereinafter "The MIRAB Economy in South Pacific Microstates").

[277] "The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century", *supra* note 276 at 2.

[278] The MIRAB model recognizes the "long standing economic and social system" of apparently stable and sustainable states due to the "stock flow relationship between the stock of overseas-resident migrants and their descendants, which sustained the flows of remittances and new migrants, and the stock of domestic public sector employment, which was sustained by the flow of aid."
Ibid.

(T) to reflect small island states that have more "proactive policy orientation and a disposition towards carving out procedural and jurisdictional powers."[279]

James McElroy's concept of Small Island Tourist Economies (SITEs) also complements the small island state economic models of MIRAB and PROFIT by identifying the economic benefits small island states acquire from proximity and spin-offs from US tourism.

MIRAB and PROFIT respond to claims of small island state vulnerability, such as Briguglio's vulnerability index, and reveal Baldacchino's observation of the "tendency to view very small states against models of development which are rooted in the experience of large industrialized countries", which has created a "tendency for policy makers in very small states to accept these models themselves precluding opportunities for truly imaginative niche strategies",[280] therefore, undermining the positive aspects and strengths of microstates.

Such examples of small island state economic models speak to small island state viability. SIS viability is also discussed by Paul Streeten in *The Special Problems of Small Countries* where Streeten suggests the resilience of very small size through political stability, a skilled and adaptable workforce and

---

[279] Godfrey Baldacchino, "Managing the Hinterland Beyond: Two Ideal-Type Strategies of Economic Development for Small Island Territories." *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 47, no. 1 (March, 30 2006): 45,54. (hereinafter "Managing the Hinterland Beyond").

[280] Godfrey Baldacchino, "Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Track Record of Very Small, Insular Economies," in David Milne and Godfrey Baldacchino (eds.), *Lessons from the Edge*, Forthcoming.
Cited in "Very Small States at the Millennium", s*upra* note 33 at 5.

an absence of administrative red tape. He argues that these things give very small economies a competitive edge in the search for investment.[281]

Despite recognition of political, economic and social viability of states of a very small size, the security and vulnerability of such states continues to be a focal point of small state literature, as with the Commonwealth Secretariat's 1997 report "*A Future for Small States – Overcoming Vulnerability.*"[282] The 1997 report is significant in its revision to the upper limit in defining a small state as having a population up to 1.5 million. Despite recognizing that any cut-off is somewhat arbitrary, the increase of world population and importance of regional consideration to countries just over the 1 million mark provided rationale to increase the cut-off to 1.5 million.[283] Moreover, the revision of the cut-off point reflects Burton Benedict's concept that smallness is relative and supports the requirement for a revision that reflects "the character of the international system…."[284]

Barry Bartmann acknowledges that the literature addressing the concerns of these very small states is "justified and necessary," [285] as he recognizes that the main obstacles of SIDS security are nonconventional security threats such

---

[281] Paul Streeten, "The Special Problems of Small Countries," *World Development* 21, no. 2 (2, 1993), 201.
[282] "A Future for Small states – Overcoming Vulnerability" is a follow-up publication to the 1985 Commonwealth report "Vulnerability: Small States in a Global Society". The 1997 Vulnerability report focuses on the political, economic, social and environmental security and development of small states. The report provides "recommendations on the influence of globalization, environment and political security at the national, regional, international and Commonwealth. *A Future for Small States, supra* note 1 at IX.
[283] *Ibid.* at 8-9.
[284] *Ibid.* at 8.
[285] "Very Small States at the Millennium", s*upra* note 33 at 8.

as civil insurgency and non-state players,[286] which "can be thoroughly corrosive in terms of the state's well-being...and may even threaten the identity and continuing existence of the state itself."[287]

Bartmann notes that "the survival of distinct cultures and community values in very small places may seem as nothing less than remarkable given the many predictions for their extinction."[288] Such survival is aided by "the friendship of a close mentor state, the support of regional bodies within their neighborhoods, and the extantism of the international system itself continue to be the major pillars of small island security."[289] Though Bartmann in *Very Small States at the Millennium: the Contest between Vulnerability and Opportunity*,[290] asserts that "the world is not entirely safe for very small states…" he acknowledges the changing patterns of the international system have encouraged a milieu more favorable to very small states, making the 20th century an ideal time for a small state system.[291] SIS in particular have become a focus of much interest, as demonstrated in "A World of Islands," which aims at moving from a continental paradigm of analyzing SIS scholarship and challenges to one where islands are placed in the centre of things.[292] This

---

[286] "Island War and Security", *supra* note 198 at 307, 314, 321.
[287] *Ibid.*
[288] Barry Bartmann, *Lilliput Revisited: Small Places in a Changing World* (Charlottetown: Institute of Island Studies, 1992), 2.
[289] "Island War and Security", *supra* note 198 at 307, 314, 321.
[290] "Very Small States at the Millennium", s*upra* note 33 at 8.
[291] *Ibid.*
[292] Godfrey Baldacchino, (Ed.) Godfrey Baldacchino, "Introducing a World of Islands," *A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader* (Charlottetown: Institute of Island Studies, 2007), 1.

change in perspective is also captured by Epeli Hau'ofa, in "Our Sea of Islands."[293]

In addition to small state viability, Bartmann recognizes a continued recognition of small island states demonstrated by a second wave of self-determination that "…is evident even among island microstates" as "even Lilliputs, if scattered it seems, can face even more diminutive Lilliputians of their own."[294] The case of Nevis demonstrates "the power of separate island identity," which illustrates "…the spectre of secession is ever present" and reveals that the 'self' in 'self-determination' of very small territories in a post-Cold War world has pushed beyond traditional colonial precepts of an earlier era.[295]

Literature Review Summary/Conclusion

The transformation of the international system and evolution of the sovereign state has been demonstrated from the Concert of Europe to current norms within the United Nations. The examination of small state and consequently very small state proliferation revealed a number of themes, including issues surrounding: small state viability and the issue of size; the correlation of very small size and islandness; conventional security threats are more the exception than the rule for SIDS; and that SIDS security is defined

---

[293] Waddell, Eric, Vijay Naidu, Epeli Hau`ofa, ed., *Rediscovering our Sea of Islands* (Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1993), 2-16.

[294] Though the post-Cold War, second wave of self-determination is most prevalent in the former USSR, its effects are "evident even among island states."
"Island War and Security", *supra* note 198 at 306- 311.

[295] Bartmann highlights "the Federation of St. Kitts- Nevis is a rarity in that its constitution allows for secession, providing Nesians approve of the decision in a referendum with a 66.6% (two-thirds) majority." The 1998 referendum for independence fell short of the two-thirds majority by less than 5% (62% supported independence).
Ibid.

more in the terms on non-conventional security and that the continued security of SIDS is best defined in terms of international cooperation and support. The nature of Commonwealth Caribbean SIDS security will be further examined in their relationship with the US, particularly in the context of the 1983 events in Grenada.

Chapter 3:

The US Role in the Commonwealth Caribbean

The US in the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America

The US has been perceived as a hegemonic power throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. However, despite such charges, particularly in the Commonwealth Caribbean with the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, the US relationship with the Commonwealth Caribbean can be viewed in terms of power asymmetry. The historic role of the US in the Commonwealth Caribbean tends to be perceived through the same lens as is Latin America. However, the very different histories, languages, legal structures and cultures of the two regions result in very different relationships with the US.

To reveal a more sensitive interpretation of the US relationship and consequent role in the Commonwealth Caribbean, its distinction from Latin America will be examined. First, it is necessary to compare the composition of the Commonwealth Caribbean[296] with that of Latin America, [297] as demonstrated in table 5, below.

[296] Though Belize and Guyana are not SIS they are part of the Commonwealth Caribbean and provide context and historical linkages to many topics discussed; particularly in terms of the separation of the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America.
"Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook", *supra* note 6.
[297] Latin America refers to states in the Americas and the Caribbean who initially claimed independence from Spain or Portugal with the exception of Haiti who gained Independence from France.
Ibid.

Table 5: The Commonwealth Caribbean versus Latin America

Commonwealth Caribbean	Independence	Latin America	Independence
Jamaica	1962	Haiti	1804
Trinidad and Tobago	1962	Columbia	1810
Guyana	1966	Chile	1810
Barbados	1966	Mexico	1810 Declared 1821 Recognized by Spain
Grenada	1974	Paraguay	1811
Dominica	1978	Venezuela	1811
St Lucia	1979	Argentina	1816
St Vincent and the Grenadines	1979	El Salvador	1821
Belize	1981	Guatemala	1821
Antigua and Barbuda	1981	Costa Rica	1821
St Kitts and Nevis	1983	Nicaragua	1821
		Peru	1821
		Honduras	1821
		Ecuador	1822
		Brazil	1822
		Bolivia	1825
		Uruguay	1828 from Brazil
		Cuba	1898 from Spain 1902 from US

		Panama	1821 from Spain 1903 from Columbia
		Dominican Republic	1844 from Haiti
		Puerto Rico	US territory with commonwealth status

Map 1[298] illustrates the proximity of the Commonwealth Caribbean (see Map 2, which also identifies sub-national jurisdictions of the Commonwealth)[299] to that of Latin America (see Map 3).[300]

Map 1

[298] "Central America & Caribbean," http://biogeodb.stri.si.edu/bioinformatics/images/maps/central_america_&_caribbean.jpg (accessed August 17, 2010).
[299] "Institute of Commonwealth Studies - Library - Regional Guide - Caribbean and Central America" http://commonwealth.sas.ac.uk/rg_carib.htm (accessed February 9, 2010).
[300] "Central America Caribbean, " http://www2.boonville.k12.mo.us/websites/Dkluck/Pictures/central-america-caribbean.jpg (accessed August 17, 2010).

Map 2


Bahamas
Bermuda
British Virgin Islands
Turks and Caicos Islands
Anguilla
Cayman Islands
Antigua & Barbuda
Belize
Jamaica
St Kitts & Nevis
Montserrat
Dominica
St Lucia
St Vincent & The Grenadines
Grenada
Trinidad & Tobago
Barbados
Guyana

Map 3


United States of America
Bahamas
Turks and Caicos Islands
Mexico
Cuba
Dominican Rep.
Jamaica
Haiti
Puerto Rico
Belize
Guatemala
El Salvador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Trinidad & Tobabgo
Venezuela
Colombia
© travelblog.org

Table 5 illustrates that sovereignty for Commonwealth Caribbean States is relatively new, compared with that of Latin America. The duration of international relationships between the US, Latin America and the Commonwealth Caribbean is also illustrated through the Organization of American States (OAS). The 35 members and permanent missions of the OAS consist of the US (1889); Suriname (1977), a former Dutch colony in Northern South America; and the following states listed in Table 6, below.[301]

Table 6: OAS Member States

OAS Commonwealth Nations	OAS Membership	OAS Latin American Nations	OAS Membership
Barbados	1967	Argentina	1889
Trinidad and Tobago	1967	Bolivia	1889
Jamaica	1969	Brazil	1889
Grenada	1975	Chile	1889

[301] "OAS: Member State " http://www.oas.org/en/states/member_state.asp?sType=007 (accessed February 15, 2010).
On July 5, 2009, the Organization of American States (OAS) invoked Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, suspending Honduras from active participation in the hemispheric body. The unanimous decision was adopted as a result of the June 28 coup d'état that expelled President José Manuel Zelaya from office. Diplomatic initiatives are ongoing to foster the restoration of democracy to Honduras.
On June 3, 2009, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Americas adopted resolution AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), which resolves that the 1962 Resolution that excluded the Government of Cuba from its participation in the inter-American system, ceases to have effect in the Organization of American States (OAS). The 2009 resolution states that the participation of the Republic of Cuba in the OAS will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the government of Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS.

Dominica	1979	Columbia	1889
St Lucia	1979	Costa Rica	1889
Antigua and Barbuda	1981	Ecuador	1889
St Vincent and the Grenadines	1981	Dominican Republic	1889
The Bahamas	1982	El Salvador	1889
St Kitts and Nevis	1984	Guatemala	1889
Canada	1990	Haiti	1889
Belize	1991	Honduras	1889
Guyana	1991	Mexico	1889
		Nicaragua	1889
		Peru	1889
		Paraguay	1889
		Uruguay	1889
		Venezuela	1889
		**Cuba	1902
		Panama	1905

US Foreign Policy in the Americas and the Caribbean

US foreign policy in Latin America and the Caribbean has often been generalized to be somewhat identical through the interpretations of the “Monroe

Doctrine (1823), passing through the Olney Declaration (1895), Roosevelt Corollary (1904 and 1905), Dollar Diplomacy (1912), the Good Neighbor policy (1933), the act of Havana (1940), the Kennan Corollary (1950), the Johnson Doctrine (1965), and the CBI (1982)…."[302] and, the Dulles Resolution (1954).

Shifts in US Foreign policy, through the Monroe Doctrine and its interpretations,[303] the Good Neighbor Policy;[304] and the Dulles Resolution;[305] has demonstrated that the US relationship with Latin America vis-*á*-vis that of

---

[302] Humberto Garcia-Muniz, (eds.) Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, "The United States and the Caribbean at Fin de Siecle: A Time of Transitions," *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation* (Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers, 2000), 48.

[303] "The three main concepts of the doctrine are: to separate spheres of influence for the Americas and Europe; non-colonization; and non-intervention were designed to signify a clear break between the New World and colonial powers of Europe and served as a warning towards European powers against interfering in the affairs of the newly independent Latin American states or potential United States territories."
"Monroe Doctrine, 1823," http://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/Monroe (accessed August 19, 2010).
Also, "Theodore Roosevelt's corollary to President James Monroe's famous doctrine of 1823 proclaimed that not only did America have the right, to block European attempts to re-colonize any of the Western Hemisphere, it also had the right to take over and shape up any nation in the hemisphere guilty of "chronic wrongdoing" or uncivilized behaviour that left it "impotent," powerless to defend itself against aggressors from the other Hemisphere, meaning mainly England, France, Spain, Germany and Italy."
Tom Wolfe, "The Doctrine that Never Died," *The New York Times Online,* 30 January 2005 (accessed August 18, 2010). (hereinafter "The Doctrine that Never Died").

[304] Franklin D. Roosevelt declared in his first inaugural address: "In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbour-the neighbour who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others-the neighbour who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbours."
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Samuel I. Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Random House, 1938), 1.

[305] The Dulles Resolution was the US response to political changes in Guatemala in the early 1950's. "The Dulles Resolution updated the Monroe Doctrine to fit in with the 20th Century experience on how foreign intervention, which Monroe sought to prevent, might be achieved through domestic conspiracy. It rebutted the sophistry that "native" Communists differ from the foreign variety. It branded Communist domination of any American state as a threat to the sovereignty of all, which should be met collectively "in accordance with all treaties."
"Pilot Dulles Outsails the Reds,"
http://books.google.ca/books?id=ZkgEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA29&lpg=PA29&dq=the+dulles+resolution+++guatemala&source=bl&ots=H5x-mmJaSd&sig=GgZECoYxITz8plnYEr6mBFcplSc&hl=en&ei=SQuqTbHDFMLq0gHh5OiOCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CBgQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=the dulles resolution + guatemala&f=false (accessed 12, 36).

the Commonwealth Caribbean is different from one another. Separation of US relations with Latin America, versus that of US relations with Britain, and Commonwealth Caribbean states and British dependencies in the Caribbean are exemplified in border disputes between Guyana and Venezuela, Belize and Guatemala, and the Falkland Islands and Argentina.

Venezuela and Guyana – The US Relationship and Olney Declaration (1895)

The British Guiana (Anglo)-Venezuelan Boundary witnessed Venezuela requesting US intervention in the dispute, which eventually occurred in 1895 and 1896 and signaled a more outward-looking US foreign policy. [306] Moreover, US intervention between Latin America and the Commonwealth Caribbean demonstrated US willingness to extend its interests in the region expressed through the Olney Declaration/Corollary,[307] and represents the first instance of US intervention in a Commonwealth Caribbean state.[308] The award of the Arbitration Tribunal proved to be unsatisfactory to Venezuela, despite US intervention. However, US intervention and resentment towards Britain due to

[306] Odeen Ishmael, "Guyana's Western Border - Introduction to the Documents," http://www.guyana.org/Western/Introduction.html (accessed February 9, 2010).

[307] Richard Olney, US Secretary of State from 1895-1897, and his interpretation and application of the Monroe doctrine as a basis of intervention demanding England for Arbitration in the Anglo-Venezuelan border dispute signalled a shift from a previously cautious U.S position to that of the threat of War.
George B. Young, "Intervention Under the Monroe Doctrine: The Olney Corollary," *Political Science Quarterly* 57, no. 2 (June 1942): 249-250, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2143553.
"85. Arbitration Agreement Between Guyana and Venezuela." http://www.guyana.org/features/guyanastory/chapter85.html (accessed October 4, 2010).

[308] This officially began in 1841 the Venezuela protesting a British Guiana encroachment on Venezuelan territory. The contested Schomburgk Line established in the 1840 survey of British Guiana eventually pushed British Guiana's border to Point Baima, at the mouth of the Orinoco River. Venezuelan protests of the new boundary lines and Britain's refusal for arbitration resulted in Venezuela, breaking diplomatic relations with Great Britain in 1876. Otto Schoenrich, "The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute," *The American Journal of International Law* 43, no. 3 (July 1949): 524-525, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2193650.

British 'pressure' on Venezuela to accept such an award speaks to US best interest of Latin American countries vis-á-vis interests of British Guiana at the time.[309] Even though Venezuela accepted the Arbitration Tribunals award, the sub-sequent publishing of the late Mr. Mallet-Prevost's Memorandum reopened the Venezuelan claim to the Western Essequibo River.[310] Though Venezuelan territorial claims did not affect Guyana's independence, the territorial claim continues to present an irredentist threat to the independent Commonwealth nation of Guyana. The Guyana-Venezuela border dispute has created suspicion between the two countries and that suspicion has subsequently been perpetuated among other states in the region. This has created two regional communities, Latin American states and the Commonwealth Caribbean states, which serves to illustrate the differentiation between the two, particularly in the context of US relations. In addition to Latin American irredentist threats to Guyana, the Commonwealth Caribbean country of Belize also experiences irredentist threats from the Latin American State of Guatemala.

Guatemala and Belize – US Relationship

At first, Belize and the US cultivated strong economic and diplomatic links due to an expression of US anti-colonialism and Belize's sentiment that Britain would be the main obstacle to its sovereignty.[311] However, Guatemala's

---

[309] *Ibid.*

[310] Mr. Mallet-Prevost's Memorandum claimed the Arbitral Tribunal decision of 1899 was a "political deal" between Great Britain and Russia.
Ibid. at 528.

[311] Originally the British colony of British Honduras, the colony's name was changed to Belize June 1, 1973 in anticipation of independence. British reluctance to self governance in Belize lasted till the 1960s.

territorial claim to the entirety of Belize represents another case of an irredentist threat to a Commonwealth nation from a Latin American country, and has proven to represent the main obstacle to Belize's independence.[312] Similar to the Britain-Venezuela border dispute, the US was requested to mediate once talks between Guatemala and Britain broke off in 1965. The US found itself caught between Latin American and Commonwealth Caribbean interests when its proposals for closer ties between Guatemala and Belize created potential for Belize becoming more dependent on Guatemala. In the end, the US proposals were denounced by Belize.[313] The failure of US mediation resulted in Belize requesting independence and defense guarantees from Britain.[314]

Though a procession of right wing governments in Guatemala since 1954 served US interests in the region, they also stirred Guatemalan national interests that witnessed pro-military Guatemalan governments mass their troops on the Guatemala/Belize border on a number of occasions. When talks from 1969 to 1972 broke off, Britain announced it was sending an aircraft carrier and

---

"Belize – Decolonisation and the Border Dispute with Guatemala," http://countrystudies.us/belize/14.htm (accessed August 30, 2010). (hereinafter "Belize – Decolonisation and the Border Dispute with Guatemala").

[312] The claim is based Guatemala's assertion that they inherited Spain's sovereign rights which date back to the 1786 Convention of London, giving Spanish sovereign rights over the area despite British control of the territory in 1821.

Ibid.

[313] It is important to note the US and Belize special relationship even though the US also had interests in Latin American states of Guatemala El Salvador and Nicaragua. US support of Guatemala is exemplified Dwight Eisenhower's support of a military Junta in the overthrow of Guatemala's elected government of Arbenz Guzman in 1954. This signalled the departure from Roosevelt's good neighbour policy and a return to "Big Stick diplomacy of an earlier era." Robert White, (Eds.) Mark Falcoff and Robert Royal. "Turnabout in US Policy," *Crisis and Opportunity: U.S. Policy in Central America and the Caribbean: Thirty Essays by Statesmen, Scholars, Religious Leaders, and Journalists* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984), 207.

"Belize - Relations with Guatemala " http://countrystudies.us/belize/85.htm (accessed January 19, 2011).

[314] "Belize - Decolonisation and The Border Dispute with Guatemala", *supra* note 311.

8,000 troops to Belize for an amphibious exercise.[315] This led to the massing of Guatemalan troops on the border.[316] Eventually talks resumed, but ceased again in 1975; cessation of talks influenced Belizean Premier of the day, George Price, to increase efforts towards independence. The increased efforts towards independence involved a push for further international recognition, particularly at the UN. Key players for further recognition included Commonwealth Caribbean states, particularly Barbados. The strategy for further international recognition by Belize influenced the US to move from its position of abstention to recognition, which influenced OAS member states, particularly Mexico. The eventual recognition of Belize by the Latin countries of Cuba, Mexico, Panama and Nicaragua, which constituted a break in Latin American solidarity, left Guatemala isolated on the issue, resulting in Belize achieving independence in 1981.[317]

The period following the independence of Belize saw an increase in US political, economic and military activity in the region. The US recognized the strategic significance of Belize, due to US military engagements in Central America, and this led to closer ties between the two countries. US diplomatic

---

[315] Guatemalan aggression require d the presence of the British military in Belize who had the most substantial foreign military base in Central America, with the exception of the United States.
Anthony J. Payne, "The Belize Triangle: Relations with Britain, Guatemala and the United States," *Journal of Interamerican Studies & World Affairs* 32, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 123, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9702025418&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live. (hereinafter "The Belize Triangle")

[316] (Ed) Tim Merrill, "Belize - Decolonization and the Border Dispute with Guatemala," Library of Congress Federal Research Division, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+bz0024) (accessed January 19, 2011). (hereinafter Tim Merrill).

[317] *Ibid.*
"Belize - Decolonisation and The Border Dispute with Guatemala", *supra* note 311.

staff grew from seven at the time of independence to more than 50 by 1990. The US also increased its assistance to the Belize Defence Force and sent military observers to joint British and Belizean forces, ensured more frequent visits by US warships, and deployed the US Army Corps of Engineers on a US AID-funded road and bridge building program in 1987. In addition, the US offered balance-of-payments assistance to Belize and US AID on domestic matters such as pricing, trade and the level of public savings. Closer ties between the two countries also witnessed the establishment of a broadcast relay station, access to US programming on Belizean television, and access to unofficial private investors such as Coca-Cola, which purchased an eighth of the country's land area to grow citrus.[318] Despite the independence of Belize in 1981, Guatemala did not recognize Belize until 1992. Moreover, the border dispute continues and is to go before the International Court of Justice at The Hague.[319]

Monarchism versus Republicanism and the Organization of American States

In addition to the historical/political tensions between Guyana and Venezuela, and between Belize and Guatemala, Roy Preiswerk discusses the challenges towards cooperation between the Latin American republics and the constitutional monarchies of the Commonwealth, as history has created two different worlds.[320] Preiswerk highlights that solidarity among Latin American

[318] "The Belize Triangle," *supra* note 315 at 129-131.
[319] Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook, "Belize: Disputes- International," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bh.html (accessed October 4, 2010).
[320] Roy Preiswerk, "The Relevance of Latin America to the Foreign Policy of Commonwealth Caribbean States," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 11, no. 2 (April 1969): 257,

states and similarly Commonwealth Caribbean states has engendered suspicion between the two regions, as the Commonwealth Caribbean was cautious of irredentist threats from Latin America. Latin America, in turn, had concerns of the Commonwealth Caribbean. The Commonwealth Caribbean comprised of ministates and raised the debate of inclusion of ministates in regional bodies such as the Organization of American States (OAS), which would also increase the number of English-speaking states, raising concern of voting solidarity between the two regions.[321] Moreover, "the economic concerns of traditional links of the West Indies and Guyana with the Commonwealth, the incompatibility of the economies from a static point of view, and the lack of cohesion of CARIFTA with regard to the foreign economic policies of members"[322] posed obstacles to Latin American and Commonwealth Caribbean relations.

Despite Latin American concerns the OAS welcomed Commonwealth Caribbean state membership, as was demonstrated with the admission of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago in 1967. This would prove to open the way for increased relations between Latin America and the Commonwealth Caribbean. However, border disputes between Guyana and Venezuela and between Belize and Guatemala serve as examples where the Commonwealth

---

http://www.jstor.org/stable/165370. (hereinafter "The Relevance of Latin America to the Foreign Policy of Commonwealth Caribbean States").

[321] *Ibid.* at 260-261.

[322] *Ibid.* at 262.

In addition, Preiswerk notes that Latin American protectionist policies of the 1960s may also be a consideration to obstacles in Latin American and Commonwealth Caribbean Relations. For further discussion on Latin American policies see, Sidney Samuel Dell, *A Latin American Common Market?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 336.

Miguel Wionczek, *Latin American Economic Integration: Experiences and Prospects* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 310.

Caribbean viewed the US as favoring Latin America states' interests over those of the Commonwealth Caribbean.[323]

The differences between Latin America and the Commonwealth Caribbean would draw the US into more than mediation of border disputes with the events of the Falklands War in 1982.

The Falkland Islands War

The Falkland Islands[324] have been at the centre of external ownership for most of its history: it has been claimed by France, Spain, Argentina and Britain, and ownership issues continue today over shipping lane rights and potential off shore oil reserves.[325] Of these countries, Argentina has never abandoned its claim to the Islands, despite British possession of them. The development of offshore oil off the Falklands by a UK oil exploration company has increased tensions in the dispute over the Falklands.[326] The British investigated decolonizing the islands in the 1970s, but it was not an initiative of the inhabitants. In response to the lack of political change on the islands, Argentina

[323] US intervention on behalf of Latin America's, Venezuela, in the border dispute with Great Britain (see Guyana – Venezuelan section above), in addition to favourable recommendations to Guatemala by US mediation in the border dispute with Belize (see Belize – Guatemala section above), created suspicion of US favouritism to Latin American states.
[324] The Argentinean name for the Islands is Islas Malvinas.
[325] "BBC News - Argentina Toughens Shipping Rules in Falklands Oil Row " http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8518982.stm (accessed February 17, 2010).
[326] Barry Bartmann, (Eds.) Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne, "Patterns of Localism in a Changing Global System" *Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands: The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 44.
"Rockhopper Shares Soar on Falklands Oil Upgrade." *The Guardian*, 4 June 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/marketforceslive/2010/jun/04/oil-oilandgascompanies (accessed January 19, 2011).

invaded the Falklands in 1982, prompting almost immediate British action to reclaim the territory.

Once again the US found itself between Latin America and the Commonwealth Caribbean. Former US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, considered a policy of neutrality in the Falklands War to be in the best interests of the US. Kirkpatrick was concerned that the US should not jeopardize its relations with Latin America by backing Britain. However, Kirkpatrick's position of neutrality was questioned as, "only hours after the 1982 invasion of the Falklands, she notoriously attended as guest of honour a reception at the Argentine Embassy in Washington."[327] She then went on television to assert that if the islands rightly belonged to Argentina its action could not be considered as "armed aggression".[328] Conversely, the Europeanists in the US State Department and the Pentagon could not imagine that the *United States* would not support a NATO member. Former US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, was aware of these conflicting pressures and held that the United States was uniquely placed to negotiate a political settlement. More importantly, he asserted that playing mediator between Argentina and the United Kingdom would at the very least provide Washington with an excuse for not taking sides immediately. When the Argentinians

---

[327] "Jeane Kirkpatrick: US Ambassador to the UN Who Strove to Get President Reagan to Take Argentina's Part in the Falklands Conflict." *Times Online* Obituary, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article1088794.ece (accessed February 10, 2010).
(hereinafter "Jeane Kirkpatrick").
[328] *Ibid.*

rejected proposals for a settlement, Washington officially committed to Britain's side in the dispute.[329]

US support for Britain is highly significant in a military sense, as Britain benefited from US fuel, Sidewinder missiles, other arms, vital US satellite intelligence that enabled it to win the war,[330] and reinforced strong ties between the US, Britain and the Commonwealth Caribbean. US division over the matter illustrates the requirement for the US to cooperate with other states, which illustrates the limits to US foreign policy as Jeane Kirkpatrick noted that, "we will need to learn to be a power, not a superpower. We should prepare psychologically and economically for reversion to the status of a normal nation…."[331]

The depth and complexity of US involvement in Latin America and the Commonwealth Caribbean is exemplified through the cases/events already mentioned. However, the US relationship with the greater Caribbean has often been interpreted through the US invasion of Grenada in 1983.

Grenada

In order to examine the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, some perspective into the events leading up to the US invasion is required. In March

---

[329] Lawrence D. Freedman, "The Special Relationship, Then and Now," in *Foreign Affairs* 85, (2006): 6, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=20586929&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live.

[330] "Jeane Kirkpatrick", *supra* note 327.

[331] Though Jeane Kirkpatrick did not coin the words until the ending of the Cold War in 1989, they illustrate that the US recognized limits to its power.
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 1 (1989): 16, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044284.

1979, a coup d'état in Grenada caught the attention of the international community. Forty-five party members of the New Jewel movement, a Marxist socialist party, mounted an attack to overthrow the government of Sir Eric Gairy,[332] exemplifying how easily one of the smaller sovereign states in the western hemisphere could be overtaken. Furthermore, the uprising of the New Jewel Movement has been described as:

> "...striking terror in to the hearts of the smaller island governments... nearly all (of whom) have come out against the coup, seeing it, especially because of their own small size, as a threatening example to their own leftists with whom Bishop, as a regional human rights lawyer, had close personal relations...."[333]

This fear resonated particularly in Antigua, St. Kitts and Nevis, Dominica and St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Barbados, all of which openly disapproved the action of the New Jewel Movement and refused to recognize the new government due to concerns that recognition would ultimately serve future political uprisings in the region. However, the rise of the New Jewel Movement gradually gained support from other Caribbean states. Expectedly, regimes of similar ideology such as Jamaica's Michael Manley and Guyana's Forbes Burnham, Cuba's Fidel Castro and the Soviet Union supported the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG).

Britain's tradition of recognizing governments even if they disapprove of them resulted in recognition of the PRG in Grenada despite anti-PRG

---

[332] *Grenada Revolution and Invasion*, *supra* note 200 at 16.
[333] Latin America Political Report, 23 March 1979 as cited in Tony Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics, and Society* (Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers, 1985), 59. (hereinafter *Grenada: Politics, Economics, and Society*).

sentiments of the Thatcher government, which led to OECS recognition.[334] However, a more resigned attitude toward the PRG was adopted in CARICOM where the new government was accepted but failed to be embraced.[335] This position largely reflects the international attitude toward the PRG and Grenada at the time; particularly the US attitude, which also recognized the new PRG government despite its communist nature.[336]

The 1979 coup d'état effectively raised international relation tensions among states in the eastern Caribbean and the western hemisphere as a whole, and inspired the creation of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS).[337] However, it was a second, more violent coup in October 1983 which prompted US intervention in Grenada.

---

[334] *Ibid.*

[335] *Ibid.* at 63.

[336] US recognition of Grenada's PRG government reflects US foreign policy of the Carter Administration, which embraced "globalist goals like 'development', 'fairness' 'and pursuit of human rights." Moreover, Carter's liberalization of US foreign policy has been described by Caribbean governments as "an era of friendly cooperative relations with the United States." *The International Crisis in the Caribbean*, *supra* note 213 at 42, 47.
Also, Carters moralist approach consists of the following five principles towards the Caribbean: 1) Significant support for economic development; 2) Firm commitment to democratic practices and human rights; 3) Clear acceptance of ideological pluralism; 4) Unequivocal respect for national sovereignty; 5) Strong encouragement of regional cooperation and an active Caribbean role in world affairs.
P. C. Habib, 'address by the US ambassador-at-large to the Miami conference on the Caribbean, 28 November 1979' in United States Department of State, *US relations with the Caribbean and Central America* (Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, 1979), 2.
The International Crisis in the Caribbean, *supra* note 213 at 44.

[337] "RSS - what we are" http://www.rss.org.bb/rss1.htm (accessed March 3, 2010). (hereinafter "RSS - what we are").
The RSS was established by a Memorandum of Understanding in 1982 by the islands of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines, where if a member state deems its security threatened it has the right to request assistance from any or all of the member states.
Edmund Dillon, "Regional Security Cooperation: Traditional and Non-traditional Areas, Caribbean Security" in Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change* (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 469. (hereinafter "Regional Security Cooperation: Traditional and Non-traditional Areas, Caribbean Security").

The 1983 coup d'état in Grenada witnessed a left wing revolt of approximately 50 armed supporters led by Bernard Coard, resulting in the capture and execution of PRG Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and high-level government officials.[338] The leftist leaders and military supporters took over the government under the Revolutionary Military Council. The coup d'état received 'hostile reactions' from even its strongest communist supporters, such as Cuba's Fidel Castro,[339] as prior acceptance of the PRG turned to regional and international condemnation.

The violence of the 1983 coup d'état increased international and regional security concerns. In particular, OECS countries of Dominica, St. Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Montserrat, requested assistance from Jamaica, Barbados and the US.[340] The US "responded to the plea of the Organization of the East Caribbean States (OECS) to intervene". [341] This resulted in the deployment of a multi-national force, with contingents from Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Barbados, and Jamaica. The US coalition forces invaded Grenada on 25 October 1983.

---

[338] "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security", *supra* note 47 at 367.
[339] *Grenada: Politics, Economics, and Society*, *supra* note 333 at 164.
[340] Even though OECS "leaders asked the United States to lead and organize a joint Commonwealth Caribbean invasion of Grenada", there is debate on the amount of US influence upon the OECS decision to request US assistance.
Grenada Revolution and Invasion, *supra* note 200 at 149.
[341] Frederic L. Pryor, *Revolutionary Grenada: A Study in Political Economy* (New York: Praeger, 1986), 357.
In addition to the OECS request for assistance to the US, the US invasion of Grenada has been legitimized on the request for assistance from Grenadian Governor-General Paul Scoon on the basis of the same OECS Treaty. For a more detailed discussion see: Frederic L. Pryor, *Revolutionary Grenada: A Study in Political Economy*, 1986), 358. See also: *Grenada Revolution and Invasion*, *supra* note 200 at 157.

The Shift in US Foreign Policy and the New Right

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 led to a shift in US foreign policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Reagan Administration was highly critical of President Carter's ideological pluralism and liberalism which recognized the PRG in Grenada and countered with concerns of Soviet-Cuban militarism in the region and throughout the Third World.[342] In addition, the US perceived Britain's withdrawal in the Commonwealth Caribbean as leaving a vacuum in which tiny economically vulnerable states such as Grenada were susceptible to exploitation by Cuba,[343] leading the US to fear the "prospect of a communized Caribbean Basin."[344] This provides insight into US President Ronald Reagan's invasion of Grenada, which exceeded the Carter Administration's policy of 'military containment' to that of 'urgent and necessary military action' as a response to political unrest in the eastern Caribbean. However, the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 received a mixed response from the international community.

[342] The US ambassador to the United Nations at the time, Jeane Kirkpatrick, viewed the Carter administration as the problem, as she stated: "American policies have not only proved incapable of dealing with problems of Soviet/Cuban expansion in the area, they have possibly contributed to them and to the alienation of major nations, the growth of neutralism, the destabilization of friendly governments, the spread of Cuban influence, and the decline of US power in the region." *The International Crisis in the Caribbean*, *supra* note 213 at 48.
[343] *Ibid.*
[344] *Grenada Revolution and Invasion*, *supra* note 200 at 55.

International Response to the Invasion

International reaction is best illustrated through the UN Security Council resolution denouncing the US invasion of Grenada,[345] which passed 11 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions. Guyana, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe, France, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Poland, Malta, Pakistan, China and Jordan voted in favour of the resolution. The US was the sole vote against, thereby vetoing the resolution. Togo, Zaire and Britain were the three abstentions. This led Nicaragua and Zimbabwe to take the resolution to the UN General Assembly, where no veto existed. Belgium amended the resolution with a clause to hold free elections in Grenada as soon as possible. The resolution passed 108 votes to 9, with a number of countries abstaining. The only countries to support the US were Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, El Salvador and Israel.[346] Despite limited support for the US invasion, the invasion was largely considered as an example "of a big power trampling on the sovereignty of a small country",[347] and created tensions in the international community, as demonstrated between the US and Britain,[348] the Caribbean[349] and Latin

[345] The draft resolution tabled by Guyana, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe to the UN Security Council declared that the council 1) Deeply deplores the armed intervention in Grenada which openly violates international law and the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that state; 2) Deplores the death of innocent civilians as a result of the armed intervention; 3) Urges all states to show the strictest respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Grenada; 4) Urges that the armed intervention be immediately stopped and that the foreign troops be withdrawn immediately from Grenada; and 5) Requests the Secretary-General to closely observe the follow-up of the situation in Grenada in to report to the council within 48 hours of the enforcement of this resolution.
United Nations weekly news summary, (2 November), 1983.
[346] *Grenada Revolution and Invasion*, *supra* note 200 at 176.
[347] *Ibid.* at 169.
[348] Though US communication to Britain on the military action was openly questioned, Britain had no intention of condemning the invasion in light of "difficulties...caused by the fact that Grenada was a Commonwealth country whose Queen was also Queen of England." However, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's tensions with the US over the invasion were obvious and

America.[350] The disparity of power between the US and the SIDS of Grenada resulted in the US invasion of Grenada being labelled as the resurgence of US hegemony in the Caribbean as "...any struggle between a colossus like the US and a tiny island, the US is going to lose in terms of public opinion. The US looks foolish or hegemonic; it's a no-winner."[351]

US Hegemony versus US Power Asymmetry

The US invasion of Grenada has been seen as an attempt to reassert US hegemony and stem the influence of communist regimes like Cuba and the Soviet Union in the region.[352] However, global US hegemony in the post WWII

---

signalled "President Reagan had failed to carry with him his closest ally in the western world." For more discussion on Britain's reaction to the US invasion of Grenada, see: *Ibid.* at 170-171.

[349] The Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago opposed the military intervention in Grenada, unlike the interventionist states of Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. The division on the matter is exemplified by the strain of Guyana's and Trinidad and Tobago's relations with Jamaica, where it was felt that Jamaica had shown greater loyalty to the US than to the Commonwealth Caribbean.

Ibid. at 152, 172.

In addition, the US invasion of Grenada created tensions between Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, exemplified when "Adams publicly called the Trinidadian ambassador to Barbados a liar for denying that he had been informed of the invasion plans and asked that he be withdrawn." In the event, Trinidad supported its ambassador. Though temporary, Trinidad and Tobago requested Barbados not to send an envoy to the Port of Spain.

Ibid. at 172.

International Herald Tribune, 1 November 1983.

[350] Brazil, Mexico, Columbia, Venezuela and Uruguay condemned the US invasion of Grenada and charged the Commonwealth Caribbean countries involved in the invasion were seen to demonstrate an "inconsistency of claims made then in defence of the principle of non-intervention and the self-determination of peoples" as they supported the British claim to the Falkland Islands in the Falklands War a year earlier. Furthermore, the US had close allies in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica, which combined with its Caribbean supporters, resulted in sufficient US support in the OAS to avoid a resolution of condemnation being brought to a vote. Anthony Payne, remarks that "this represented a relative diplomatic success for the United States" as "the OAS was legally the competent international authority to have dealt with the situation in Grenada.

G*ranma*, 6 November 1983.

Grenada Revolution and Invasion, *supra* note 200 at 174.

[351] Gary Williams's correspondence with Robert Pastor, former National Security Council member, February 18, 2003. Cited in Gary Williams, *US-Grenada Relations: Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 165.

[352] *The International Crisis in the Caribbean*, *supra* note 213 at 35-66.

era was considered to be in global decline with the outcome of the war in Vietnam. [353] Moreover, US resources to assert the political, economic, and social requirements of formal hegemony were arguably in decline.[354]

Despite a focus on state interdependence within the international community,[355] the Commonwealth Caribbean was cautious of close links with the US.[356] Furthermore, the US invasion of Grenada can be interpreted as a response to the violence of the 1983 coup d'état in an attempt by the US and OECS states to attain security: "If it is assumed that most statesmen most of the time seek security rather than hegemony and that power is regarded as means to attain security, there is at least a possibility that there could be an all-round increase in security."[357] Considering US intervention in Grenada did result in 'an all-round increase in security,' which will be further discussed in following chapters, the re-assertion of US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean is questionable. While the argument of the re-assertion of US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean with the US invasion of Grenada is open for debate, the demonstration of power asymmetry between the US and Grenada is not.

---

[353] "Rethinking United States-Caribbean Relations", *supra* note 72 at 74.

[354] Keohane and Nye argue the US no longer possessed adequate resources to meet the extensive requirements to assert formal hegemony. For further discussion see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. in Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, *supra* note 215 at 38-60. Also, Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, *supra* note 215 at 31-46.

[355] *The International Crisis in the Caribbean*, *supra* note 213 at 42.

[356] "The establishment of closer links with the United States was not necessarily a popular idea in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The feeling of substituting one form of foreign domination for another and the unpleasant experiences suffered by many black West Indians in the United States account for the limited enthusiasm which large segments of the West Indian public are able to generate for this development."
"The Relevance of Latin America to the Foreign Policy of Commonwealth Caribbean States", *supra* note 320 at 256.

[357] William Fox, *The Super-powers: the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union — Their Responsibility for Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944), 11.
William T. R. Fox, "E. H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision," *Review of International Studies* 11, no. 1 (January 1985): 13, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097028.

US Caribbean Power Asymmetry

"The power asymmetry in North-South negotiations is many layered."[358]

In the case of the US invasion of Grenada, military power asymmetry was illustrated as the 6,000-strong US force demonstrated their superiority by occupying their 'major military objectives within 4 days.[359] Moreover, William Zartmann describes the "North-South" relationship as "the confrontation between developed societies and less developed societies locked into a relationship of interdependence which only accentuates the power imbalance."[360] Political unrest in Grenada with the violent coup d'état in 1983 proved to illustrate the interdependence of Commonwealth Caribbean and US security, as US President Ronald Reagan observed "…it isn't nutmeg that is at stake in the Caribbean and Central America; it is the United States National Security."[361] Moreover, the US invasion of Grenada signaled the turning point in US-Commonwealth Caribbean relations, as the US moved from its relatively small role, to replacing Britain as the major player in the region.[362]

This turning point further demonstrated the 'superpower' status of the US in relation not only to small states or powers, but also to the major or great powers. Therefore, to claim that small island states are insecure or lack

---

[358] "Negotiating from Asymmetry," supra note 219 at 123.
[359] *Grenada Revolution and Invasion*, *supra* note 200 at 160.
[360] "Negotiating from Asymmetry," supra note 219 at 123.
[361] "Central America and El Salvador, March 10, 1983," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 19, no.10 (March 14, 1983): 377.
[362] Paul Sutton, (eds.) Anthony Payne and Paul K. Sutton, "US Intervention, Regional Security, and Militarization in the Caribbean," *Modern Caribbean Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 284. (hereinafter "US Intervention, Regional Security, and Militarization in the Caribbean").

necessary security capabilities due to an inability to thwart a superpower invasion is unreasonable.

Furthermore, the violence and conventional security of Grenada proved to be the cause of underlying political and economic concerns, [363]and illustrated that even the security of a small island state could translate into security concerns for the wider international community.[364] The recognition of political and economic aspects to commonwealth security prompted an increase of diplomatic, economic and military cooperation between the US and Commonwealth Caribbean governments.

The Commonwealth Caribbean and Closer Ties to the United States

The Cold War created an atmosphere in which the US was eager to reward friendly Latin American and Caribbean states. However, Latin American and Caribbean states were also eager to accept economic support in exchange for anti-communist support. Nonetheless, increased political, economic and social ties with the US would prove to increase the international security of Commonwealth Caribbean states.

Increased diplomatic ties between the Commonwealth Caribbean and the US were apparent before the US invasion of Grenada as Jamaica's Edward Seaga was one of the first foreign heads of government to visit Washington. His visit would signal an increase of Caribbean government official visits to the

[363] Report on the Inter-American Dialogue, *The Americas at a Crossroads* (Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington 1983), 40. Cited in The *International Crisis in the Caribbean*, *supra* note 213 at 157.
[364] "Non-Traditional Security," *supra* note 203.

US.[365] Efforts to build closer ties between the Commonwealth Caribbean and the US are also illustrated by the efforts of Seaga and Tom Adams of Barbados in the creation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).[366] In addition to increased Commonwealth Caribbean/US ties, the CBI was also a response to "the growing rejection of US hegemony" in Central America and the Caribbean, as exemplified by the Nicaraguan and Grenadian revolutions.[367]

Though the effectiveness of the CBI has been the centre of much debate, the Reagan Administration commenced a cooperative relationship in the Caribbean, and made substantial investments in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Despite arguments of the effectiveness of the CBI, it was integral to US-Commonwealth Caribbean relations. The CBI signaled recognition of the Commonwealth Caribbean creating a more favorable environment for English-speaking countries in the region, and signaled that the Commonwealth Caribbean was out of Latin America's backyard.

The CBI consisted of bilateral aid, tax incentives, concessionary trade agreements and commitment of US aid dollars to the Commonwealth Caribbean region, and signalled an increase in US investment in, and cooperation with, Caribbean governments.[368] Table 7 illustrates the increase of US Economic and Development assistance to CARICOM states from 1980 to 1986.[369]

---

[365] *Grenada Revolution and Invasion*, *supra* note 200 at 55.
[366] *The International Crisis in the Caribbean*, *supra* note 213 at 55.
[367] Abigail B. Bakan, David Cox and Colin Leys, *Imperial Power and Regional Trade: The Caribbean Basin Initiative* (Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1993), 2, 5.
[368] US investment to Central America and the Caribbean witnessed economic increases of 212% and total military increases of 2052% from 1980 to 1986. However, the majority of funding went to Central America.

Table 7: Economic/ Development Assistance to selected CARICOM States and to The Eastern Caribbean (millions of dollars)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Jamaica	12.7	69.1	136.9	115.0	108.0	98.0	124.4
The Eastern Caribbean	46.1	27.1	70.0	66.0	55.0	52.0	66.1

In addition to US foreign assistance to the Commonwealth Caribbean, the US increased security assistance by 22,542.0% from 1979 to 1986 in the form of military sales grants: military education and military training to the CARICOM region are illustrated in Table 8.[370] Ultimately, direct military assistance from the

---

Cited in H. Michael Erisman, "The Caricom States and US Foreign Policy: The Danger of Central Americanization," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 31, no. 3 (Autumn 1989): 162, http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/165896. (hereinafter "The CARICOM States and US Foreign Policy: The Danger of Central Americanization").

[369] The Eastern Caribbean consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St Vincent and St. Kitts. US assistance to CARICOM states from 1980 to 1986 represented a 2215% economic increase.

Source: US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Special Report No. 97, "Background On the Caribbean Basin Initiative" (March 1982), pp.6-7; and US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 467, "Bilateral Assistance for Latin America And the Caribbean, FY 1984" (March 1983), pp.7-8; and US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 666, (March 5, 1985), p.3.

Erisman, i*bid.* at 163.

[370] The Eastern Caribbean consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St Vincent and St. Kitts.

Source: US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy 166, " Foreign Assistance Proposals: Latin America And the Caribbean" (April 16, 1980); H. Michael Erisman, "Colossus Challenged: US Caribbean Policy in The 1980s" in H. Michael Erisman and John D. Martz (Eds.), *Colossus Challenged: The Struggle For Caribbean Influence* (Boulder: Waterview Press, 1982), 13; US Department of State, Special Report No. 108, "International Security and Development Cooperation Program" (April 4, 1983); US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 467, " Bilateral Assistance For Latin America and the Caribbean, FY 1984" (March 1983); US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 666,, "Aid and US Interests in Latin America and The Caribbean" (March 5, 1985); and data provided by the US Department of State.

Note: The percentage of increase, 1980-1986 are as follows:

Military Sales Credits	= 0.0%
Military Education/Training	= 951.1%
Military Grants	= 1,900.0%
Overall Total	= 22,542.0%

Erisman, i*bid.* at 171.

US to the Eastern Caribbean "increased from less than $100,000 a year in 1981 and 1982 to more than US$5.6 million a year in 1985-87."[371]

Table 8: US Security Assistance in the CARICOM Region (US$ millions)

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Military Sales Credits								
Bahamas	-------	-------	-------	1.0	-------	.06	-------	-------
Jamaica	-------	-------	1.59	1.0	3.25	-------	-------	-------
*E. Caribbean	-------	-------	5.0	7.5	3.25	-------	-------	-------
Military Education/Training								
Antigua	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	.05	-------	-------
Bahamas	-------	-------	.06	.06	.06	-------	.05	.05
Barbados	.006	.058	.084	.10	-------	.075	-------	-------
Dominica	-------	.01	.008	.06	-------	.05	-------	-------
Grenada	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	.10	-------	-------
Jamaica	-------	-------	.025	.075	.175	.20	.25	.275
St. Kitts	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	.025	-------	-------
St. Lucia	-------	.01	.008	.06	-------	.05	-------	-------

[371] Paul Sutton, (eds.) Anthony Payne and Paul K. Sutton, "US Intervention, Regional Security, and the Militarization in the Caribbean," *Modern Caribbean Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 285.

St. Vincent	-------	.01	.008	.06	-------	.05	-------	-------
E. Caribbean	-------	-------	-------	-------	.21	.40	.30	.40
Trinidad	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	.05	.05
Grants								
Belize	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	.50	.50	1.0
Jamaica	-------	-------	-------	1.00	3.25	4.00	5.00	8.00
E. Caribbean	-------	-------	-------	1.00	2.25	3.00	5.00	10.00

In addition to political and economic initiatives, the US committed to a supportive military program which fostered an increase of US military presence in the Commonwealth Caribbean with the creation of the US Forces Caribbean Command in 1981.[372] An increased US military presence resulted in joint exercises Solid Shield 80, Readex 80, Ocean Venture and Operation Amber in 1981, and Universal Trek in 1983. This was just the beginning of other joint military operations between the US and the Commonwealth Caribbean such as *Modus Operandi* to combat drug trafficking; *Operation Buccaneer* in Jamaica against marijuana growing and trafficking; and large exercises such as Exercise Palm in 1985; *Tradewinds* in 1995 and 96 which involved, at varying times, all Anglo Caribbean countries, the US, Britain, France and the Netherlands.[373]

[372] For further discussion on US Forces Command in the greater Caribbean and Central America see Paul Sutton, *Ibid.* at 286.
[373] Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century* (Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2004), 5,43,46,65.

The progress of economic and military cooperation between the US and the Caribbean is reflected in the continuation of US foreign assistance dollars to the Commonwealth Caribbean into the 21st century; foreign assistance dollars to the Commonwealth Caribbean are illustrated in Table 9. [374]

Table 9: US Foreign Assistance to the Caribbean, 2002-2007 (US$ millions)

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006 Est.	2007 Req
Bahamas	1.444	1.336	1.264	1.294	2.512	0.805
Jamaica	19.102	22.337	24.186	22.459	19.472	16.617
Trinidad &Tobago	0.432	0.540	0	0.049	1.028	2.894
Eastern Caribbean	—	15.491	6.900	4.958	4.813	4.774
Third Border	—	3.000	4.976	8.928	2.970	3.000

Moreover, cooperation between the US and Commonwealth Caribbean small island states continues, as exemplified by the “Conference on the Caribbean: A 20/20 Vision” in 2007, which brought heads of state from the 15-nation Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to Washington for the first time in 10

[374] Source: US Department of State. FY2004-2007 Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations.
Note: The Eastern Caribbean category funds military assistance and Peace Corp programs for seven countries. Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Development assistance for these nations is funded under US AID’s Caribbean Regional program.
Cited in Mark P. Sullivan, "Caribbean Region: Issues in US Relations: CRS Report for Congress 2005", 28, http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:xFGk3krs8qoJ:www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_rl32160_25may05.pdf+US+and+Caribbean+relations&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=ca&client=firefox-a (accessed February 3, 2009) and Mark P. Sullivan, "Caribbean Region: Issues in US Relations 2006", 35, http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:e-AxvSV8_iYJ:www.nationalaglawcentre.org/assets/crs/RL32160.pdf+US+and+Caribbean+relations&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=10&gl=ca&client=firefox-a (accessed February 3, 2009).

years,[375] and the 2009 Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago. Moreover, continued US support to the Caribbean Basin Security is demonstrated by President Barack Obama's $45 million commitment to the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and request of $79 million for 2011.[376]

Secondary Roles in the Caribbean

The increasing role of the US in the Caribbean Basin and the events of Grenada in 1983 signified the lesser role of Britain and the lead role of the US in the region. However, like Britain, other European powers such as France and the Netherlands have also maintained a presence in the region. Moreover, Latin American powers such as Venezuela, Mexico, Columbia and Brazil have risen in international profile with their inclusion into the G20 and arguably have become more influential in the 'widening of the Caribbean', as the move from the G8 to the G20 represent "the opening to a new era of global governance.[377] Even though there is no small state representation in the G20, the G20 includes states that were once considered lesser states, which now contribute to changing the dynamic of power in the international system.[378] While the G8 represents the

[375] Andrew Carmona, "CARICOM and Washington Commission a New Chapter in U.S.-Caribbean Relations - Council on Hemispheric Affairs," http://www.coha.org/2007/07/caricom-and-washington-commission-a-new-chapter-in-us-caribbean-relations/ (accessed February 3, 2009).
[376] Office of the Spokesman, "U.S.-Caribbean Technical Meeting on Security Cooperation," http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123543.htm (accessed January 31, 2010).
US Department of State - Bureau of Public Affairs, "Caribbean Basin Security Initiative " http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/May/20100524122040ihecuor0.2683331.html (accessed October 5, 2010).
[377] Larry Elliott, "From G8 to G20: The End of Exclusion," Open Democracy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/from-g8-to-g20-the-end-of-exclusion (accessed February 9, 2010).
[378] Fareed Zakaria, "Writing the Rules for a New World," *Newsweek*, 30 December 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/2008/12/30/writing-the-rules-for-a-new-world.html (accessed January 23, 2011). (hereinafter Fareed Zakaria).

rich nations of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, the G20 includes the major developing nations of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.[379]

The move from the G8 to G20 was introduced by former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin despite possible negative consequences in terms of Canada's influence on the international stage. As more developing nations realize an increase in their influence or power as they participate in international affairs through bodies such as the G20, conversely, the G8 powers find themselves in a more compromised position. The creation of the G20 raises the question: "what relevance Canada might have in the larger group, because axiomatically the country will have much less," which consequently diminishes Canada's international influence.[380] Nonetheless, realizing the increase of equity among states to participate in the direction of the international system speaks to the equity of sovereign states, whether they be small or large; or developing or advanced. This is exemplified by the increased participation of SIS in the international community on issues such as climate change.

Ultimately, moving from the G8 to the G20 will ultimately work to the advantage of small Caribbean territories, given that a more "effective and stable

[379] The European Union, which is represented by the rotating Council presidency and the European Central Bank, is the 20th member of the G20.
[380] Jeffrey Simpson, "Canada's Importance Fades, Going from G8 to G20," The *Globe and Mail*, http://www.theglobeandmail.com.rlproxy.upei.ca/news/opinions/canadas-importance-fades-going-from-g8-to-g20/article1420033/ (accessed February 4, 2010).

international economic order is likely to emerge if the advanced developing countries of Latin America and elsewhere…participate fully in its design."[381]

The Impact of the US invasion of Grenada on Small Island State Concerns

The events in Grenada between 1979 and 1983 raised concerns about the quality of small island state independence[382] and prompted a focus on the conventional security concerns of SIDS and their impact on the international community. The recognition of economic, social and political instability[383] as contributors to security concerns in microstates led to the further recognition of small island state security in terms of non-conventional security threats, which will be discussed further in Chapter 4. Moreover, the US invasion of Grenada signalled the beginning of increased cooperation between the US and the Commonwealth Caribbean, which will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

[381] Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Rethinking US Interests in the Western Hemisphere," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 29, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/165637.
[382] "Very Small States at the Millennium", *supra* note 33.
[383] Report on the Inter-American Dialogue, *The Americas at a Crossroads* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 1983), 40. Cited in Payne, *The International Crisis in the Caribbean*, *supra* note 213 at 157.

Chapter 4:

Non-Conventional Security Threats

The UN instilled measures of collective security following WWII as a means of avoiding the outbreak of general war and in an attempt to increase security in the international system.[384] Measures have been taken to stem conventional threats, such as invasion, irredentist threats from a neighboring state or sub-version from a neighboring state. Though these threats have been less common in the post-1945 world, they continue to challenge state security in our international system. This has been demonstrated in events such as East Timor, where the colonial power, Portugal, abdicated responsibility for East Timor. This opened the way for the irredentist threat of Indonesia to invade and annex East Timor despite UN recognition of East Timor's right to self-determination.[385] Moreover, irredentist threats between Guyana and Venezuela[386] and Belize and Guatemala[387] in the Commonwealth Caribbean overshadowed the self-determination of both Guyana, and Belize. However, the most dramatic example of such threats was Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, through which Iraq sought to eliminate Kuwait's legal international personality.[388]

---

[384] For a discussion on UN collective security relevant to small states see:
"International Law: The Protection of Small States", *supra* note 204 at 1, 15.
[385] "The Trail of Diplomacy," *Supra* note at 204.
"Non-Aligned Countries," *Supra* note at 204.
[386] *Ibid.*
Pollard notes, "Guyana lodged a complaint with the Security Council in 1971 when Venezuela, in an unwarranted and unprovoked act of aggression, occupied Guyana's half of the island of Ankoko in the Essequibo river and which, incidentally, still remains under hostile occupation."
"International Law: The Protection of Small States," *supra* note 204 at 8.
[387] Tim Merrill, *supra* note 316.
[388] The Security Council authorized the military expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait.
"International Law: The Protection of Small States," *supra* note 204 at 8.

In response to such threats, it has become common for the international community or regional powers to intervene to establish order when a state is subject to aggression by a more powerful state, as was the case in Kuwait. Also, regional powers such as Australia and New Zealand have been integral to South Pacific Island security, as demonstrated in their intervention in the Solomon Islands in 2003 and in Papua New Guinea in 2004. Though Australian and New Zealand intervention was accepted by host governments, "each required considerable persuasion to overcome the traditional posture of respect for sovereignty and 'the Pacific Way'."[389]

Despite arguments of US encroachment on Grenada's sovereignty, the re-establishment of order in Grenada makes the case that US intervention was intended to re-establish its status as a regional power.[390] Nevertheless, the US invasion of Grenada led the international community and academics to recognize the potential vulnerability of small island states, as illustrated by the 1985 Caribbean Colloquium on the Special Needs of Small States.

---

[389] Stephen Hoadley, "Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand and Australia: Towards a New Paradigm - Working Paper 20." Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/working_papers/wp20.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011), 8.

[390] Pollard notes: "For, even though it is quite clear that allied military intervention was informed by perceptions of important national interests being endangered, it is open to no one in the international community to discern with precision what constitutes an important national interest of any State or what considerations would advise the employment of force for the protection of such an interest. The earlier invasion of Grenada and the recent invasion of Iraq are excellent cases in point. In any event, the applicable norms of international law do not preclude any State from seeking military assistance from friendly States where the national interest so prescribes, irrespective of the ability of the Security Council to act pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Charter. United States intervention in Grenada to expel Cubans and restore constitutional government eminently illustrates this point."
"International Law: The Protection of Small States," *supra* note 204 at 16.

The 1985 Caribbean Colloquium raised a wide range of debates and identified conventional security threats such as irredentist threats, sub-version from a neighboring state and invasion from another state. However, it was recognized that security threats toward Caribbean small island states are not only of a military nature, but also arise out of economic, social and political instability.[391] In addition, a number of non-conventional security threats were identified, such as drugs, gun-running, money laundering, illegal migration and proneness to natural disasters.[392] Furthermore, the US determined issues such as illegal migration and drugs to be a national security threat as early as 1986.[393]

Though the colloquium considered US hegemony a security threat, a quote in a speech delivered on 17 October 1996 by the Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago, Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj, illustrates how arguments of US hegemony can be considered secondary in comparison to the severity of non-conventional security threats. Maharaj stated:

> "Let me state emphatically that the greatest threat to our sovereignty comes from the drug lords. These are international criminals who have no respect for sovereignty or boundary lines. They do not stop at our borders or anyone else's borders with their poison. The truth is they cannot carry on their deadly trade without violating our borders and sovereignty. If the United States of America, the most powerful nation in the world, cannot fight the drug barons alone, how can we? Drug traffickers are

---

[391] Report on the Inter-American Dialogue, *The Americas at a Crossroads* (Washington, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 1983), 40.
Cited in Payne, *The International Crisis in the Caribbean*, *supra* note 213 at 157.
[392] "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean," *supra* note 263 at 15.
[393] Paul Sutton, (Eds.) Anthony Payne and Paul K. Sutton, "US Intervention, Regional Security and Militarization in the Caribbean", *Modern Caribbean Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 289.

> international criminals and can be defeated only with international cooperation"[394]

Despite the gravity of Venezuela's irredentist threat to Trinidad and Tobago's territorial waters and offshore oil resources, Maharaj viewed non-conventional security threats (such as drug lords) to be a greater threat to Trinidad and Tobago's sovereignty.

The nature of non-conventional security threats can be comprehensively referred to as organized crime and will be explored in a closer examination of drugs, gun-running, money laundering and illegal migration in the Caribbean region. [395]

Non- Conventional Security Threats

Drugs:

Ivelaw Griffith describes a 'vortex' where drug traffickers take advantage of the Caribbean Sea to transport drugs from drug producers in South America to a drug distributor in North America. The "island character" of the region "…permits entry into and use of Caribbean territories from the surrounding sea at literally hundreds of different places."[396] Some examples of plural island territories are the several islands of St. Vincent and the Grenadines; about 100 islands and cays of the US Virgin Islands; and the 700 islands and 200 cays of

[394] Beardsworth, Randy. "Maritime Counternarcotics Agreements: The cop on the Beat" chapter in Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation* (Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers, 2000), 201. (hereinafter "Maritime Counternarcotics Agreements: The cop on the Beat").
[395] "Organized Crime " http://www.unodc.org/unodc/fr/organized-crime/?ref=menuside (accessed February 22, 2010).
[396] Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvannia State University Press, 1997), 54. (hereinafter *Sovereignty Under Siege*).

the Bahamas.[397] Caribbean countries that do not trade their own drugs can be affected by the drug trade by being used as drug transshipment points which increase the scope of the problem. The movement of drugs such as cocaine is illustrated below, in Map 4: 1996 Cocaine Flow in the Western Hemisphere.[398]

Map 4:



Drug seizures in Commonwealth Caribbean SIS provide an indication of the amount of drugs in the region, as shown in Table 10 below.[399]

---

[397] *Ibid.*

[398] Source: US Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement in United States General Accounting Office, "Drug Control: 1997 Update on US Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific - Report to Congressional Requesters," http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98030.pdf (accessed March 3, 2010), 5. (hereinafter "Drug Control: 1997 Update on US Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific - Report to Congressional Requesters").

[399] Weights are metric (g = grams, kg = kilograms, t = metric tons).
US Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,

Table 10: Drug Seizures in Commonwealth Caribbean SIS 2007 - 2010

Country	Drug	2010	2009	2008	2007
Antigua and Barbuda	Cocaine	1.36 kg	2.3 kg	14kg	5.7 kg
	Marijuana	168.5 kg	496 kg	96 kg	464 kg
The Bahamas	Cocaine	269 kg	1.823 t	1,878 kg	630 kg
	Marijuana	42 t	11 t	12 t	50.5 t
Barbados	Cocaine	63.67 kg	78.3 kg	46 kg	228.6 kg
	Marijuana	…	3,989 kg	4,662 kg	4,194 kg
Dominica	Cocaine	1.5 kg	30.5 g	11 kg	353 kg
	Marijuana	…	1,415 kg	842 kg	181 kg
Grenada	Cocaine	25.03 kg	6 kg	46 kg	935.8 kg
	Marijuana		460 kg	355 kg	260 kg
Jamaica	Cocaine	177.88 kg	264kg	266 kg	80 kg
	Marijuana	39.291t	9 t	32 t	…
St Kitts and Nevis	Cocaine	602.1 g	.5 kg	78 kg	29 g
	Marijuana	…	44 kg	155 kg	7.5 kg
Saint Lucia	Cocaine	48.87 kg	93 kg	21 kg	792.5 kg

"US International Narcotics Strategy Report 2008," http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100890.pdf (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011), 190, 205-209, 221, 229.

US Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, "US International Narcotics Strategy Report 2009," http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/120054.pdf (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011), 137, 241-247, 359, 360, 583.

US Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, "US International Narcotics Strategy Report 2010," http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138548.pdf (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011), 136, 253-259, 381, 616.

US Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, "US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2011," http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156575.pdf (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011), 134, 224-231, 326, 327.

	Marijuana	…	540 kg	534 kg	793 kg
St. Vincent & Grenadine	Cocaine Marijuana	28 kg …	8 kg 8,911 kg	5 kg 17,911 kg	524.4 kg 1,559.7 kg
Trinidad & Tobago	Cocaine Marijuana	… 26.3 kg	158 kg …	84 kg 375 kg	167 kg 194 kg

The drug trade has become the most profitable sector of the Caribbean's informal economy and has resulted in widespread corruption; in greater consumption of marijuana, heroin, and cocaine, which has in turn exacerbated the incidence of domestic violence; and has undermined the social development and well being of Caribbean societies.[400]

Gun-running/Arms Trafficking:

Gun-running has become inextricably linked with (1) the drug trade, where weapons and ammunition are used for protection of drugs and drug operatives, and (2) money laundering, which provides the financial means to obtain large shipments of arms and ammunitions.[401] The impact of arms trafficking has been detrimental to the governance of Caribbean small island states. As a result, weapons highlight the limitations of small island states' conventional forces such as police and military and make them more susceptible to corruption and coups.

[400] Bryan, Anthony T. "The State of the Region: Trends Affecting the Future of Caribbean Security" chapter in Michael C. Desch, Jorge I. Domínguez and Andrés Serbín, *From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 47. (hereinafter "The State of the Region").
[401] *Sovereignty Under Siege*, *supra* note 396 at 153-154.

The movement of guns is illustrated by Dominica's Sidney Burnett-Allyne, an arms merchant with direct ties to corruption in Dominica, who was caught in a boat loaded with weapons headed for Barbados in an attempt "to overthrow the newly elected government of Tom Adams in Barbados."[402] This was after Tom Adams charged that Burnett-Allyne was "subverting" Barbadian government officials with guns and gifts in exchange for a government license for the Alleyne Mercantile Bank. This was to be a contribution to the beginning of Dominica's involvement in offshore banking.[403]

The coup d'etat attempt by the Black Muslim group, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, in Trinidad and Tobago in 1990 is another example of how the impact arms have in the region has been underestimated. In that event, 115 rifles were bought legally in the US and shipped legally from Miami to be used in the coup attempt. It was only over a year later that Jamaat operatives were finally arrested for contracting to buy 60 AK-47s and 10 Mach-10 machine guns.[404]

Suspicion of government corruption led to an Official Commission of Inquiry into government corruption involving drug cartels in Antigua in the early 1990s which exposed "the depth and spread of corruption, indeed, its internationalization."[405] The corruption involved approximately 10 tons of arms

---

[402] Anthony P. Lozano Maingot Wilfredo, *The United States and the Caribbean: Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 111, http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0647/2004011023-d.html; Materials specified: Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0647/2004011023-d.html. (hereinafter *Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty*).
[403] *Ibid.*
[404] Maingot, *ibid.* at 116.
[405] Maingot, *ibid.* at 113.

that were bought in Israel and legitimatized under the guise of the Antiguan Defense Force, but ended up in the possession of the Medellin drug cartel. Some of the arms were later used in the assassination of a Colombian presidential candidate.

This issue of arms trafficking and violence reveals a larger issue of Caribbean small island governance as it was highlighted when the Commission's report raised the concern over "the wider, more enduring corrupt relationships between the principals in the scheme and high-ranking officials within the Antigua government."[406]

These examples illustrate the contagious effect guns play in contributing to the violence and corruption that is synonymous with non-conventional security threats. Such violence and internal corruption has made the task of meeting security needs even more difficult for Commonwealth Caribbean governments. The impact of non-conventional security threats is further illustrated with the concerns over money laundering and offshore banking in the Caribbean.

Money laundering:

Bruce Zagaris sums up the money laundering threat by stating:

> "Money laundering and other financial operations carried out by narco-terrorists in developing countries are a source of grave financial problems to those countries. [Money laundering] brings a new entrepreneur class, the financial power of which is often used in a manner contrary to national and international interests."[407]

---

[406] Maingot, *ibid.* at 114.
[407] *Sovereignty Under Siege*, *supra* note 396 at 93.

The impact of money laundering is much greater when placed in the larger context of the drug trade; creating capital; illicit offshore banking and moving assets; and creating capital for gun purchases from other countries.[408]

Money laundering is defined as the conversion of profits from illegal activities (not limited to drug trafficking) into seemingly legitimate financial assets, and is achieved in three stages: placement, layering and integration.[409] Placement involves the disposal of cash through integration into revenues from a legitimate business or converting the cash into bank deposits, then layering the money by transferring it through many accounts to disguise the trail and integrate the seemingly legitimate funds into legitimate businesses.[410] To give context to the magnitude of the illegal activity, the amount of drug money laundered worldwide in the late 1990s was estimated to be between US $300 billion and US $500 billion annually.[411] These funds provide criminal organizations with economic power that can be used for political contributions and favors and bribes, which in turn translates into political power.

Caribbean small island states typically have mono-cultural economies and offshore banking has become a strategy for economic diversification which provides important service sectors in their economies. However, offshore banking is described as facing "unprecedented Rapid Complex Constant Change" which has "…had significant impacts on their host governments." Such uncertainty and questionable decisions have raised "resource issues" with host

---

[408] *Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty*, *supra* note 402 at 117.
[409] *Sovereignty Under Siege*, *supra* note 396 at 94.
[410] *Ibid.*
[411] *Ibid.*

governments.[412] Concern over off-shore banking is illustrated by the 1998 and 2000 OECD report that found offshore banking or tax havens were involved in harmful tax practices.[413] This brought the largely un-scrutinized and unregulated sector of offshore banking under the review of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2000.[414]

The FATF is an inter-governmental body charged with developing and promoting national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.[415] The FATF's blacklist of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) identified "serious systemic problems" in the transparency of offshore banking practices, and included the following jurisdictions: Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. All blacklist countries complied with FATF recommendations with the last countries (Myanmar, Nauru and Nigeria) being delisted in 2006.[416] In addition to FATF regulations, the US introduced further

---

[412] Mark Hampton, "Offshore Finance Centres and Rapid Complex Constant Change", Working Paper 132 Kent Business School, Academia.edu, http://kent.academia.edu/MarkHampton/Papers/114902/Offshore_Finance_Centres_and_Rapid_Complex_Constant_Change (accessed January 20, 2011), 3-4.

[413] Hampton, *ibid.* at 11.

[414] The FATF comprises of the following 34 member jurisdictions and regional organizations: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Gulf Co-operation Council, Hong Kong-China, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
"FATF Members and Observers " http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/52/0,3343,en_32250379_32236869_34027188_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed October 5, 2010).

[415] "Financial Action Task Force (FATF) " http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed February 24, 2010).

[416] There are currently no Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories listed with the FATF.

regulation to stem money laundering and terrorism in the US through the US Patriot Act.[417] The actions against money laundering has aided in making off-shore banking institutions more transparent, and therefore, has reduced some of the secrecy that enables money laundering.

Illegal Migration/Undocumented migration:

Illegal migration was not viewed as a regional security threat until the 1980s. The noticeable rise of migration, specifically undocumented migration from the Eastern Caribbean to the US, resulted in illegal migration becoming a widely debated policy issue rivaled only by the illegal drug trade.[418] In the past, illegal migration in the Caribbean tended to be focused on illegal immigrants from Haiti and the Dominican Republic to the US. However, illegal migration is also seen from poorer countries to wealthier countries within the Caribbean as demonstrated by the Eastern Caribbean cases of unauthorized workers moving from Dominica and St. Lucia to the French *departments* of Martinique and Guadeloupe, and from Grenada and the Windward Islands to Trinidad and Tobago. The impact of illegal migration on security is that it "undermines the established laws and regulations of many countries."[419] This in turn erodes

---

"About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative " http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/51/0,3343,en_32250379_32236992_33916403_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed February 24, 2010).
Financial Action Task Force, "Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 2006-2007: Eighth NCCT Review
" http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/14/11/39552632.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011) 4-7.
[417] "USA Patriot Act " http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/ (accessed 2/24/2010, 2010).
[418] Jorge Duany. "The Fear of Illegal Aliens: Caribbean Migration as a National and Regional Security Threat" in Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation* (Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers, 2000), 99.
[419] Duany. *ibid.* at 103.

"people's trust in the legal and formal economy" of that country.[420] The issue of US deportees is also a significant aspect of the problem. This was noted by President Bharatt Jagdeo of Guyana who "chastised the US for 'aggressively' recruiting their nurses and teachers while at the same time 'aggressively' deporting criminals and turning a blind eye to export of small arms."[421] The US deportation policy of criminals back to the Caribbean created such resentment that a former ambassador of the Dominican Republic "referred to it as a major part of the "Second Cold War" and The Regional Security System met to create "a common position *vis-á-vis* the US in terms of the threats to sovereignty and security posed by the deportees." In the end, however, nothing ever came of the meeting. [422]

The Eastern Caribbean has seen an increase in crime, specifically drug-related crime. For example, Trinidad and Tobago has seen an increase in the number of kidnapped businessman, including eight in 2001 and twenty nine in 2002.[423] The increase in crime has led to the overcrowding of jails, according to the report "from the Bahamas down the chain of islands to Guyana, jails are bursting at the seams."[424] The deporting of criminals from the US to the Caribbean is blamed for the increase of violent crimes, such as the Machete

---

[420] Duany, *ibid.* at 99.
[421] *The Weekly Gleaner*, August 15, 2001, 5.
[422] *Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty*, *supra* note 402 at 131.
[423] *Ibid.*
[424] "The Drama of Drugs in the Caribbean," Caribbean Perspective Issue 69 (June 2000): 79-82, 91.

attack in Grenada by Ronald Michael Phillip who was deported from in the US in 2000 after spending more than 6 years in a US prison. [425]

Recently, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement deportation data obtained by News America Now show the number of criminal deportees from the beginning of the 2011 fiscal year (October of last year) to the end of March this year for the following countries: Antigua 5, The Bahamas 65, Barbados 11, Dominica 10, Jamaica 528, St. Kitts and Nevis 3, St. Lucia 7, Trinidad and Tobago 125.[426]

The Impact of Non-Conventional Security Threats

The non-conventional security threats of drug trafficking, gun-running, money laundering and illegal migration all contribute to the corruption within the state. The elements and impacts of the non-conventional security threats described above illustrate the link between corruption and security, where:

> "Corruption undermines the legitimacy of public institutions and strikes at the society, moral order, and justice, as well as at the comprehensive development of peoples…."[427] The correlation of drug trafficking and money laundering have come "subsumed under the label of narco-terrorism."[428]

---

[425] Mike Melia, "Caribbean Crime Wave Linked to US Deportations - Americas, World - the Independent " http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/caribbean-crime-wave-linked-to-us-deportations-2089388.html (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011).

[426] Grenada and St. Vincent and The Grenadines were not represented. "Criminal Deportees to Latin America, Caribbean Pass 88 Thousand in Six Months " http://www.newsamericasnow.com/criminal-deportees-to-latin-america-caribbean-pass-88-thousand-in-six-months/ (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011).

[427] *Sovereignty Under Siege*, *supra* note 396 at 153.

[428] Emilio Garcia and Thomas Klak, "Globalization and Economic Vulnerability: The Caribbean And the 'Post-9/11 Shift'", in Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change* (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 177.

Current Atmosphere of Non-Conventional Security threats in the Commonwealth Caribbean

The current atmosphere of Commonwealth Caribbean transnational security issues related to illicit drugs illustrate the Commonwealth Caribbean small island states not as primary producers or consumers, but as transshipment points, minor drug cultivators or home states of offshore financial centers. While states share concerns regarding money laundering, current transnational security concerns for the commonwealth Caribbean are listed in Table 11.[429]

Table 11: Commonwealth Caribbean Transnational Security Concerns

Antigua and Barbuda	Considered a minor transshipment point for narcotics bound for the US and Europe; more significant as an offshore financial centre.
Bahamas	Transshipment point for cocaine and marijuana bound for US and Europe; offshore financial centre.
Barbados	One of many Caribbean transshipment points for narcotics bound for Europe and the US; offshore financial centre.
Grenada	Small-scale cannabis cultivation; lesser transshipment point for marijuana and cocaine to US.
Dominica	Transshipment point for narcotics bound for the US and Europe; minor cannabis producer (2008).
Jamaica	Transshipment point for cocaine from South America to North America and Europe; illicit cultivation and consumption of cannabis; government has an active manual cannabis eradication program; corruption is a major concern; substantial money-laundering activity; Colombian narcotics traffickers favor Jamaica for illicit financial

[429] Central Intelligence Agency - the World Factbook", s*upra* note 6.

	transactions.
St Kitts and Nevis	Transshipment point for South American drugs destined for the US and Europe; some money-laundering activity.
St Lucia	Transit point for South American drugs destined for the US and Europe.
St Vincent & the Grenadines	Transshipment point for South American drugs destined for the US and Europe; small-scale cannabis cultivation.
Trinidad and Tobago	Transshipment point for South American drugs destined for the US and Europe; producer of cannabis.

The security concerns of Eastern Caribbean small island states may appear modest in comparison to that of Jamaica, where corruption is a major concern, but Eastern Caribbean states still face challenges as the encompassing nature of non-conventional security threats effect the political, economic and social aspects of small island sovereign states. An examination of the Bahamas provides insight into the impact of non-conventional security threats on Caribbean small island states.

The Bahamas

The Bahamas illustrates the impact organized crime and non-conventional security threats can have on a small island state. The Bahamas' proximity to the US and its geography of 700 islands and 200 cays provides an expanse of passageways that act as a transshipment conduit for marijuana and

cocaine, as well as the smuggling of Haitian refugees.[430] Moreover, banking secrecy laws have created an ideal environment for money laundering. Furthermore, the corruption of Bahamian police and senior levels of government was revealed through their inadequate and ineffective response to drug transshipment activities at Norman's Cay in the early 1980s. In addition to the corruption of government, the "easy money" of drug trafficking caused other detrimental social effects. The 1980s saw a drop in school attendance among children who were offered as much as $500 for an afternoon acting as lookout. Drug use "skyrocketed", with up to 80% of poor adult males freebasing on cocaine, which resulted in an increased strain on mental health facilities and a rise in crime. The impact of these events are best described by Bruce Bullington, who stated "Bahamian society was thoroughly diseased as the result of the penetration of the narcotics trade, a security catastrophe that is a far more real danger for many small island states, particularly those sitting in the drug lanes, than any conventional military threat from another state."[431]

Recognizing the social aspect of security, Barry Bartmann stresses that "the penetration of small island states by the narcotics trade can be so corrosive and so tragic."[432] Though more subtle than the situation described in the Bahamas, the case of St Lucia illustrates the correlation of economic security and non-conventional security threats in small island states.

---

[430] Barry Bartmann, "Island War & Security," in *A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader*, ed. Godfrey Baldacchino (Charlottetown; Malta: Institute of Island Studies; Miller House, 2007), 301-304. (hereinafter "Island War & Security").
[431] B. Bullington, 'A Smugglers' Paradise: Cocaine Trafficking through the Bahamas', *Crime, Law and Social Change* Vol. 16, no.1 (1991): 67.
[432] "Island War & Security", *supra* note 430 at 304.

Saint Lucia

The stability of Saint Lucian economy and society is best described by the statement "when 'the banana is up'…the economy booms. When 'the banana is down', both economy and people are depressed."[433] The banana industry benefited from the trade protection of the Lome Conventions, which gave former colonies of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries trade preference into EU markets and resulted in Saint Lucia becoming a "true banana republic."[434]

The "WTO Panel report, issued on the 22 May 1997, found that the EU's banana import regime was discriminatory and inconsistent" with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).[435] The ending of the EU's banana import regime led to the less efficient banana industry of Saint Lucia becoming vulnerable to the competition of more regulated banana industries in Ecuador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala, each of which produces around "24 tons per acre, which is three times as high as in St Lucia, and the cost to importers of these 'dollar bananas' is half as much." Furthermore, the more regulated banana industries require a standard where the bananas should be at least

---

[433] "Expelled from Eden," *Economist* 345, no. 8048 (December 20, 1997): 35, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=4456&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live. (hereinafter "Expelled from Eden").

[434] *Ibid.*

[435] Simi T. B. and Atul Kaushik, "The Banana War at the GATT/WTO " CUTS Centre for International Trade, Economics & Environment, http://www.cuts-citee.org/pdf/TLB08-01.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011), 2-3.
The banana wars between the US and Europe were so contentious that US President Bill Clinton openly triumphed the 1997 WTO ruling with "We won a trade dispute. We won", while at a press conference with visiting French President Jacques Chirac. US - The White House - Office of the Press Secretary, "Clinton-Chirac Press Conference on Kosovo," http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/clintchi.htm (accessed January 20, 2011).

27mm wide, 14cm long and with no ``abnormal'' curvature," which was not the type of banana produced in Saint Lucia.[436]

This resulted in Saint Lucian farmers having bananas turned away from export, which influenced diversification into other crops, the most successful being plantains. However, Latin America quickly intervened asserting they could grow any product bigger and cheaper than in Saint Lucia. The banana proved to be the only product Saint Lucian farmers could produce competitively with Latin America. As diplomatic and legal options surrounding trade agreements became more difficult the alternative of illegal drugs, where marijuana reaped about 30 times more per pound than bananas, resulted in marijuana replacing bananas as a principal export crop considering that Saint Lucia already served as a transshipment point for drugs on route to the US.[437] This has caused many to "believe the future of the drug trade in the Caribbean is intimately related to the future of the banana trade."[438]

The weakness of the legal economy has created inroads for illegal enterprise. However, Saint Lucia's banana industry has made vast improvements and continues to battle Latin American producers and large

---

[436] "Expelled from Eden", *supra* note 433.
[437] *Ibid.*
[438] "I want to point out that drug trafficking, money laundering and bananas are all interrelated," said Elizabeth Symon, the British junior minister in charge of the Caribbean. Serge F. Kovaleski & Douglas Farah, Organized Crime Exercises Clout in Island Nations, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1998, at A01, available in 1998 WL 2468237. "We are trying to keep the islands from the awful downward spiral into drug trafficking and money laundering."
Cited in Michelle Williams, "Caribbean Shiprider Agreements: Sunk by Banana Trade War?" *The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 31, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 180, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40166420. (hereinafter "Caribbean Shiprider Agreements: Sunk by Banana Trade War?").

corporations such as Wal-Mart, which continues to make inroads into Britain's marketplace.[439]

In addition to the widespread effects of non-conventional security threats mentioned, the environment has proved to be one of the most devastating forms of non-conventional security threats to the Caribbean. Though environmental threats are different from other non-conventional security threats such as organized crime and drug cartels which involve non-state actors, the environment has proved to be just as debilitating to Caribbean security.

The Environment as a Nonconventional Security Threat

The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti dramatically demonstrates how the environment poses a non-conventional security threat. This is but one example of a natural disaster in the Caribbean. Environmental non-conventional security threats include natural disasters such as cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, landslides, storms, tsunamis, typhoons and volcanoes. Environmental threats have widespread effects, including damage to state infrastructure and transport and to personal and commercial property; human health and life; agriculture and livestock; and business activities. The impacts of environmental disasters go beyond the physical damage and can be debilitating for small island states, as the cost of recovery adds to public expense and government indebtedness and can result in reliance on external financial

[439] Dominic Rushe, "Wal-Mart's Political Banana Skin," *Times Online*, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/article861307.ece (accessed February 25, 2010).

assistance.[440] Table 12 illustrates the frequency and extent of damage incurred by Eastern Caribbean Currency Union states from 1970 to 2002.[441]

Table 12: Eastern Caribbean Environmental Disasters from 1970 to 2002

Country	Year	Event	Number of Total Persons Affected	% of Population	Est. Damage US$ Thousands	Est. Damage % 0f GDP
Antigua and Barbuda	1983	Drought	75,000	100.0	…	…
	1989	Hurricane Hugo	8,030	12.4	80,000	21.4
	1990	Hurricane Gustav	…	…	…	…
	1995	Hurricane Luis	68,702	100.0	500	0.1
	1998	Hurricane Georges	2,025	3.0	…	…
	1999	Hurricane Jose	2,534	3.8	…	…
	1999	Hurricane Lenny	3,423	5.1	…	…
Dominica	1970	Hurricane	…	…	…	…
	1979	Hurricanes David and Frederick	72,100	100.0	44,650	100.8

[440] *A Future for Small States, supra* note 1 at 20.

[441] *Sources:* EM-DAT; and IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
St. Kitts National Emergency Management Agency estimated damage of US$402 million (140% of GDP).
Note that EM-DAT's entry for damage (US$1 billion, or 305 percent of GDP) is omitted, as it was disputed by national authorities.
Cited in Tobias N. Rasmussen, "Macroeconomic Implications of Natural Disasters in the Caribbean," IMF Working Paper, http://www-bcc.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04224.pdf (accessed February 25, 2010) 19.

Country	Year	Event	Number of Total Persons Affected	% of Population	Est. Damage US$ Thousands	Est. Damage % 0f GDP
	1980	Hurricane Allen	…	…	…	…
	1984	Hurricane Klaus	10,000	14.2	2,000	2.2
	1989	Hurricane Hugo	710	1.0	20,000	13.0
	1995	Hurricane Luis	3,001	4.2	3,428	1.6
	1999	Hurricane Lenny	715	1.0	…	…
	2001	Hurricane Iris	175	0.2	…	…
Grenada	1975	Flood	…	…	4,700	13.4
	1980	Hurricane Allen	…	…	5,300	7.7
	1990	Tropical Storm Arthur	1,000	1.1	…	…
	1999	Hurricane Lenny	210	0.2	5,500	1.5
St. Kitts and Nevis	1984	Hurricane Klaus	…	…	…	…
	1987	Flood	…	…	500	0.6
	1989	Hurricane Hugo	1,330	3.1	46,000	32.1
	1990	Hurricane Gustav	…	…	…	…
	1995	Hurricane Luis	1,800	4.2	197,000	85.4

Country	Year	Event	Number of Total Persons Affected	% of Population	Est. Damage US$ Thousands	Est. Damage % 0f GDP
	1998	Hurricane Georges	10,000	23.2	… 1/	…1/
	1999	Hurricane Lenny	1,180	2.7	41,400	13.6
St. Lucia	1980	Hurricane Allen	80,000	61.5	87,990	66.0
	1983	Storm	3,000	2.2	1,290	0.8
	1986	Tropical Storm Danielle	…	…	…	…
	1987	Hurricane Emily	…	…	…	…
	1988	Hurricane Gilbert	…	…	… 2/	… 2/
	1994	Tropical Storm Debby	750	0.5	…	…
	1996	Landslide	175	0.1	…	…
	1999	Hurricane Lenny	200	0.1	…	…
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	1971	Volcano	2,000	2.3	…	…
	1977	Flood	…	…	…	…
	1979	Volcano	20,000	18.6	…	…
	1980	Hurricane Allen	20,500	18.8	16,300	27.6
	1986	Flood	152	0.1	…	…
	1987	Hurricane Emily	208	0.2	5,300	3.7

Country	Year	Event	Number of Total Persons Affected	% of Population	Est. Damage US$ Thousands	Est. Damage % 0f GDP
	1987	Flood	1,000	0.9	5,000	3.5
	1992	Flood	200	0.2	…	…
	1999	Hurricane Lenny	100	0.1	…	…
	2002	Hurricane Lili	…	…	…	…

Grenada experienced hurricanes in 2003 with an estimated damage of 4 million US$ and 2004 with an estimated damage of 4.4 million US$. Dominica experienced a hurricane in 2008 with an estimated damage of 3.3 million US$ and St. Kitts and Nevis experienced a hurricane in 2009 with an estimated damage of 3.4 million US$. [442] Such events illustrate the harassing and devastating nature of disasters in the Eastern Caribbean, as well as their financial impact.

The effects of non-conventional security threats have had impacts on the political, economic and social aspects of Caribbean small island states. The threat extends beyond one state becoming reliant on a patron state and becoming a “banana republic”.[443] The impacts of non-conventional security threats lead to the deterioration of governance as it is recognized that:

[442] "Factsheet -- IMF Emergency Assistance: Supporting Recovery from Natural Disasters and Armed Conflicts," http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conflict.htm (accessed February 25, 2010).
[443] “The term “banana Republic’ accurately described the situation in which US-owned banana companies determined the fate of many a Central American administration.”

> "SIS may face non-conventional security threats which can be thoroughly corrosive in terms of the state's well being. And, as we have seen, they may even threaten the identity and continuing existence of the state itself."[444]

Recognizing the severity of non-conventional security threats raises the concern of failed statehood in the Caribbean,[445] which is considered the ultimate security collapse of the state.[446] While such terminology in the case of the Caribbean may be severe, it is raised to highlight awareness that the efforts to deter non-conventional security threats are driven by the hope of maintaining order and governance and avoiding security collapses of states in the region.

Commonwealth Caribbean states have recognized the seriousness and implications of non-conventional security threats and have sought measures to increase regional and international cooperation to alleviate such concerns. These issues will be further examined in Chapter 5.

Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty, *supra* note 402 at 2.
[444]"Island War and Security", *supra* note 198 at 321.
[445] Jaime S. A. Ogilvie, "Exploring the Future of the Security in the Caribbean: A Regional Security Partnership?" http://www.dtic.mil.rlproxy.upei.ca/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA475515&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed January 27, 2010),3.
[446] "Island War & Security", *supra* note 430 at 311.

Chapter 5:

International and Regional

Cooperation in the

Commonwealth Caribbean

The recognition of shared non-conventional security threats, discussed in chapter 4, in addition to the recognition of limits to US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean, discussed in chapter 3, resulted in a transition of US foreign policy from a traditional hegemonic approach to one of "a global strategy for the management of interdependence."[447] In order to examine Commonwealth Caribbean and US interdependence and cooperation, an understanding of Commonwealth Caribbean regional cooperative bodies is necessary.

Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Cooperation

The islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean had traditionally been more accustomed to dealing directly with the British Colonial office than among themselves. However, the British Colonial Office encouraged the creation of a federation among the UK colonies in the West Indies due to the recognition of common social, economic and political challenges. The British Colonial Office promoted the West Indies Federation as "a means of creating the effective size of the West Indian territories to a point where they became eligible for self-government as one unit."[448] Furthermore, the British Colonial Office considered the West Indies Federation a viable option that would counteract challenges of "small size".[449] However, the argument that a federation would be more economically viable for the two largest island economies, Jamaica and Trinidad

[447] *The International Crisis in the Caribbean*, *supra* note 213 at 42.
[448] *The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79*, *supra* note 24 at 13.
[449] *Ibid.*

and Tobago, which would be the main contributors to sustain the federation, failed to win public opinion, particularly in Jamaica.

Concerns over "a balance of responsibilities" between Jamaica and the other islands, particularly the smaller, poorer islands, were at the centre of Jamaican public opinion, which created an opportunity for Jamaica's Alexander Bustamante's skepticism of the Federation. The eventual no vote to the Federation in Jamaica's Referendum led to the prospect of a Federation without Jamaica.[450] This created uncertainty towards the prospect of a Federation where Trinidad and Tobago would be the wealthiest contributor to the Federation and "be required to sustain any new federation virtually single-handed."[451] Though Eric Williams moved quietly on Trinidad and Tobago's exit from the Federation, Jamaica's withdrawal translated into the dissolution of the organization.[452]

Upon the dissolution of the West Indies Federation, Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Eric Williams pointed out that "federation was but *one* manifestation of the regional idea" and proposed the concept of a Caribbean Economic Community.[453] This led to the First Heads of Government Conference by the 'Big Four of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados and British Guiana.[454] The Heads of Government conference would be instrumental in Caribbean cooperation, as it would include

[450] Payne, *ibid.* at 15-22.
[451] Payne, *ibid.* at 27.
[452] Payne, *ibid.* at 26-29.
[453] Payne, *ibid.* at 37.
[454] Payne, *ibid.* at 40.

leaders of all Commonwealth territories and countries, and would be the setting for agreements such as the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA).

CARIFTA

CARIFTA was founded in 1965 by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines, Montserrat and Jamaica joined in 1968. Belize joined CASRIFTA in 1971. CARIFTA was intended to unite these Commonwealth Caribbean economies and to give them a joint presence on the international scene. CARIFTA had significant outcomes.[455] First, smaller territories were granted formal recognition as less developed countries. Second, the need for regional institutions and the concept of a regional secretariat were recognized. Third, the creation of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) included the US as a full member, along with Britain and Canada, in addition to the Commonwealth Caribbean states. This created a specialized financial institution to meet the needs in the Commonwealth Caribbean of developing states which otherwise lacked access to, or did not meet the necessary criteria of, other lending agencies.[456]

CARICOM

CARIFTA evolved into the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 1972. CARICOM created a Caribbean common market which took a holistic package

[455] "The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) " http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/carifta.jsp?menu=community (accessed March 2, 2010).
[456] *The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79*, *supra* note *24 at* 92-95.

approach to address the issues which challenged CARIFTA, such as a common external tariff and protective policy, the harmonization of fiscal incentives, a common policy on foreign investment, the rationalization of regional agriculture, the development of a regional industrial policy, cooperation in tourism and in fiscal and monetary affairs, agreement on external commercial policy, adoption of further measures to enable LDC's to benefit from integration, and cooperation in areas like foreign policy.[457]

CARICOM now consists of the following members:[458]

State	Year
Antigua and Barbuda	4 July 1974
The Bahamas	4 July 1983
Barbados	1 August 1973
Belize	1 May 1974
Dominica	1 May 1974
Grenada	1 May 1974
Guyana	1 August 1973
Haiti	2 July 2002
Jamaica	1 August 1973
Montserrat	1 May 1974 (Overseas dependency of UK)
Saint Lucia	1 May 1974
St. Kitts and Nevis	26 July 1974
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	1 May 1974

[457] Payne, *ibid.* at 143-144.
[458] "CARICOM MEMBER STATES" http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community (accessed March 2, 2010).

Suriname	4 July 1995
Trinidad and Tobago	1 August 1973
CARICOM Associate Members:	
Anguilla	4 July 1999
Bermuda	2 July 2003
British Virgin Islands	2 July 1991
Cayman Islands	15 May 2002
Turks and Caicos Islands	2 July 1991

Considering island insularity, CARICOM has been instrumental in the integration of the greater Caribbean Community. However, other organizations, including the OECS, were created to meet the needs of smaller states facing similar challenges.

The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)

The collapse of the West Indies Federation created an atmosphere of uncertainty for those smaller islands of the Eastern Caribbean that were no longer wanted as colonies, that were viewed as unviable candidates for sovereignty, and therefore were included in many discussions of federation among the 'tiny' islands of the Eastern Caribbean. The creation of the West Indies Associated States Council of Ministers (WISA) in 1966 saw the islands shift from colonial status to one of free association with the United Kingdom and the creation of the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) in 1968, which was eventually replaced with CARICOM.

Recognizing the need for a more formal development arrangement as Eastern Caribbean islands gained their independence, the OECS was established with the signing of the Treaty of Basseterre in 1981. The OECS adopted the WISA Secretariat as the central secretariat of the OECS and the ECCM as the Economic Affairs Secretariat.[459] The objectives of the OECS are to: "promote co-operation among its Members and defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity; promote economic integration; assist them in meeting their international obligations and responsibilities; and establish wherever possible, arrangements for joint overseas representation and common services."[460] The OECS reflects the regional cooperation among the smallest of Caribbean small island states and includes the following members.[461]

State	Year
Antigua and Barbuda	18 June 1981
Dominica	18 June 1981
Grenada	18 June 1981
Montserrat	18 June 1981 (Overseas dependency of UK)
St. Lucia	18 June 1981
St. Kitts and Nevis	18 June 1981

[459] "Origin & Evolution of the OECS," http://www.oecs.org/about-the-oecs (accessed March 3, 2010).
[460] "OECS", *supra* note 57.
[461] Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, "Member States," http://www.oecs.org/about-the-oecs/member-states (accessed January 21, 2011).
"The OECS - 25 Yrs of Integration" http://www.foreign.gov.vc/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32&Itemid=8 (accessed 4/12/2011, 2011).
Also, detailed information regarding the associate membership of Anguilla was obtained from the OECS High Commission Political and Consular Affairs Office in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. Barbara Wallace, (bwallace@oecs.org) "Anguilla," 25 March 2011, Personal email (26 March, 2011).

St. Vincent	18 June 1981
Associate Members:	
Anguilla	25 May 1995
British Virgin Islands	22 November 1984

The OECS focused mainly on economic and political support of member countries demonstrated by the creation of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) in 1983, which replaced the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority. The ECCB sought to maintain stability of the East Caribbean Dollar and has been pegged to the US Dollar, which it has remained stable with for over 20 years. OECS initiatives eventually led to a more contentious agreement focused on security with the Regional Security System (RSS).

Regional Security System

The RSS was established by a Memorandum of Understanding in 1982 and includes the following Eastern Caribbean States.[462]

State	Year
Antigua and Barbuda	1982
Barbados	1982
Dominica	1982
Grenada	1985
St. Kitts and Nevis	1983
St. Lucia	1982
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	1982

[462] "RSS - what we are," *supra* note 337.

The RSS was intended to provide a rapid response capability to traditional security concerns of the smaller Eastern Caribbean islands, against the backdrop of the 1979 Marxist coup in Grenada.[463] The RSS is a paramilitary or 'hybrid' organization that comprises both military and police personnel who remain under the command of their respective forces.[464] The RSS may be invoked if a member state deems its security to be threatened, in which case it has the right to request assistance from any or all of the member states.[465]

Though the RSS was designed with traditional security concerns in mind, conventional security issues such as territorial and political threats were assigned less weight, as the Commonwealth Caribbean 1985 Colloquium only touched on recommendations typically in line with aspects of traditional security such as force levels and capabilities. Instead, the colloquium focused on economic and institutional development, coordinating foreign policies, and the national, regional, and international mechanisms needed to give effect to non-conventional security threats.[466] This resulted in the adaption of the RSS to encompass those security needs that coincide with nontraditional security threats as illustrated in the RSS update of its MOU in 1992, and upgraded to treaty status in 1996. The treaty's purpose and function promote cooperation

---

[463] *Grenada Revolution and Invasion*, *supra* note 200 at 97.
[464] "RSS - what we are," *supra* note 337.
[465] "Regional Security Cooperation: Traditional and Non-traditional Areas, Caribbean Security," *supra* note 337 at 469.
[466] "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean," *supra* note 263 at 15.
Also, the recognition of non-security threats and creation of regional and international rules and institutions to respond to non-military threats corresponds with the post-realist view that traditional concepts of sovereignty cannot cope with the trans-border flows of drugs, money, weapons/arms and immigrants, and that these non-military developments pose genuine threats to security and cannot be addressed by one country alone.
Theodore C. Sorensen, "America's First Post-Cold War President," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 29, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045307.

with member states in the prevention and interdiction of traffic in illegal drugs, in national emergencies, search and rescue, immigration control, fisheries protection, customs and excise control, maritime policing duties, natural and other disasters, pollution control, the prevention of smuggling, the protection of offshore installations and exclusive economic zones and combating threats to national security.[467]

The RSS was deployed in Grenada for Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, and for seven other events up to 2003, including in Grenada post-Hurricane Ivan in 2004, and in Barbados in the aftermath of extensive prison riots in 2005.[468] The RSS is financed by contributions from its member states. The US, UK and Canada also provide technical assistance and funding for training courses, conferences and equipment for RSS personnel.[469] The RSS relies heavily on US financing and has been subject to budget cuts. RSS member states have had difficulty in assuming these additional costs.[470]

---

[467] "Regional Security Cooperation: Traditional and Non-traditional Areas, Caribbean Security," *supra* note 337 at 469.

[468] RSS Operations: 1989 Hurricane Hugo relief in St Kitts and Nevis and Montserrat; 1990 aftermath of attempted coup in Trinidad and Tobago; 1994 St Kitts and Nevis prison uprising; 1995 Hurricane Luis relief in Antigua and St Kitts and Nevis; 1998 Hurricane Georges relief in St Kitts and Nevis and Operation WEEDEATER (cannabis eradication) in St Vincent and the Grenadines; 2003 Operation BORDELAIS (prisoner transfer) in St Lucia. Cited in K. W. Henry, "Caribbean Security in 2005 Fact Or Fiction?" http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA495874&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed March 3, 2010). (hereinafter "Caribbean Security in 2005 Fact Or Fiction?").

[469] "RSS - what we are," *supra* note 337.

[470] As a sample cost, as of July 2005 the cost for operating the RSS Air wing (two Fairchild C-26A maritime surveillance aircraft based in Barbados) was US$23 million, funding for the air wing by the US government was suspended on 21 December 2005. "US pulls support for Caribbean Air Wing." Foreign Report, 20 July 2005. http://www.janes.com/security/law_enforcement/news/fr/fr050720_1_n.shtml. 28 January 2006. Cited in "Caribbean Security in 2005 Fact Or Fiction?" *supra* note 468.

Organization of American States

The Organization of American States has the most extensive membership of South American hemisphere states, and its membership has been discussed in Chapter 2. The encompassing nature and emergence of influential states such as Mexico and Brazil have increased the profile and importance of OAS initiatives. The OAS has been a springboard for small island state concerns. First, "the countries of Central America identified with the concerns expressed by the small island states since Central America had similar ones." [471] Second, the OAS recognized the 'special' nature of small island state concerns.[472]

The OAS has been essential to the security of the region, in that it addresses security concerns over and above the specialized security interests of organizations such as the RSS. The OAS security arrangement is solidified through the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty.[473] The Rio Treaty recognizes "that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of

[471] "Permanent Council of the OAS / Committee on Hemispheric Security Report on the Security of Small Island States," http://www.oas.org/csh/english/sisreports284.asp (accessed March 3, 2010).
[472] *Ibid.*
[473] "Inter-American Treaty Of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)," http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/sigs/b-29.html (accessed March 3, 2010).

individual or collective self-defense…."[474] The Rio Treaty consists of the following signatories in Table 13:[475]

Table 13: OAS Countries and Year of Signature/Entry to the Rio Treaty

Commonwealth Caribbean	Year	Latin America	Year
Barbados	1967	Argentina	1947
Trinidad and Tobago	1967	Brazil	1947
Jamaica	1969	Bolivia	1947
Grenada	1975	Chile	1947
Dominica	1979	Columbia	1947
St Lucia	1979	Costa Rica	1947
Antigua and Barbuda	1981	Cuba	1947
St Vincent and the Grenadines	1981	Dominican Republic	1947
Bahamas	1982	El Salvador	1947

[474] *Ibid.*

[475] The following non Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin American states are also members of the OAS: Canada 1990, Suriname 1977, and the US 1947.
The Rio Treaty was signed in 1947 and came into force in 1948.
Note - On June 3, 2009, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Americas adopted resolution AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), that resolves that the 1962 resolution, which excluded the Government of Cuba from its participation in the inter-American system, ceases to have effect in the Organization of American States (OAS). The 2009 resolution states that the participation of the Republic of Cuba in the OAS will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS.
On July 5, 2009, the Organization of American States (OAS) invoked Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, suspending Honduras from active participation in the hemispheric body. The unanimous decision was adopted as a result of the June 28 coup d'état that expelled President José Manuel Zelaya from office. Diplomatic initiatives are ongoing to foster the restoration of democracy to Honduras.
"Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)."
Organization of American States, "OAS: Member States "
http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp (accessed January 21, 2011).

St Kitts and Nevis	1984	Guatemala	1947
Belize	1991	Haiti	1947
Guyana	1991	Honduras	1947
		Mexico	1947
		Panama	1947
		Paraguay	1947
		Peru	1947
		Uruguay	1947
		Venezuela	1947
		Nicaragua	1948
		Ecuador	1949

OAS membership serves to demonstrate not only the separation between the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America, but also the separation between the Commonwealth Caribbean and the US. Though Commonwealth Caribbean states achieved independence much later than Latin American states, the Commonwealth Caribbean was slow to pursue OAS membership because they were not only suspicious of Latin America, but also the US.[476]

[476] "The Relevance of Latin America to the Foreign Policy of Commonwealth Caribbean States," *supra* note 320 at 256.

Nonetheless, the Commonwealth Caribbean had little choice but to create closer ties with the US as British presence in the region decreased.[477]

Closer ties to the US also translated into closer ties with Latin America, as demonstrated with Trinidad and Tobago becoming the first Commonwealth Caribbean state and only the second English-speaking state in the OAS. US influence in the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America served to integrate both regions into the OAS, which demonstrates that US superiority does not have to be dangerous. Closer ties between the Commonwealth Caribbean and the US are evident in larger regional bodies such as the OAS, but are also demonstrated through an increased US presence and investment in the Commonwealth Caribbean region.

US Cooperation and Role in Commonwealth Caribbean

The overview of Caribbean regional bodies, in which small island states participate, illustrates the cooperation and integration of Caribbean states. The inclusion of US participation, leadership and funding, particularly in the sphere of military training, equipment, capabilities and operations, shows US cooperation and integration with Commonwealth Caribbean states. US presence in the region has taken precedence over that of the UK, with the CBI and participation in the RSS 1983 Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. US participation and leadership continued as seen in US contributions to combating the common security threat posed by the drug trade in the Caribbean region.

[477] *Ibid.*

US contributions towards combating the drug trade in the Caribbean illustrate US capabilities and leadership, which are imperative in alleviating drug-related security concerns in the Caribbean. The US has contributed extensive sea and air resources to patrol drug-shipping lanes in the Caribbean as part of their drug interdiction efforts. .[478] In addition, the US has engaged in bilateral counterdrug agreements with Caribbean small island states, as illustrated in Table 14.

Table 14: US Bilateral Counterdrug Agreements as of August 1997[479]

Country	Ship boarding	Shiprider	Pursuit	Entry to Investigate	Overflight	Order to Land
Antigua and Barbuda	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bahamas		X			X	
Barbados						
Belize	X	X	X	X		

[478] US employs logistics, cruiser, destroyer, frigate, amphibious and coast guard sea capabilities in addition to C130, C141, E2, E3, F15/F16, KC135, P3C, S3, SH2F, SH60B, C5, EC130, H46D, UH60, OV10, and U2 air capabilities as part of their Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) – East is responsible for the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.
"Drug Control: 1997 Update on US Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific - Report to Congressional Requesters," supra note 398 at 18, 19.

[479] Ship boarding: Standing authority for the US Coast Guard to stop, board, and search foreign vessels suspected of illicit traffic located seaward of the territorial sea of any nation.
Shiprider: Standing authority to embark law enforcement official on vessel platforms of the parties. These officials may then authorize certain law enforcement actions.
Pursuit: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to pursue fleeing vessels or aircraft suspected of illicit drug traffic into foreign waters or airspace. May also include authority to stop, board, and search pursued vessels.
Entry to investigate: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to enter foreign waters or airspace to investigate vessels or aircraft located therein suspected of illicit drug traffic. May also include authority to stop, board, and search such vessels.
Overflight: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to fly in foreign airspace when in support of counter drug operations.
Order to land: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to order to land in the host nation aircraft suspected of illicit drug traffic. Source: US Coast Guard in United States General Accounting Office, *ibid.* at 15-16.

Dominica	X	X	X	X		
Grenada	X	X	X	X	X	X
Jamaica						
St. Kitts and Nevis	X	X	X	X	X	X
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	X	X	X	X	X	X
Trinidad and Tobago	X	X	X	X	X	X

The countries listed in Table 14, with the exception of Barbados and Jamaica, signed the August 1997 Shiprider Agreement in its original form, "giving the US blanket authority in drug enforcement operations in their jurisdiction, plus powers of interdiction."[480] Barbados and Jamaica did not sign the August 1997 Ship Rider Agreement:

> "…arguing that it did not give enough consideration or respect to their sovereignty. Of particular concern, too, was the fear that the US would be able to exercise unconditional power within Jamaica's territorial waters, especially its Exclusive Economic Zone."[481]

Jamaica negotiated for three months to reach an agreement that respected its' sovereignty and removed blanket immunity in respect of US personnel taking action against a suspected vessel. The negotiated Shiprider

[480] Lloyd Williams, "The Shiprider Agreement: No Smooth Sailing," Jamaica *Gleaner,* 8 February 2004," http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040208/cleisure/cleisure2.html (accessed March 4, 2010). (hereinafter "No Smooth Sailing").
[481] *Ibid.*
See also, "The State of the Region," *supra* note 400 at 45. Which notes the Shiprider agreements came under attack as Caribbean countries' viewed the agreement as a breach of their sovereignty by the United States.

agreement was signed by Jamaica on 6 May 1997.[482] Barbados also engaged the US in lengthy negotiations and signed its own Shiprider Agreement on 25 June 1997.[483]

The stance of Jamaica and Barbados received reaction from "hegemon tamed" to recognition of US willingness to negotiate.[484] This has resulted in debate over US hegemony where the US is viewed as bullying "weaker countries of limited resources into treaties and concessions without providing anything in return".[485] However, Anthony Maingot, in *The United States and the Caribbean: Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty*, concedes that Jamaica and Barbados "…acknowledged that the US hardly acted as a conventional *hegemon*."[486] Moreover, the Ship Rider Agreement resulted in Jamaica receiving the support of US radar protection, sophisticated aircraft sorting techniques, and cellular intercept equipment, in addition to three 44-foot fast patrol boats, costing some US$500,000 apiece, that were presented to Jamaica's Defense Force Coast Guard.[487] The Shiprider Agreement is useful in illustrating the US Caribbean relationship because it highlights the concerns and realities Commonwealth Caribbean states face in meeting their security needs,

---

[482] "No Smooth Sailing," *supra* note 480.
[483] See Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking, U.S.-Barb., (entered into force 11 October 1998) K.A.V. 5337(S) available in 1998 WL 773436. Cited in "Caribbean Shiprider Agreements: Sunk by Banana Trade War?," *supra* note 438 at 184.
[484] Forum on Sovereignty, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, June 7, 1997. Cited in *Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty*, *supra* note 402 at 15.
[485] "The State of the Region," supra note 400 at 46.
[486] *Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty*, *supra* note 402 at 16.
[487] "No Smooth Sailing," *supra* note 480.

and also the significant US contributions in the region, mainly in the form of intelligence and detection systems.

US Intelligence and Detection Contributions to Caribbean Security

Though challenges in intelligence-sharing exist among agencies and countries, US intelligence-gathering has proven invaluable in detecting and monitoring suspected drug traffickers and making successful law enforcement interdictions.[488] Challenges are also reflected in US radar surveillance, which experienced reductions from nine microwave radars and was eventually replaced with less accurate Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar (ROTHR) systems.[489] This is illustrated in Table 15, depicting radar capability in 1994 compared with that of Table 16 depicting radar capability in 1995.[490] Despite the recognition that reduced radar resources limit capabilities, the larger challenge remains funding for operations and maintenance.[491]

[488] "Drug Control: 1997 Update on US Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific - Report to Congressional Requesters," supra note 398 at 25.
[489] United States General Accounting Office, *ibid.* at 22.
[490] United States General Accounting Office, *ibid.* at 34.
[491] United States General Accounting Office, *ibid.* at 22.

Table 15:



Table 16:



The scale of US investment into Caribbean security in the 1990s is illustrated in Table 17.[492] The decrease of US funding raises questions of American willingness to assert hegemony in the region. This does not imply that the US has not and does not continue to play a central role in the Caribbean. In fact, the US remains a large contributor to Caribbean small island state economies.

Table 17: US Counternarcotics Funding in the Transit Zone, Fiscal Years 1991-97 (Dollars in Millions)

Agency	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997 Est.
DOD	$407.1	$504.5	$426.0	$220.4	$214.7	$228.9	$304.6
USCG	565.2	443.9	310.5	234.1	301.2	323.2	335.7
USCS	Not Available	Not Available	16.2	12.5	10.1	4.5	6.2
DEA	26.2	28.8	29.1	28.7	29.6	34.0	31.7
State	35.9	36.2	14.0	7.9	10.6	8.5	18.4
Total	$1,034.4	$1,013.4	$795.8	$503.6	$566.2	$599.1	$696.6

[492] Legend: USCG= US Coast Guard; USCS= US Customs Service.
Note:
1. US Coast Guard data for 1994 are different from the data presented in our April 1996 report because of updated information provided by the U.S Coast Guard.
2. US Customs Service data do not include funding for Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. These areas are territories of the United States, and funding is not included as part of the transit zone.
Source: Indicated federal agencies in United States General Accounting Office, *ibid.* at 17.

US Third Border Initiative

The US "Third Border Initiative" (TBI) was announced by President Bush in April 2001 as an "effort to deepen cooperation between the United States and the Caribbean nations, particularly on issues such as HIV/AIDS, disaster mitigation, and law enforcement". [493] The TBI is a "targeted package of programs designed to enhance diplomatic, economic, health, education and law enforcement cooperation and collaboration" with Caribbean Countries.[494] Though security was not the main theme of the TBI, the events of 9/11 resulted in a paradigm shift creating a focus on security and law enforcement such as improved customs and border practices, surveillance, expertise of security forces and international cooperation.[495] However, the sentiment that "the United States has paid little policy attention to the Caribbean countries as an integral part of its 'perimeter defense' structure" prevails,[496] as Third Border initiatives have been critiqued as unable "to achieve critical mass and develop to their fullest potential" therefore maintaining "the status quo".[497] Concerns of socio-cultural differences between all the nations involved, language barriers, territorial disputes, perceived threats to national sovereignty, the strong influence of the powerful narcotics trafficking cartels and organized crime organizations in the

[493] "Fact Sheet: President's Speech at the Summit of the Americas - Quebec City, Canada " http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010423-1.html (accessed 4/19/2011, 2011).
[494] "Fact Sheet: Caribbean Third Border Initiative - Quebec, Canada " http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010423-5.html (accessed 4/19/2011, 2011).
[495] Dion E. Phillips, "Terrorism and Security in the Caribbean Before and After 9/11," *Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace, Economics and Development* 7 (2008), 123, 130.
[496] Anthony T Bryan and Stephen E. Flynn, "Free Trade, Smart Borders and Homeland Security: U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation in a New Era of Vulnerability," *The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Working Paper Series* 8 (September 2002), 5.
[497] "Caribbean Institution for Safety and Preparedness " http://www.cisp-inc.org/challenge/scenario.htm (accessed 4/19/2011, 2011).

region that engage in weapons smuggling and the human trade, socialist and nationalist movements, and terrorist activity have all been obstacle to US and Caribbean cooperation.[498] Nevertheless, US and Caribbean governments "continue to work together to achieve shared goals".[499]

Contributions to the Political Economy of Caribbean Small Island States

Different models to describe the economic structures of small island states, such as, MIRAB, SITEs, and PROFITs aid in the examination of the US/Caribbean relationship.

MIRAB

St. Kitts and the US Virgin Islands have been described as Caribbean Migration Aid and Bureaucracy (MIRAB) economies.[500] Migration between the US and the Caribbean has resulted in a large Caribbean diaspora. To give an idea of the scope of Caribbean migration to the US, a 2000 US census indicated that 10% out of a population of 291 million were born in the Caribbean.[501] A benefit can be experienced by the sending community of a migrant through remittances, which in turn increases the income and therefore the quality of life within the community.[502] Indeed, Bertram notes the significance of remittances in stating that, "transnational networks of unrequited transfers now dwarf official development aid and rank alongside private direct investment as a source of

---

[498] *Ibid*.
[499] Adam J. Ereli, "Joint Statement on Third Border Initiative," http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/v.26-2/Ereli.pdf (accessed 4/19/2011, 2011).
[500] "The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century," *supra* note 276 at 7.
[501] *Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty*, *supra* note 402 at 119.
[502] "The MIRAB Economy in South Pacific Microstates," *supra* note 276 at 498.

global development finance."[503] In addition to economic benefits, migration also has a social and cultural impact, because an increase in the Caribbean population affects the sentiments behind US policies towards the region.

PROFIT

PROFIT is an acronym for: People considerations affecting citizenship, residence and employment rights (P); Resource management (R); Overseas engagement and ultra national recognition (O); Finance (F); and Transportation (T).[504] PROFIT economies found in the following SNIJ's: the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda and Turks & Caicos, exemplify Caribbean economies which manifest PROFIT economic strategies. PROFIT economies are successful in deploying their jurisdictional autonomy to advance their ambitions through interaction with their larger metropolitan partner.[505] Such jurisdictional autonomy is exemplified through offshore banking facilities and tax havens in proximity to the US and its corporations. Characteristics of MIRAB and PROFIT economies compared below illustrate the nuances between a MIRAB economy and a PROFIT economy. The comparison of MIRAB and PROFIT economies highlights the ability of Caribbean small island states to use jurisdiction as a resource to adapt to the normative rules of the regional economy.

[503] "The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century," *supra* note 276 at 8.
[504] "Managing the Hinterland Beyond," *supra* note 279 at 54.
[505] "The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century," *supra* note 276 at 5.

Characteristics of MIRAB and PROFIT Economies:[506]

MIRAB economies	PROFIT economies
Migration (out)	Migration (in/out)
Remittances (high)	Remittances (low/medium)
Aid (high)	Aid (low/nil)
Bureaucracy (high)	Bureaucracy (medium/high)
Resource management (low/nil)	Resource management (medium/high)
(Para-)Diplomacy (subsidy driven)	(Para-) Diplomacy (procedure-driven)
Finance management (low)	Finance management (medium/high)
Transportation management (low)	Transportation management (medium/high)
Manufactures (low)	Manufactures (medium)

In addition to the MIRAB and PROFIT economies mentioned, Jerome McElroy describes a prominent tourism sector or industry as an economic driver for Caribbean small island states.

SITEs

The Caribbean includes many Small Island Tourist Economies (SITEs).[507] SITEs benefit from the proximity and lucrative spinoffs from US tourists and include such islands as the British Virgin Islands, St. Maarten, Aruba, Cayman Islands, Turks & Caicos, Bermuda, the US Virgin Islands, Anguilla, Barbados, Bonaire, Antigua, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, Curacao, Martinique, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Vincent, Guadeloupe, and Dominica.[508] As in MIRAB and PROFIT economies, SITEs also overlap.



[506] "Managing the Hinterland Beyond," *supra* note 279 at 54.
[507] For more information of SITE's see, Jerome L. McElroy, "Small Island Tourist Economies Across the Life Cycle," *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 471, no. 1 (April 2006): 62.
[508] "The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century," *supra* note 276 at 7.

The models of MIRABs, PROFITs, and SITEs illustrate the interconnectedness of the US Caribbean economies through transfers of aid, remittances, tourist dollars, and tax havens. Moreover, social interconnectedness is also present, due to the cultural exchange involved in migration of MIRAB and PROFIT economies.

The Impact of US/Caribbean Cooperation

Political, economic, social and military cooperation among the Caribbean small island states with the US through bilateral agreements and regional and international institutions has created more equal footing between small powers such as small island states and large powers such as the US. The increase of equality among nations lends to the arguments on the full extent of US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean in the late 20th century.[509] Moreover, the focus of US/Caribbean security on non-conventional threats highlights the prevalence of such threats compared with conventional security threats, and illustrates the true nature of security threats which Commonwealth Caribbean SIS face.

[509] The examples of US and Commonwealth Caribbean cooperation serve to further Robert Keohane's argument of a general decline of US hegemony and the rise of international institutions and the normative rules they set out.
After Hegemony, *supra* note 215 at 244.
Also, Hilbourne Watson suggests that the post-1945 era of US hegem**o**ny has come to an end, and that control of the world order has slipped beyond the capacity of any single state, or indeed any group of states.
Hilbourne Watson, "Caribbean Integration under Global Neo-liberalism: Selected Issues in the West Indian Commission Report," *21st Century Policy Review*, vol. 2, no. 1-2, (1994): 63.
Discussed in Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, "Repositioning the Caribbean within Globalisation : Centre for International Governance Innovation | Centre Pour l'Innovation Dans La Gouvernance Internationale," http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2007/6/repositioning-caribbean-within-globalistion (accessed February 17, 2010), 2.

Chapter 6:

Conclusions

The US Invasion of Grenada in 1983 was significant for a number of reasons. It illustrated the asymmetry of power between very small states and major powers because it was the first time a sovereign microstate found itself in open conflict with a major power.[510] It signaled the US as the major player in the Commonwealth Caribbean and created the debate on US hegemony in the region.[511] Moreover, the US invasion of Grenada created international focus on small state conventional security, which in turn revealed the non-conventional nature of small island state security. Furthermore, the recognition of SIS security concerns, conventional or non-conventional, fostered increased regional cooperation where the US has come to act as a mentor state. Moreover, the Commonwealth Caribbean's increased regional and international profile has proven to increase its influence on greater powers such as the US through regional organizations (for example, the OAS), and extends to bodies such as the G20.

The literature review discusses the concerns of the asymmetry of power between great states and small states, which were borne into reality with the US invasion of Grenada. However, control of Grenada by its people and government was restored via democratic elections. In contrast, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 was the ultimate test of the integrity of international principles such as collective security and extantism. Had it not been for the intervention of the international community, Kuwait would have lost its legal

[510] "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security," *supra* note 47 at 363.
[511] "US Intervention, Regional Security, and Militarization in the Caribbean," *supra* note 361.

international personality as a sovereign state and participant in the international community.

Nonetheless, despite recognition in the decline of global US hegemony prior to the events in Grenada, US intervention was perceived as an act to reassert US hegemony in the region, as demonstrated in *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion* by Paul Sutton, Anthony Payne, and Tony Thorndike, where they highlighted the predominance of US hegemony in the Caribbean.[512] However, the US role in the territorial disputes between Guyana and Venezuela, Belize and Guatemala and the British Falkland Islands and Argentina illustrate how the US has been caught between Latin American and Commonwealth Caribbean interests. Acknowledging the separation of Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America aids in delineating how US foreign policy differs between Latin America and the Commonwealth Caribbean and in concluding that the Commonwealth Caribbean has not experienced aspects of US hegemony found in the 'banana republics' of Latin America. Furthermore, the premise of US hegemony in the region is also in question, considering that Britain had been the main player in the Commonwealth Caribbean and continues to hold influence with the US, demonstrated by Britain's ability to gain US support in the Falklands War.

The US invasion of Grenada demonstrated the asymmetry of power between a small state and not only a major power, but a superpower, as well as the US ability to restore order to the SIS of Grenada. The reassertion of US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean over time has even been

[512] *Grenada Revolution and Invasion*, *supra* note 200.

reassessed by Anthony Payne, who acknowledges that the 'New Right' of the Reagan era was unable to restore US hegemony in the region.[513] Moreover, with the passage of time, the initial reaction of the US invasion of Grenada was seen as an overreaction, given the return of constitutional government in Grenada and increased US cooperation with Commonwealth Caribbean SIS.[514]

The role of the US in the Commonwealth Caribbean is also illustrated through the response of the international community. Though the reaction of the international community to the US-led invasion was negative, when the international community was given an opportunity for reprisal toward the US, the OECS countries instead lent their support to the US. Even though the validity of the request from Grenada's Head of State, Governor-General Paul Scoon, for assistance from the US and the OECS was questioned, it is reasonable to conclude that the OECS considered US hegemony secondary to the threat of leftist coups in the region.

Furthermore, concerns of US hegemony or encroachment of US interests on OECS member state sovereignty have proven to be secondary to the security threats posed by violent coups in the Commonwealth Caribbean as US intervention facilitated the return of a democratically elected government in Grenada. US ability to restore order in Grenada demonstrates US respect for the sovereignty of Grenada and the integrity of the international system as US

---

[513] "Rethinking United States-Caribbean Relations," *supra* note 72.
[514] Frederic L. Pryor, "Review: Grenada: Revolution and Invasion; Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Internal Crisis and U. S. /OECD Intervention," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 492, Unemployment: A Global Challenge (July 1987): 208-209,http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/1045304.

actions have been more similar to that of a mentor state rather than a hegemonic power.[515]

Despite the return of democratic rule to Grenada, the ease with which the US invaded Grenada became a 'watershed' for SIS security and caused great concern among the international community, leading eventually to initiatives in the Commonwealth Secretariat and the UN to explore means in which to bolster small state security. Commonwealth and UN concerns focused on conventional security threats stemming from the demonstration of the asymmetry of power between the SIS of Grenada and the superpower of the US during the latter's invasion of Grenada.

However, US 'superpower' status should not only be considered in relation to small states. The disparity in the asymmetry of power between superpowers and major powers also needs to be contemplated. Therefore, to claim that SISs are insecure or lack necessary security capabilities due to their inability to thwart an invasion by a superpower is unreasonable. This is especially so if one considers that major powers are also vulnerable to the military supremacy of a superpower.

Nonetheless, initial studies and organizations focused on conventional security threats towards small state security. However, as pre-Grenada literature indicates, SIS concerns were more political, economic, and social in

[515] US actions can be interpreted as being in line with Bartmann's assertion that "The friendship of close mentor state, the support of regional bodies within their neighbourhoods, and the extantism of the international system itself continue to be the major pillars of small island security.
"Island War and Security," *supra* note 198 at 307, 314, 321.

nature, and such concerns would prove to become the focus of the 1985 Commonwealth Caribbean Colloquium as well as Commonwealth Secretariat and UN studies, where they would be described in terms of non-conventional security threats. The recognition of non-conventional security threats and their debilitating impacts on SISs have proven to be more urgent, making any potential conventional security concern guised in terms of US hegemony in the Commonwealth Caribbean secondary to non-conventional security threats in the region.[516] Moreover, the recognition of the predominance of non-conventional security threats in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the US has led to regional co-operation efforts, further illustrating the key political, economic and social aspects of regional security.

The proliferation of SIS in the international system has increased the importance of regional and international cooperation as a basis for small island states. The shift from realist to neo-realist perceptions of security with the emergence of liberalization demonstrated through regional cooperation has resulted in the integration of US and Commonwealth Caribbean governments. This has created a more interactive atmosphere through common institutions and normative values, as noted by Keohane. The atmosphere of regional and international cooperation has become more entrenched with the recognition that states share common security concerns emanating from non-state actors. The security concerns posed by non-state actors have proven to be beyond the

[516] "Maritime Counternarcotics Agreements: The cop on the Beat," *supra* note 394.

capability of any one state to address on its own and in turn dominate the Commonwealth Caribbean and US security agenda.

The increased diplomatic recognition of Commonwealth Caribbean states by the US has increased both Commonwealth Caribbean regional cooperation and the region's international profile. Though the US relationship with the Commonwealth Caribbean has been described as one of a non-conventional hegemon that produces an encroachment on Commonwealth Caribbean state sovereignty, the US/Commonwealth Caribbean diplomatic relations and cooperation actually have served to demonstrate the practice of Commonwealth Caribbean state sovereignty. Additionally, US cooperation with the Commonwealth Caribbean has enhanced regional security through organizations such as OECS and OAS. US technology such as radar and intelligence-gathering has been instrumental in counter-drug operations.

The rise of new influential states and their participation in facing international challenges, as demonstrated by the G20, has shifted the dynamic of power in the international community.[517] This change has coincided with the evolution of globalization, which has led to the US being unable to reconstitute "a new Bretton Woods."[518] Also, Commonwealth Caribbean economies have demonstrated their ability to become more economically competitive through MIRAB, PROFIT, and SITE economies, which has made them more economically competitive . Though the US plays a major role in Commonwealth Caribbean economies, there is also a degree of Commonwealth Caribbean

[517] Fareed Zakaria, *supra* note 378.
[518] "Rethinking United States-Caribbean Relations," *supra* note 72 at 74.

influence on the US economy. Such influence is exercised by their territorial jurisdiction and inclusion in the regional and international institutions in which they are equal members to address their concerns with the US.

Moreover, the integration of Commonwealth Caribbean culture into the US society has occurred through migration. This has resulted in the influence of US policy through Caribbean diaspora communities. In addition, the sense of 'island identity' across the Commonwealth Caribbean diaspora and the insularity of Commonwealth Caribbean SISs has proved effective against external influence, as demonstrated in the Commonwealth Caribbean's ability to avoid British plans of a West Indies Federation. The Commonwealth Caribbean has proven to be just as successful in thwarting US influence, as the US has been unable to assert the necessary cultural power to embed a hegemonic relationship in the Commonwealth Caribbean.[519]

Negative connotations of hegemony based on the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 have overshadowed the mentor role of the US in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Such interpretations fall short in considering US contributions to the increase of Commonwealth Caribbean SIS security and have also been counterproductive in recognizing the true nature of small island state security. Though the US invasion increased the profile of small state security, the focus remained on state actors, rather than on non-state actors and

[519] For a discussion on hegemony and culture see, Antonio Gramsci and others, *Selections from Cultural Writings* (London: Electric Book Co., 2001), 331-334, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/upei/Doc?id=2001713. Also, Colin Flint and Ghazi-Walid Falah, "How the United States Justified its War on Terrorism: Prime Morality and the Construction of a 'Just War'," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 8 (2004): 1380, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993792.

non-conventional security. Continued cooperation and study, however, reveals that the true nature of SIS security is expressed in non-conventional terms and that those threats are the primary security threat to Commonwealth Caribbean security, not the US.

Bibliography

Trinidad Guardian. 1 November 1972.

Trinidad Guardian. November 1972.

Africa. June 1975.

The Times. 28 June 1975.

The Weekly Gleaner. 15 August, 2001.

"85. Arbitration Agreement Between Guyana and Venezuela." http://www.guyana.org/features/guyanastory/chapter85.html (accessed October 4, 2010).

"About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative." http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/51/0,3343,en_32250379_32236992_33916403_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed February 24, 2010).

"About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative." http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/51/0,3343,en_32250379_32236992_33916403_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed February 24, 2010).

"Argentina Toughens Shipping Rules in Falklands Oil Row." BBC World News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8518982.stm (accessed February 17, 2010).

"Avalon Project - the Covenant of the League of Nations." http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp (accessed January 6, 2011)

"Belize." http://countrystudies.us/belize/ (accessed August 30, 2010).

"Belize: Decolonization and the Border Dispute with Guatemala. " http://countrystudies.us/belize/14.htm (accessed August 30, 2010).

"Belize - Relations with Guatemala." http://countrystudies.us/belize/85.htm (accessed January 19, 2011).

"Belize - Relations with the United States." http://countrystudies.us/belize/84.htm (accessed August 8, 2010).

"The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA)." http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/carifta.jsp?menu=community (accessed March 2, 2010).

"Caribbean Institution for Safety and Preparedness " http://www.cisp-inc.org/challenge/scenario.htm (accessed 4/19/2011, 2011).

"Caribbean/United States Summit. Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean." Bridgetown Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action 10 May 1997. http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/meetings_statements/caribbean_ussummit.jsp?menu=communications (accessed February 3, 2009).

"CARICOM and Washington Commission a New Chapter in U.S.-Caribbean Relations / Council on Hemispheric Affairs." http://www.coha.org/caricom-and-washington-commission-a-new-chapter-in-us-caribbean-relations/ (accessed February 9, 2010).

"CARICOM Member States." http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community (accessed March 2, 2010).

"Central America & Caribbean." http://biogeodb.stri.si.edu/bioinformatics/images/maps/central_america_&caribbean.jpg (accessed August 17, 2010).

"Central America – Caribbean." http://www2.boonville.k12.mo.us/websites/Dkluck/Pictures/central-america-caribbean.jpg. (accessed August 17, 2010).

"Conference on the Caribbean: A 20/20 Vision: A Strategy Against Corruption." http://66.102.1.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&client=firefox-a&q=cache:H1DOKCBS6IwJ:siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOECS/Resources/NazarioPaper.pdf+Conference+On+The+Caribbean:+A+2020+Vision (accessed March 4, 2009).

"Criminal Deportees to Latin America, Caribbean Pass 88 Thousand in Six Months " http://www.newsamericasnow.com/criminal-deportees-to-latin-america-caribbean-pass-88-thousand-in-six-months/ (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011).

"Developments in Cyprus - January to February - Fighting at Limassol - British Governments Protest Against Importation of Arms - Strengthening of British Forces." *Keesings Record of World Events* 14 (1963-1964): 20117.

"East Timor - Formal Granting of Independence." *Keesings Record of World Events* 48, no. 1 (2002): 44781-44782.

"Expelled from Eden." *Economist* 345, no. 8048 (12/20, 1997): 35. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=4456&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live.

"Fact Sheet: Caribbean Third Border Initiative - Quebec, Canada " http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010423-5.html (accessed 4/19/2011, 2011).

"Fact Sheet: President's Speech at the Summit of the Americas - Quebec City, Canada " http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010423-1.html (accessed 4/19/2011, 2011).

"Factsheet -- IMF Emergency Assistance: Supporting Recovery from Natural Disasters and Armed Conflicts." http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conflict.htm (accessed February 25, 2010).

"FATF Members and Observers." http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/52/0,3343,en_32250379_32236869_34027188_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed October 5, 2010).

"Financial Action Task Force (FATF)." http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed February 24, 2010).

"Foreign Policy in Focus: U.S.-Caribbean Relations." http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol5/v5n19carib.html (accessed February 3, 2009).

"Free Trade Area of the Americas: Official Website." http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ (accessed February 4, 2009).

"The Group of 77." http://www.g77.org/ (accessed July 26, 2010).

"Institute of Commonwealth Studies: Caribbean and Central America." http://commonwealth.sas.ac.uk/rg_carib.htm (accessed February 9, 2010).

"Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance." http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/treaties/b-29.html (accessed March 3, 2010).

"Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance: Rio Treaty." http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/sigs/b-29.html (accessed March 3, 2010).

"Jeane Kirkpatrick: US Ambassador to the UN Who Strove to Get President Reagan to Take Argentina's Part in the Falklands Conflict." *Times Online* Obituary. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article1088794.ece (accessed February 10, 2010).

"Monroe Doctrine, 1823." http://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/Monroe (accessed August 19, 2010).

"Non Aligned Movement." http://www.nam.gov.za/ (accessed July 26, 2010).

"Non-Aligned Countries: Attendance at the March 1983 Summit Conference in Delhi." *Keesings Record of World Events* 29 (1983): 32350-32351.

"OAS: Member State." http://www.oas.org/en/states/member_state.asp?sType=007 (accessed February 15, 2010).

Organization of American States. "OAS: Member States " http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp (accessed January 21, 2011).

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. "Member States " http://www.oecs.org/about-the-oecs/member-states (accessed January 21, 2011).

"Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)." http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/oecs.jsp?menu=community (accessed March 3, 2010).

"Origin & Evolution of the OECS." http://www.oecs.org/about-the-oecs (accessed March 3, 2010).

"The OECS - 25 Yrs of Integration" http://www.foreign.gov.vc/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32&Itemid=8 (accessed April 12, 2011).

"Permanent Council of the OAS: Committee on Hemispheric Security Report on the Security of Small Island States." http://www.oas.org/csh/english/sisreports284.asp (accessed March 3, 2010).

"Pilot Dulles Outsails the Reds." http://books.google.ca/books?id=ZkgEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA29&lpg=PA29&dq=the+dulles+resolution+++guatemala&source=bl&ots=H5x-mmJaSd&sig=GgZECoYxITz8plnYEr6mBFcplSc&hl=en&ei=SQuqTbHDFMLq0gHh5OiOCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CBgQ

6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=the dulles resolution + guatemala&f=false (accessed April 11, 2011).

"Rockhopper Shares Soar on Falklands Oil Upgrade." *Guardian* Online. http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/marketforceslive/2010/jun/04/oil-oilandgascompanies (accessed January 19, 2011).

"RSS - What We Are." http://www.rss.org.bb/rss1.htm (accessed March 3, 2010).

"ScienceDirect - Marine Policy: Assessing Climate Change Impacts on Coastal Infrastructure in the Eastern Caribbean." http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VCD-4BY3WRW-2&_user=10&_coverDate=09/30/2004&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=1187611787&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=5bb7bc4b0339304c89c2f47ff9551588 (accessed January 31, 2010).

"A Special Relationship." *Economist* 371, no. 8379 (June 12, 2004): 56-56, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=13425043&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live.

"The Statement of Santo Domingo: The Caribbean Encounter: Towards the 21st Century." http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CAR_DOM/Negotiations/SantoDomingo_e.pdf (accessed March 3, 2010).

United Nations and Decolonization. "U.N. Historical Background." http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/history.htm (accessed March 26, 2010).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "UNODC and Organized Crime." http://www.unodc.org/unodc/fr/organized-crime/?ref=menuside (accessed February 22, 2010).

"USA Patriot Act." http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/ (accessed February 24, 2010).

Wallace, Barbara. (bwallace@oecs.org) "Anguilla," 25 March 2011, Personal email (March 26, 2011).

"The World Factbook." CIA. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed February 18, 2010).

"The World Factbook: Grenada." CIA. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gj.html (accessed September 29, 2007).

Acar, Dilaver Arikan Acar. "Small State Playing the Asymmetric Game: Continuity and Change in Albanian Foreign Policy." Unpublished PhD, Thesis submitted to Dept. of International Relations. Ankara: Bilkent University, 2008.

Agnew, John A. *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005.

Anderson, Thomas D. *Geopolitics of the Caribbean Ministates in a Wider World.* Praeger, 1984.

Armstrong, H.W. and R. Read. "Trade, Competition and Market Structure in Small States: The Role of Contestability." *Malta, Bank of Valletta Review* 18 (1998): 1-18.

Aron, Raymond. *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*. New York: Doubleday, 1966.

Bahcheli, Tozun, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Felix Srebrnik. *De Facto States*. Politics/International Relations. London: 2004. http://www.myilibrary.com?id=5897.

Bakan, Abigail B., David Cox, and Colin Leys. *Imperial Power and Regional Trade: The Caribbean Basin Initiative*. Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993.

Baldacchino, Godfrey. "Editorial Introduction." *Tijdschrift Voor Economishce En Sociale Geografie." Journal of Economic and Social Geography - Island Studies* 95, no. 3 (2004): 267-354.

Baldacchino, Godfrey. "Managing the Hinterland Beyond: Two Ideal-Type Strategies of Economic Development for Small Island Territories." *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 47, no. 1 (30 Mar 2006): 45-60.

Baldacchino, Godfrey. *Island Enclaves: Offshoring Strategies, Creative Governance, and Subnational Island Jurisdictions*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010.

Baldacchino, Godfrey. *A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader*. Charlottetown: Institute of Island Studies, 2007.

Baldacchino, Godfrey and David Milne. "Exploring Sub-National Island Jurisdictions: An Editorial Introduction." *Round Table* 95, no. 386 (September, 2006): 487-502.

Baldacchino, Godfrey and David A. Milne, eds. *Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands: The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

Baldacchino, Godfrey, University of Prince Edward Island, and International Small Islands Studies Association. *Island Studies*. Special issue ed. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 2004.

Barston, R. P. *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*. London: Barnes and Noble, 1973.

Bartmann, Barry. "Very Small States at the Millennium: The Contest between Vulnerability and Opportunity." *Invited Paper at the International Colloquium of the Royal Commonwealth Society, the Commonwealth at the Millennium Conference Centre* (February 20, 1998).

Bartmann, Barry. "In Or Out: Sub-National Island Jurisdictions and the Antechamber of Para-Diplomacy." *Round Table* 95, no. 386 (September, 2006): 541-559.

Bartmann, Barry. "Island War & Security." In *A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader*, edited by Godfrey Baldacchino. Charlottetown, P.E.I.; Malta: Institute of Island Studies; Miller House, 2007.

Bartmann, Barry. *Lilliput Revisited: Small Places in a Changing World*. Charlottetown: Institute of Island Studies, 1992.

Bartmann, Barry. "Meeting the Needs of Microstate Security." *Round Table* 91, no. 365 (July, 2002): 361-374.

Bartmann, Barry. "The Microstate Experience: Very Small States in the International System." In *Hvitabok (the White Book)*. Torshavn: Government of Faroe Islands, 1999.

Bartmann, Barry. *A World Made Safe for Small States*. Charlottetown: Institute of Island Studies, 1991.

Benedict, Burton. *Problems of Smaller Territories*. London: Pub. for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies by Athlone Press, 1967.

Bernal, Richard. "The Integration of Small Economies in the Free Trade Area of the Americas." *CSIS Policy Papers on the Americas* 9, (1998).

Bertram, Geoff and Ray Watters. "The MIRAB Economy in South Pacific Microstates." *Pacific Viewpoint* 26, no. 3 (September 1985): 497-519.

Bertram, Geoff. "Introduction: The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century." *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 47, no. 1 (04, 2006): 1-13, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=20308326&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live.

Bertram, Geoffrey. "Sustainability, Aid, and Material Welfare in Small South Pacific Island Economies, 1900–1990." *World Development* 21, no. 2 (February, 1993): 247-258.

Black, George. *The Good Neighbor: How the United States Wrote the History of Central America and the Caribbean*. 1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.

Blood, Hilary. *The Smaller Territories, Problems and Future.* London: Pub. by the Conservative Political Centre on behalf of the Conservative Commonwealth Council, 1958.

Boxill, Ian. "New Generation Series: Ideology and Caribbean Integration." Jamaica: University of the West Indies, 1997.

Brana-Shute, Gary. "Narco-Criminality in the Caribbean: Global Problems in Small Places." Caribbean Paper Series. http://trinitydc.edu/academics/depts/Interdisc/International/caribbean (accessed January 31, 2010).

Bray, Mark. "Small Countries in International Development." *Journal of Development Studies* 23, no. 2 (January 1987): 295. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=7137156&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live.

Briguglio, Lino. "Small Island Developing States and their Economic Vulnerabilities." *World Development* 23, no. 9 (September 1995): 1615. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9510290620&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live.

Briguglio, Lino, Eliawony J. Kisanga, University of Malta. Islands and Small States Institute, and Commonwealth Secretariat. *Economic Vulnerability and Resilience of Small States*. Malta: Formatek for the Islands and Small States Institute of the University of Malta and the Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 2004.

Bryan, Anthony T and Stephen E. Flynn. "Free Trade, Smart Borders and Homeland Security: U.S. - Caribbean Cooperation in a New Era of Vulnerability." *The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Working Paper Series* 8, (September 2002).

Bryan, Anthony T. "The State of the Region: Trends Affecting the Future of Caribbean Security." In *From Pirates to Drug Lords the Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment*, edited by Michael C. Desch, Jorge I. Domínguez and Andrés Serbín. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. http://www.netlibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action=summary&v=1&bookid=5499.

Brotherson, Festus Jr. "The Foreign Policy of Guyana, 1970-1985: Forbes Burnham's Search for Legitimacy." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 31, no. 3 (Autumn, 1989): 9-35. http://www.jstor.org/stable/165891.

Bull, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Buzan, Barry. *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Colorado: L. Rienner, 1991.

Buzan, Barry."Review: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 61, no. 2 (Spring, 1985): 290-291, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2617490.

Buzan, Barry. *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983.

Buzan, Barry and Ole Waver. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge Studies in International Relations).* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Caldwell, John C., Graham E. Harrison, and Pat Quiggin. "The Demography of Micro-States." *World Development* 8, no. 12 (December 1980): 953-962.

Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat. "Community History: West Indies Federation." http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/west_indies_federation.jsp?menu=community (accessed October 1, 2007).

Carmona, Andrew. "CARICOM and Washington Commission a New Chapter in U.S.-Caribbean Relations - Council on Hemispheric Affairs." http://www.coha.org/2007/07/caricom-and-washington-commission-a-new-chapter-in-us-caribbean-relations/ (accessed February 3, 2009).

"Central America and El Salvador March 10 1983." *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 19, no. 10 (March 14, 1983).

CIA. "The World Factbook." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed 10/01, 2007).

CIA. "Andorra – Introduction." ." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/an.html (accessed January 12, 2011).

CIA. "Anguilla - Introduction." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/av.html (accessed January 11, 2011).

CIA. "Barbados - Government - Independence." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bb.html (accessed January 11, 2011).

CIA. "Belize: Disputes - International." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bh.html (accessed October 4, 2010).

CIA. "Comoros - Introduction and Disputes - International." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cn.html (accessed January 11, 2011).

CIA. "Cyprus - Introduction." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html (accessed January 11, 2011).

CIA. "Guyana – Government." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gy.html (accessed January 11, 2011).

CIA. "Mayotte - Introduction and Disputes - International." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mf.html (accessed January 11, 2011).

CIA. "Saint Kitts and Nevis – Introduction." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sc.html (accessed January 11, 2011).

CIA. "Trinidad and Tobago - Transnational Issues." https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html (accessed January 20, 2011).

Clarke, Colin G. and Anthony Payne. *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987.

Clarke, Thurston. *Searching for Crusoe: A Journey among the Last Real Islands*. New York: Ballantine Books, 2001.

Commonwealth Advisory Group for Updating the 1985 Vulnerability Report and Mary Eugenia Charles. *A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997.

Commonwealth Secretariat. "Commonwealth Secretariat Briefing - Small States." http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/216535/FileName/ComSec. (accessed July 15, 2010).

Commonwealth Secretariat and Consultative Group on the Special Needs of Small States. *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society: Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985.

Cox, Richard Howard. *The State in International Relations.* San Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 1965.

Cox, Robert W. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 1, 1981): 126-155.

Cox, Robert W. *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

Craddock, John and Barbara R. Fick. "The Challenge of Governance and Security." *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly* no. 4 (Summer 2006): 10-13.

Cronin, Bruce. "The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations." *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 1 (March, 2001): 103-130.

Cross, Colin. *The Fall of the British Empire, 1918-1968*. 1 American ed. New York: Coward McCann, 1969.

Davidson, Basil. "On Revolutionary Nationalism: The Legacy of Cabral." *Latin American Perspectives* 11, no. 2 (Spring, 1984): 15-42. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2633519.

De Smith, Stanley. *Microstates and Micronesia Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories*. New York: New York University Press, 1970.

Dell, Sidney Samuel. *A Latin American Common Market?* New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Demas, William G. *The Economics of Development in Small Countries: With Special Reference to the Caribbean*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965.

Desch, Michael C., Jorge I. Domínguez, and Andrés Serbín. *From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.

Dickinson, Edwin De Witt. *The Equality of States in International Law*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920.

Dommen, E. C. "Reflections on the Security of Small Island Countries." *Journal of World Trade Law* 11, no. 1 (1986): 110-117.

Dommen, Edward and Philippe Hein. *States, Microstates, and Islands*. London: Croom Helm, 1985.

Dosman, Edgar J. "Points of Departure: The Security Equation in Canadian-Commonwealth Caribbean Relations." *International Journal* 42, no. 4 (1987): 821.

East, Maurice A., Stephen Salmore A. Hermann, and Charles F. *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies*. California: Sage Publications, 1978, http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0660/77022119-d.html;

El-Doufani, Mohamed M. "Regional Revisionist Client States Under Unipolarity." *Third World Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (1992): 255-265. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/3992775.

Elliott, Larry. "From G8 to G20: The End of Exclusion." http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/from-g8-to-g20-the-end-of-exclusion (accessed February 9, 2010).

Elliot, Larry. "This Summit Signaled the Passing of the Exclusive Club of Wealthy Nations." *The Observer*. http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/nov/16/global-economy-global-recession (accessed February 9, 2010).

Emerson, Rupert. *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples.* Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1962.

Emerson, Rupert. *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization*. Harvard University. Center for International Affairs. Vol. 9. Massachusetts: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1964.

Ereli, Adam J. "Joint Statement on Third Border Initiative." http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/v.26-2/Ereli.pdf (accessed 4/19/2011, 2011).

Erisman, H. Michael. *The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a Volatile Region*. Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

Erisman, H. Michael. "The Caricom States and US Foreign Policy: The Danger of Central Americanization." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 31, no. 3 (Autumn, 1989): 141-182. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/165896.

Espindola, Roberto. "Security Dilemmas." In *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*, edited by Colin Clarke and Tony Payne. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987.

Falcoff, Mark and Robert Royal. *The Continuing Crisis: U.S. Policy in Central America and the Caribbean: Thirty Essays by Statesmen, Scholars, Religious Leaders, and Journalists*. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center; Lanham, MD, 1987.

Falcoff, Mark and Robert Royal. *Crisis and Opportunity: U.S. Policy in Central America and the Caribbean: Thirty Essays by Statesmen, Scholars, Religious Leaders, and Journalists*. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984.

Fenwick, C. G. *International Law*. New York: Appelton-Century-Crofts, 1948.

Financial Action Task Force. "Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 2006-2007: Eighth NCCT Review." http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/14/11/39552632.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011).

Flint, Colin and Ghazi-Walid Falah. "How the United States Justified its War on Terrorism: Prime Morality and the Construction of a 'Just War'." *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 8 (2004): 1379-1399. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993792.

Fox, Annette Baker. *The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Fox, Annette Baker. *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.

Fox, Annette Baker. "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969." *International Journal* 24, no. 4 (Autumn, 1969): 751-764. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/40200289.

Fox, William T. R. "E. H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision." *Review of International Studies* 11, no. 1 (January 1985): 1-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097028.

Fox, William T.R. *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959.

Freedman, Lawrence D. "The Special Relationship, then and Now." Chap. 3 in *Foreign Affairs* vol. 85 (2006): 61-73. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=20586929&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live.

Gaviria, César. "Permanent Council of the OAS / Committee on Hemispheric Security: Special Security Concerns of Small Island States." http://www.oas.org/csh/english/sisreports2990.asp (accessed March 3, 2010).

General Accounting Office Washington DC National Security and International Affairs Division. "Drug Control: Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific." United States General Accounting Office. http://oai.dtic.mil.rlproxy.upei.ca/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA331587 (accessed February 27, 2010).

Gilderhus, Mark T. "The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (March 2006): 5-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552742.

Graham, Lawrence S. "Is the Portuguese Revolution Dead?" *Luso-Brazilian Review* 16, no. 2 (Winter 1979): 147-159. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3513531.

Gramsci, Antonio, David Forgacs, and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. *Selections from Cultural Writings*. London: Electric Book Co., 2001. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/upei/Doc?id=2001713.

Grant, Thomas D. "Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents." *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 37, no. 2 (1998-1999): 403-457.

Greene, J. Edward. "Review: Facing the Future of the Caribbean as Realists; Democracy in the Caribbean: Political, Economic and Social Perspectives." *Mershon International Studies Review* 38, no. 1 (April 1994): 138-140. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/222623.

Griffith, Ivelaw L. *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*. Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004.

Griffith, Ivelaw L. "Caribbean Security: Retrospect and Prospect." *Latin American Research Review* 30 (1995): 3.

Griffith, Ivelaw L. *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century*. Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2004.

Griffith, Ivelaw L. *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

Griffith, Ivelaw, Lloyd. *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States.* M.E. Sharpe, 1993.

Griffith, Ivelaw L. "The RSS – A Decade of Collective Security in the Caribbean."
Round Table 324, no. 1 (October 1992): 465.

Griffiths, Martin. *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2007.

Guerrant, Edward Owings. *Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1950.

Gunter, Micheal M. "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations: A Precedent for the Nation's Ministate Problem?" *The American Journal of International Law* 68 (July 1974): 496-501.

Gunter, Michael M. "What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?" *The American Journal of International Law* 71, no. 1 (January 1977): 110-124. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2200327.

Guttman, Jeannine. "United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs." *United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs* (July 17, 2008). http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/.

Hampton, Mark. "Offshore Finance Centres and Rapid Complex Constant Change- Working Paper 132." Kent Business School, Academia.edu. http://kent.academia.edu/MarkHampton/Papers/114902/Offshore_Finance_

Centres_and_Rapid_Complex_Constant_Change (accessed January 20, 2011).

Harbert, Joseph R. "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972." *International Organization* 30, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 109-127. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706250.

Harris, William L. "Microstates in the United Nations: A Broader Purpose." *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 9 (Spring 1970): 23.

Harden, Sheila, ed. *Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World: Report*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1985.

Heine, Jorge, ed. *A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990.

Henry, K. W. "Caribbean Security in 2005 Fact Or Fiction?" http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA495874&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed March 3, 2010).

Higgins, Rosalyn, United Nations and International Court of Justice. *The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Hira, Anil. "Latin America at Century's End: What Next?" *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 3 (June 2001): 457-462.

Hoadley, Stephen. "Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand and Australia: Towards a New Paradigm - Working Paper 20." Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/working_papers/wp20.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011).

Holm, Bill. *Eccentric Islands Travels Real and Imaginary*. Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions, 2000.

Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (September 1970): 233-309. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013584.

Horowitz, Irving Louis. "Review: Mythologizing Latin America/Demonizing the United States; Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of US-Latin American Relations; America/Americas: Myth in the Making of US Policy Toward Latin America; US-Latin American Policy: A Reference Handbook." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 163-175. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/166503.

Hudson, M. O. "The Members of the League of Nations." *British Yearbook of International Law* 16, (1935).

Hudson, Manley O. "Membership in the League of Nations." *The American Journal of International Law* 18, no. 3 (July 1924): 436-458. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2188357.

International Herald Tribune. (November 1, 1983).

Ishmael, Odeen. "Guyana's Western Border - Introduction to the Documents." http://www.guyana.org/Western/Introduction.html (accessed February 9, 2010).

Ishmael, Odeen. "The Trail of Diplomacy: Part 8 " http://www.guyana.org/features/trail_diplomacy_pt8.html (accessed January 18, 2011).

James, Alan. *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society*. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986.

Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. *Power and Interdependence*. 2nd ed. Illinois: Scott, Foresman, Brown Series in Political Science, 1989.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "Beyond the Cold War." *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 1 (1989): 1-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044284.

Kiste, Robert C. and R.A. Herr and Center for Asian and Pacific Studies. "The Potential for Soviet Penetration of the South Pacific Islands: An Assessment." (1984).

Klepak, Hal. "If it's Broke Don't Fix it: The Context for Practical Possibilities for Reform of the Inter-American Security Architecture." RESDAL - LASA 2004: Conference of the Latin American Studies Association. http://maria.webpg.net/experiencias/main-lasa-04.html (accessed February 26, 2009).

Knight, Andrew. "The Conduct of American Foreign Policy: Ronald Reagan's Watershed Year?" *Foreign Affairs*. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/37141/andrew-knight/the-conduct-of-american-foreign-policy-ronald-reagans-watershed- (accessed January 27, 2010).

Krenn, Michael L. *The Chains of Interdependence: U.S. Policy Toward Central America, 1945-1954*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.

Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Kuznets, Simon Smith. *Postwar Economic Growth: Four Lectures.* Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Kuznets, Simon Smith. *Six Lectures on Economic Growth*. Illinois: Free Press, 1959.

Langley, Lester D. *The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985.

Lapradelle, A. G. de and Ellery C. Stowell. "Latin America at the Hague Conference." *The Yale Law Journal* 17, no. 4 (February 1908): 270-280. http://www.jstor.org/stable/784436.

Lasswell, Harold Dwight and Abraham Kaplan. *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry*. Yale University Press, 1950.

League of Nations. "Report on the Second-Sub-Committee to the Fifth Committee." *Records of the First Assembly - Plenary Meetings* (1920): 563-564.

League of Nations, *The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary* Meetings (1920): 652, 667.

Lebow, Richard Ned. "Review: Small States and Big Alliances." *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 3 (September 1997): 705-709. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952086.

Leibenstein, Harvey. "Review: Six Lectures on Economic Growth." *The American Economic Review* 51, no. 1 (March 1961): 171-173. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1818935.

Lewis, Vaughn A. ed. *Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean*. Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1976.

Lewis, Gary P. "Prospects for Regional Security System in the Eastern Caribbean." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 15, no. 1 (1986): 73-90.

Lewis, Vaughn A. *Commentary on Basil Ince: "The Decolonization of Grenada in the United Nations"; in Independence for Grenada: Myth Or Reality? (Proceedings of a Conference on the Implications of Independence for Grenada.)* St. Augustine: Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, 1974.

Lloyd-Jones, Stewart. "Portugal's History since 1974." ISCTE – Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa (Lisbon). http://www1.ci.uc.pt/cd25a/media/Textos/portugal-since-1974.pdf (accessed December 15, 2010).

Lockhart, Douglas G., David Drakakis-Smith, and John Schembri, eds. *The Development Process in Small Island States*. New York: Routledge, 1993.

Lowenthal, Abraham F. "Rethinking US Interests in the Western Hemisphere." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 29, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 1-23. http://www.jstor.org/stable/165637.

Lowenthal, Abraham F. "The United States and Latin America: Ending the Hegemonic Presumption." *Foreign Affairs* 55, no. 1 (October 1976): 199-213. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20039635.

Lyon, Peter, ed. *Small States and the Commonwealth*. London: Buttersworth, 1985.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World*. Maryland: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003.

Maingot, Anthony P. and Wilredo Lozano. *The United States and the Caribbean: Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty*. Contemporary Inter-American Relations. New York: Routledge, 2005, http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0647/2004011023-d.html;

Maniruzzaman, Talukder. *The Security of Small States in the Third World*. Canberra, Australia: The Australian National University, 1982.

Matz, John D. "Counter Point and Concatenation in the Caribbean: The Substance and Style of Foreign Policy." *Latin American Research Review* 21, no. 1 (1986): 161-172. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2503507.

McElroy, Jerome L. "Small Island Tourist Economies Across the Life Cycle." *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 471, no. 1 (April 2006): 61-77.

McElroy, Jerome L. and Klaus de Albuquerque. "Migration Transition in Small Northern and Eastern Caribbean States." *International Migration Review* 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 30-58. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2546584.

Melia, Mike. "Caribbean Crime Wave Linked to US Deportations - Americas, World - the Independent" http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/caribbean-crime-wave-linked-to-us-deportations-2089388.html (accessed April 18, 2011).

Merrill, Tim. "Belize - Decolonization and the Border Dispute with Guatemala." Library of Congress Federal Research Division. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+bz0024) (accessed January 19, 2011).

Meyer, Peter J. "Fifth Summit of the Americas, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, April 2009: Background, Agenda and Expectations." http://www.dtic.mil.rlproxy.upei.ca/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494440&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed January 27, 2010).

Miller, Eric. "Coast Guard is a Partner in Caribbean Security." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 125, no. 1 (December 1999): 58.

Millett, Richard and W. Marvin Will. *The Restless Caribbean: Changing Patterns of International Relations*. New York: Praeger, 1979.

Milne, David and Godfrey Baldacchino, ed. *Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Track Record of very Small, Insular Economies.* Lessons from the Edge, Forthcoming.

Milner, Helen V. "International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability." *Foreign Policy* no. 110 (Spring 1998): 112-123. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149280.

Mitchell, Colin L. "Countering Maritime Terrorism in the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean: Implications of Possible Maritime Terrorism in the Caribbean." http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:kBHWXXnjt-YJ:scholar.google.com/&hl=en&as_sdt=2000 (accessed February 27, 2010).

Mittelman, James H. "Collective Decolonisation and the U.N. Committee of 24." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, no. 1 (March 1976): 41-64. http://www.jstor.org/stable/159647.

Moore, Oliver. "Grenadian Revolutionaries Get a Chance at Freedom." *The Globe and Mail.* 16 February 2007, sec. A.

Morrill, Dan L. "Nicholas II and the Call for the First Hague Conference." *The Journal of Modern History* 46, no. 2 (June 1974): 296-313. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1877523.

Nye, Joseph S. *Understanding International Conflicts an Introduction to Theory and History.* Ontario: Addison-Wesley, 2004.

Office of the Spokesman. "U.S.-Caribbean Technical Meeting on Security Cooperation." http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123543.htm (accessed January 31, 2010).

Ogilvie, Jaimie S. A. "Exploring the Future of the Security in the Caribbean: A Regional Security Partnership?" http://www.dtic.mil.rlproxy.upei.ca/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA475515&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed January 27, 2010).

Oyos, Matthew M. "Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War." *The Journal of Military History* 60, no. 4 (October 1996): 631-655. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944659.

Pace, Roderick. *Microstate Security in the Global System: EU-Malta Relations*. Malta: Midsea Books, 2001.

Parker, Jason C. *Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Pathania, Jyoti M. "South Asia Analysis Group: Bangladesh: Non-Traditional Security." http://www.southasiaanalysis.org//papers8/paper751.html (accessed July 8, 2010).

Payne, A., ed. *Economic Issues*. Development and Security in Small States. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987.

Payne, Anthony and Paul Sutton. "Repositioning the Caribbean within Globalisation." Centre for International Governance Innovation. http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2007/6/repositioning-caribbean-within-globalistion (accessed February 17, 2010).

Payne, Anthony. *Grenada Revolution and Invasion.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.

Payne, Anthony. *The International Crisis in the Caribbean.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Payne, Anthony ed. *Key Debates in New Political Economy.* New York: Routledge, 2006.

Payne, Anthony. *The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79: Regional Integration among New States*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980.

Payne, Anthony. "Rethinking United States-Caribbean Relations: Towards a New Mode of Trans-Territorial Governance." *Review of International Studies* 26, no. 1 (January 2000): 69-82. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/20097656.

Payne, Anthony. "US Hegemony and the Reconfiguration of the Caribbean." *Review of International Studies* 20, no. 2 (April 1994): 149-168. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/20097365.

Payne, Anthony J. "The Belize Triangle: Relations with Britain, Guatemala and the United States." *Journal of Interamerican Studies & World Affairs* 32, no. 1 (Spring, 1990): 119. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9702025418&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live.

Payne, Anthony, and Paul K. Sutton. *Modern Caribbean Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Payne, Anthony and Paul Sutton, eds. *Dependency Under Challenge: The Political Economy of the Commonwealth Caribbean*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.

Pearce, Jenny and Richard Gott. *Under the Eagle: U. S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean*. London: Latin American Bureau, 1982.

Perkins, Dexter. *The United States and the Caribbean*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.

Perry, William and Max Primorac. "The Inter-American Security Agenda." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 111-127. http://www.jstor.org/stable/166529.

Phillips, Dion E. “Terrorism and Security in the Caribbean Before and After 9/11.” *Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace, Economics and Development* 8, (September 2002), 97-138.

Pirtle, Charles E. "Review: Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options; Mini-Nations and Macro-Cooperation: The Caribbean and the South Pacific." *The American Political Science Review* 73, no. 1 (March 1979): 350-351. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1954875.

Plischke, Elmer. *Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977.

Pollard, Duke E. E., JCCJ. "International Law: The Protection of Small States." http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/speeches/pollard/03-Intl (accessed January 20, 2011).

Preiswerk, Roy. "The Relevance of Latin America to the Foreign Policy of Commonwealth Caribbean States." *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 11, no. 2 (April 1969): 245-271. http://www.jstor.org/stable/165370.

Premdas, Ralph. "Self-Determination and Decentralization in the Caribbean: Tobago and Nevis." http://www.cavehill.uwi.edu/bnccde/sk&n/conference/papers/RRPremdas.html (accessed February 6, 2007).

Pryor, Frederic L. "Review: Grenada: Revolution and Invasion; Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Internal Crisis and U. S. /OECD Intervention." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 492 (July 1987): 208-209, http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/1045304.

Pryor, Frederic L. *Revolutionary Grenada: A Study in Political Economy.* New York: Praeger, 1986.

Quester, George H. "Trouble in the Islands: Defending the Micro-States." *International Security* 8, no. 2 (Autumn 1983): 160-175. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538600.

Ramdin, Albert R. ""“Homeland Security, Terrorism, and the Caribbean" Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, 2007 Annual Legislative Conference." http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:YD33KWp_YfwJ:www.der.oas.org/Congress/270907%2520Congress%2520on%2520Security%2520single.doc+Organization+of+American+States+role+in+in+Caribbean+and+United+states+security&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca (accessed March 3, 2010).

Rao, P. C. "Microstates and the United Nations." *Indian and Foreign Review* 5 (November 15, 1967).

Rapkin, David P. *World Leadership and Hegemony*. International Political Economy Yearbook: Volume 5. Colorado: L. Rienner, 1990.

Rapoport, Jacques, Ernest Muteba, Joseph J. Therattil, and United Nations Institute for Training and Research. *Small States & Territories: Status and Problems*. New York: Arno Press, 1971.

Rasmussen, Tobias N. "Macroeconomic Implications of Natural Disasters in the Caribbean." IMF Working Paper. http://www-bcc.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04224.pdf (accessed February 25, 2010).

Reid, George. "A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policies of Very Small States with Special Reference to the Commonwealth Caribbean." 1971.

Reid, Orville. "Minefields in the Caribbean: A Region Vectored to Becoming Failed States." http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA475602&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed February 26, 2010).

Robinson, A. N. R. *The West Indies Beyond 1992*. Grenada, 1989.

Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge and García Muñíz Humberto. *Security Problems and Policies in the Post-Cold War Caribbean*. International Political Economy Series. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. and Samuel I. Rosenman. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*. New York: Random House, 1938.

Rosenau, James N. "Hurricanes are Not the Only Intruders: The Caribbean in an Era of Global Turbulence." In *From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment*, edited by Michael C. Desch, Jorge I. Domínguez and Andrés Serbín. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.

Rosenau, James N. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Rothstein, Robert L. *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.

Rothstein, Robert L. *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations.* University of South Carolina Press, 1991.

Rothstein, Robert L. *The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Royle, Stephen A. *A Geography of Islands: Small Island Insularity*. New York: Routledge, 2001.

Rusett, Alan de. "Review: [Untitled]." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of* International Affairs 1944-) 36, no. 3 (July, 1960): 358-359. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2610034.

Rushe, Dominic. "Wal-Mart's Political Banana Skin." Times Online. http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/article861307.ece (accessed February 25, 2010).

Russell, Bertrand. *Power: A New Social Analysis.* Norton, 1969.

Safire, William and William Safire. *Safire's Political Dictionary*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Schaffer, Bernard. "The Politics of Dependence." In *Development Policy in Small Countries*, edited by Percy Selwyn. London: Croom Helm in association with the Institute of Development Studies, 1975.

Schoenrich, Otto. "The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute." *The American Journal of International Law* 43, no. 3 (July 1949): 523-530. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2193650.

Schwebel, Stephen M. "Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations." *The American Journal of International Law* 67, no. 1 (January 1973): 108-116. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2199098.

Scott, A. M. *The Functioning of the International System*. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

Selwyn, Percy. "Smallness and Islandness." *World Development* 8, no. 12 (December 1980): 945-951.

Selwyn, Percy and University of Sussex. *Development Policy in Small Countries*. London: Croom Helm in association with the Institute of Development Studies, 1975.

Simi T. B. and Atul Kaushik. "The Banana War at the GATT/WTO." CUTS Centre for International Trade, Economics & Environment. http://www.cuts-citee.org/pdf/TLB08-01.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011).

Simmons, David A. "Militarization of the Caribbean: Concerns for National and Regional Security." *International Journal* 40, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 348-376. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40202263.

Simpson, Jeffrey. "Canada's Importance Fades, Going from G8 to G20." *The Globe and Mail.* http://www.theglobeandmail.com.rlproxy.upei.ca/news/opinions/canadas-importance-fades-going-from-g8-to-g20/article1420033/ (accessed February 4, 2010).

Singer, J. David and Melvin Small. "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815-1940." *World Politics* 18, no. 2 (January 1966): 236-282. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009697.

Smith, Robert Freeman. *The Caribbean World and the United States: Mixing Rum and Coca-Cola*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994.

Smith, Robert Freeman. *The United States and the Latin American Sphere of Influence*. Florida: Krieger Pub. Co., 1981.

Snyder, Jack. "One World, Rival Theories." *Foreign Policy* no. 145 (November - December 2004): 53-62. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4152944.

Soderlund, W. C. *Media Definitions of Cold War Reality*. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2001. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/upei/Doc?id=10220526.

Sorensen, Theodore C. "America's First Post-Cold War President." *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 13-30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045307.

Stoessinger, John George. *Why Nations Go to War*. California: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2005.

Strang, David. "From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of Decolonization 1870-1987." *American Sociological Review* 55, no. 6 (December 1990): 846-860. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2095750.

Strang, David. "Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500-1987." *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (December 1991): 429-454. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2600949.

Strange, Susan. "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony." *International Organization* 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987): 551-574. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2706758.

Streeten, Paul. "The Special Problems of Small Countries." *World Development* 21, no. 2 (February 1993): 197-202.

Sullivan, Mark P. "Caribbean Region: Issues in U.S. Relations: CRS Report for Congress 2005." http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:xFGk3krs8qoJ:www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_rl32160_25may05.pdf+US+and+Caribbean+relations&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=ca&client=firefox-a (accessed February 3, 2009).

Sutton, Paul. "Review: Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America." *International Affairs* 64, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 162-163. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2621578.

Sutton, Paul K. *Europe and the Caribbean*. London: Macmillan Caribbean, 1991.

Sutton, Paul K. and Anthony Payne. *Size and Survival: The Politics of Security in the Caribbean and the Pacific*. London: Frank Cass, 1993.

Sutton, Paul and Anthony Payne. "Lilliput Under Threat: The Security Problems of Small Island and Enclave Developing States." *Political Studies* 41, no. 4 (December 1993): 579-593. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9501183528&loginpage=Login.asp&site=ehost-live.

Taylor, Charles. "Statistical Typology of Micro- States and Territories: Towards a Definition of a Micro-State." *United Nations Institute for Training and Research: Small States and Territories: Status and Problems* (1971).

Taylor, Peter J. and Gerard Kearns. *Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis*. New York: Halsted Press, 1993.

The United Nations. "About the Group of 77." http://www.g77.org/doc/ (accessed April 13, 2010).

Thomson, Robert. "Review: The Caribbean After Grenada." *International Journal* 40, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 377-386. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/40202264.

Thorndike, Tony. *Grenada: Politics, Economics, and Society*. Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers, 1985.

Tulchin, Joseph S. and Ralph H. Espach. *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*. Woodrow Wilson Center Current Studies on Latin America. Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers, 2000.

U.S. Department of State - Bureau of African Affairs. "Background Note: Sao Tome and Principe." http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5434.htm (accessed December 15, 2010).

U.S. Department of State - Bureau of Public Affairs. "Caribbean Basin Security Initiative" http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/May/20100524122040ihecuor0.2683331.html (accessed October 5, 2010).

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Sustainable Development. "DSD: Areas of Work: SIDS Members." http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_sids/sids_members.shtml (accessed April 13, 2010).

United Nations. *An Introduction to the Annual Report to the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization.* General Assembly Official Records (22nd Session). New York, 1967.

United Nations. "Cyprus." *Demographic Yearbook - Statistics Division* no. 12 (1960): 138-139.

United Nations Institute for Training and Research and Jacques Rapoport. *Status and Problems of very Small States and Territories.* New York: 1969.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "Caribbean Drug Trends: 2001-2002." http://www.unodc.org/pdf/barbados/caribbean_drug-trends_2001-2002.pdf (accessed January 26, 2011).

United Nations Weekly News Summary. (2 November 1983).

United States General Accounting Office. "Drug Control: 1997 Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific - Report to Congressional Requesters." http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98030.pdf (accessed March 3, 2010).

United States General Accounting Office. "Drug Control: Status of U.S. International Counternarcotics Activities." Statement for the Record by Benjamin F. Nelson. Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice. http://www.druglibrary.org/Schaffer/GOVPUBS/gao/pdf5.pdf (accessed March 3, 2010).

U.S. – The White House- Office of the Press Secretary. "Clinton-Chirac Press Conference on Kosovo." http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/clintchi.htm (accessed January 20, 2011).

US Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. "US International Narcotics Strategy Report 2008." http://www.state.gov.rlproxy.upei.ca/documents/organization/100890.pdf (accessed April 18, 2011).

US Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. "US International Narcotics Strategy Report 2009." http://www.state.gov.rlproxy.upei.ca/documents/organization/120054.pdf (accessed April 18, 2011).

US Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. "US International Narcotics Strategy Report 2010." http://www.state.gov.rlproxy.upei.ca/documents/organization/138548.pdf (accessed April 18, 2011).

US Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. "US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2011". http://www.state.gov.rlproxy.upei.ca/documents/organization/156575.pdf (accessed April 18, 2011).

Vandenbosch, Amry. "The Small States in International Politics and Organization." *The Journal of Politics* 26, no. 2 (May 1964): 293-312. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/2127598.

Vital, David. *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations*. Clarendon Press: 1967.

Vital, David. *The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power / Great Power Conflict*. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Vojvodich, Joseph M. "Building an Effective Maritime Neighborhood Watch in the Caribbean." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 130, (March 2004): 68-69.

Waddell, Eric, Vijay Naidu, and Epeli Hau`ofa, ed. *Rediscovering our Sea of Islands*. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1993.

Waltz, Kenneth Neal. *Theory of International Politics*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979.

Watson, A. Hilbourne. "Caribbean Integration Under Global Neo-Liberalism: Selected Issues in the West Indian Commission Report." *21st Century Policy Review* 2, no. 1-2 (1994).

Weale, David. "Islandness." *Island Journal* 8, (1991): 82-82.

Weiss, Thomas George and James G. Blight. *The Suffering Grass: Superpowers and Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean*. Emerging Global Issues. Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers, 1992.

Whitaker, Urban. "Mini-Membership for Mini-States." *War/Peace Report* 7 (April 1967).

Whittlesey, Derwent. "Andorra's Autonomy." *The Journal of Modern History* 6, no. 2 (June 1934): 147-155. http://www.jstor.org.rlproxy.upei.ca/stable/1875140.

Wilgus, A. Curtis and University of Florida. *The Caribbean: Current United States Relations*. The Caribbean Conference Series. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1966.

Williams, Lloyd. “The Shiprider Agreement: No Smooth Sailing.” *Jamaica Gleaner.* 8 February 2004. http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040208/cleisure/cleisure2.html (accessed March 4, 2010).

Williams, Gary. *US-Grenada Relations: Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Williams, Michelle. "Caribbean Shiprider Agreements: Sunk by Banana Trade War?" *The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 31, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 163-195. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40166420.

Wionczek, Miguel. *Latin American Economic Integration: Experiences and Prospects*. Praeger Series on International Economics and Development. New York: Praeger, 1966.

Wolfe, Tom. "The Doctrine that Never Died." *The New York Times Online.* 30 January 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/30/opinion/30wolfe.html (accessed August 18, 2010).

Wright, Q. *Mandates Under the League of Nations*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1930.

Young, Alma H. *Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986.

Young, George B. "Intervention Under the Monroe Doctrine: The Olney Corollary." *Political Science Quarterly* 57, no. 2 (June 1942): 247-280. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2143553.

Zakaria, Fareed. "Writing the Rules for a New World.” *Newsweek*. http://www.newsweek.com/2008/12/30/writing-the-rules-for-a-new-world.html (accessed January 23, 2011).

Zartmann, I. W. "Negotiating from Asymmetry: The North-South Stalemate." *Negotiation Journal* 1, no. 2 (1985): 121-138. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1985.tb00301.x.